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On 21 August 1974 the Australian Government under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam 
(1972-1975) announced a royal commission into the intelligence and security apparatus 
of the Australian Government. The Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security 
(‘the Royal Commission’) would begin a long process of reform resulting in the 
Australian intelligence community that operates in the present time. The government’s 
terms of reference were broad but directed at producing practical outcomes that ensured 
the continuance of a domestic intelligence agency. The commissioner, Justice Robert 
Marsden Hope of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, delivered eight reports 
between 1975 and 1977. While exploring the origins of the Royal Commission this 
thesis will focus on one organisation in particular, the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO). 
 
The Whitlam Government wanted to depoliticise ASIO and increase the efficacy of the 
intelligence apparatus more generally. Soon after it came to office in December 1972 
the government had become embroiled in controversy over its relationship with ASIO. 
This was not surprising given Labor had been in opposition since 1949, in part the result 
of the Coalition’s access to ASIO during the 1950s and 1960s. However, this distrust of 
the organisation tended toward conspiracy by the 1970s even amongst senior figures 
within Labor who supported its primary objective. As a result, the first months of the 
new government quickly unearthed significant tensions between government and 
agency, exposing the relationship to public gaze. Until the 1974 election the 
government discreetly went about reforming ASIO. The Royal Commission became 
Labor policy in September 1973 and formed part of its election policy platform taken to 
the 1974 election. By that stage the ASIO issue had become a minor one politically. 
 2 
However, within weeks of the Whitlam Government returning to office this issue gained 
prominence after ASIO documents discrediting the new Deputy Prime Minister, Jim 
Cairns, were made public. The government thus moved swiftly to erect the Royal 
Commission, capitalising on the moment. 
 
It has often been stated and implied that Labor under Whitlam was radical, inspired by 
socialism and a threat to the establishment and the political and economic status quo.1 It 
is submitted that this popular perspective is inaccurate, especially since Whitlam had 
denounced socialism and tried to shift Labor’s image towards the so-called ‘centre’.2 
With regard to intelligence and security, the radicalism of the Whitlam government did 
not extend to ASIO. It did not wish to abolish the organisation but merely improve its 
efficacy at the dawn of a new age, one of global terrorism. This was so before the 1972 
election and became even clearer in early 1973. In September 1972 Australia was 
exposed to political violence in Sydney not long after the violence of the Summer 
Olympics in Munich. Labor saw this occurrence as evidence of ASIO’s ideological 
partiality toward conservatism. While the election campaign of 1972 was preoccupied 
with other issues one of the first acts of the new government was to support the United 
States of America in its attempts to address global terrorism. 
 
In order to understand the significance of the Whitlam Government’s actions it is 
necessary to know the historical context in which the decision to establish the Royal 
Commission was made. This thesis will show that the government’s decision was at 
odds with Labor’s experience of ASIO shortly after its creation. However, the decision 
to reform – not abolish – ASIO was not at odds with the party’s history as an 
                                               
1 e.g. Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 17, 21 October 2014, 11517-11550.; 
Cth, Parliamentary Debates, Australian Senate vol. 14, 27 October 2014, 7757-7829. 
2 David Kemp, “A Leader and a Philosophy” in Labor to Power: Australia’s 1972 election, edited by 
Henry Mayer (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1973), 48, 53. 
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establishment party or ‘party of government’. ASIO was created by the Chifley Labor 
Government (1945-1949) in 1949 because of the pressure placed on it by two foreign 
powers, the United States and the United Kingdom. It was clear that the Australian 
Government’s processes were compromised by another foreign power, the Soviet Union. 
The United States at that time was on the cusp of realising the seriousness of the post-
war conflict which became known as the Cold War. The government, as a recipient of 
United States intelligence and secrets, was at the mercy of its foreign friend. On the 
issue of communism Labor was less animated than the Coalition, but it perceived a 
threat nonetheless and engaged in numerous efforts to undermine the Communist Party 
of Australia. Labor’s opposition to numerous attempts by Coalition governments to 
outlaw the Communist Party was predominantly based on pragmatic considerations, not 
philosophical differences. When Labor finally abandoned its extreme anti-communism 
in the 1950s its political enemies within and without the Parliament pounced. Although 
the split of 1955 was largely the fault of a willful leader it did not occur in a vacuum. 
The combined actions and omissions of the second Menzies Government (1949-1966), 
many politically active Catholics, and ASIO certainly facilitated a mutual benefit. 
 
Within months of ASIO’s creation senior officers came to see the organisation as not 
just the defender of the Commonwealth but the defender of democracy and capitalism 
too. This was understandable given the depth of understanding commonly possessed on 
these ideas even amongst the most privileged members of society. There was a fine line 
to be drawn between defending the Australian Government and defending philosophical 
ideas. If one objective ever came into conflict with the other a choice would have had to 
be made. ASIO escaped this dilemma by perceiving the institutions of government and 
democracy-capitalism as one. Of course, ASIO was actually created to defend the 
Commonwealth of Australia; the institutions of government. It will be demonstrated 
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that this confused world view made the organisation partisan as the Coalition shared its 
central belief; anti-communism. It will also be shown that ASIO inherited this confused 
view from the domestic intelligence organisations that preceded it. Despite this history 
the Whitlam Government and – to a lesser extent – Labor sought to reform ASIO. The 
Royal Commission did not consider this history in an exhaustive or even comprehensive 
way, despite its terms of reference, although decades later Hope stated that the 
organisation he had found was ideologically partisan. 
 
By the time Hope made his recommendations the Whitlam Government had been 
dismissed from office and the Fraser Government (1975-1983) had come to power. The 
Whitlam Government undertook many changes of ASIO but the Royal Commission 
was used by the Fraser Government to continue the reform process. Labor was therefore 
successful in its depoliticising ASIO and bringing about the beginnings of a lasting 
bipartisan consensus. Given the significance of the Royal Commission to Australian 
society today, some forty years later, it is important that its origins be considered. 
 
At the outset it is important to note that logic, in the absence of evidence, can often 
mislead people. In order to obtain greater understanding and accuracy it is important 
that scholarship is driven by empirical research.3 This thesis is conscious of the damage 
conspiracy, ideology, and partisan fanaticism have rendered to what was a significant 
moment in Australian history. The fact that the Royal Commission came into being so 
close to one of the most contentious moments of Australian constitution history – the 
Whitlam dismissal of 1975 – only exacerbates the damage caused by these three 
influences. This thesis is an attempt to offer a version of the origins of the Royal 
Commission that is based on a reasonable interpretation of the evidence consulted. 
                                               





This thesis began as an undergraduate research essay in 2015. Since that time it has 
changed considerably with respect to its breadth, focus, and argument. This chapter will 
briefly set out the methodology employed in conducting the research and writing of this 
thesis. It will also discuss the limitations of the work and the sources consulted.  
 
In order to address the question of the origins of the Royal Commission, the author has 
worked backwards from the fourth report to trace major influences on the Whitlam 
Government. The thesis is divided into four parts: Methodology and secondary source 
overview, the history of ASIO before Hope, the decision to reform, and reforming 
ASIO. The first two parts of the thesis provide context necessary to understand the 
importance of the last two parts. Primary source research efforts have predominately 
focused on the third part of the thesis, which discusses the immediate origins of the 
Royal Commission. Primary sources, as well as some secondary sources, are quoted at 
length in order to avoid distortion of the evidence. If the author were to describe the 
evidence without quotation there would be an acute risk that the intended meaning of 
the original author would be compromised. Of course, quotations cannot be over used as 
this work would become a compilation instead of a thesis. Quotations are therefore used 
when the meaning of a passage cannot fairly be summarised or described without it 
being undermined. The use of extensive quotations is consistent with various scholars in 
the humanities who present evidence with coincidental discussion based on that 
evidence.4 
 
                                               
4 e.g. Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Penguin, 2003).; Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: 
A critical (re)introduction to International Relations (Boulder: Rienner, 1994); Peter Paret ed., Makers of 
Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the nuclear age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); 
Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992); David Horner, The Spy 
Catchers, vol. 1 of The Official History of ASIO, ed. David Horner (Sydney: Allen & Unwin: 2014). 
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The Official History of ASIO provides scholars with a wealth of primary source 
material. The present thesis utilises this extensive research. However, it must be noted 
that the author interprets some of this evidence differently from the authors. This thesis 
also consults many major contemporary Australian newspapers, especially since they 
provide a useful timeline of events – a day-by-day political journal– that can be used to 
chart how issues developed and rhetoric morphed, as well as the information being 
exchanged. Unlike online newspapers, where content and headings are routinely 
‘updated’, there is no risk content on microfilm has been similarly treated. Therefore, 
there is a greater capacity for holding “historical amnesia” or “doublethink” to account.5 
By combing contemporary newspapers one can go a considerable way in understanding 
the zeitgeist of the time. Reflected in a newspaper’s pages are the topics that occupied 
political discussion of the day, as well as advertisements, photographs and satirical 
cartoons, all of which give a sense of time and place that are lost in solitary articles or 
official documents. This thesis has drawn on the latest edition of the Companion to the 
Australian Media to gain greater insight into the internal workings of these newspapers 
in the 1970s. Where it has been hard to ascertain the political persuasions  of a 
newspaper or periodical, the author has elected to let the opinion speak for itself. 
 
The limitations associated with this thesis can predominately be attributed to time and 
word count restrictions. A more complete work would include consideration of the time 
since Hope handed down his reports in order to ascertain the extent of bipartisan 
agreement that was reached between Labor and Coalition parties. There is substantial 
scholarship about ASIO as it existed from the 1980s onwards that has not been 
comprehensively consulted. As such the significance of the Royal Commission is 
assumed, not established. This thesis does not touch on Hope’s later contributions, 
                                               
5 Noam Chomsky, Power Systems (London: Penguin Books, 2013), 97; George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-
Four (London: Penguin Books, 2011), 39-40. 
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namely the Protective Security Review and the Royal Commission into Australia’s 
Security and Intelligence Agencies. There is also an extensive debate on the 
compatibility of intelligence agencies and democracy, which was deliberately excluded 
given its breadth. Similarly, discussion on the legitimacy of political violence, power 
systems, the rule of law, and the executive are not touched on. For example, there is a 
strong argument that the definitions of global or international terrorism and domestic 
terrorism pertain to whatever violence certain states do not sanction.6 Indeed, if political 
violence were genuinely seen as being illegitimate there could never be a just war 
fought in pursuit of Australia’s national interest. Finally, the thesis could have 
considered contemporary perspectives beyond those mentioned by the press, especially 
with respect to the labour movement and within the parties of government and minor 
parties as well. It is submitted that the inclusion of such perspectives would improve our 
understanding of the level of dissent surrounding ASIO but ultimately detract from 
more important elements of the argument. These limitations were factored into the 
decision to adopt a narrower scope focusing on the origins of the Royal Commission. It 
should also be noted that the Royal Commission’s fourth report is inconsistent and 
unclear in parts. To avoid this the author has attempted to narrow the interpretation so 
that specific statements constrain general ones.  
 
With regard to the choice between ‘public service’ or ‘bureaucracy’, the latter will be 
used without invoking the negative connotations it now attracts. Etymologically, ‘public 
service’ implies subservience to citizenry and is therefore propagandistic. Conversely, 
‘bureaucracy’ is more objective; ‘bureau’ evokes the imagery of a writing desk while 
the suffix ‘-cracy’ means ‘power’ or ‘rule’. Lastly, the terms ‘royal commission’, 
                                               
6 Noam Chomsky, Failed States: The abuse of power and the assault on democracy (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 2006), 35-36, 109; Antiterrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. s 2331 (1990). 
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‘judicial inquiry’ and ‘inquiry’ have subtle differences in meaning.7 This thesis assumes 
‘royal commission’ and ‘judicial inquiry’ have the same meaning, as the distinction is 
often overlooked in primary sources. The term ‘Coalition’ is used to describe the 
conservative parties of government, especially the Liberal Party of Australia. It was 
decided that reference to the parties that preceded the Liberal Party was needlessly 
confusing, especially since – as Robert Menzies political career demonstrates – the 
parties were closely related. 
 
  
                                               





I. The Creation of ASIO 
 
In order to understand why the Royal Commission came into existence one must have 
an understanding of the history of ASIO. It is only with this context that we can 
appreciate not only the significance of the decision made by the Whitlam Government 
but also the effort it made to preserve the organisation. In light of the following 
discussion it will become clear that the Whitlam Government’s decision to reform and 
entrench ASIO is at odds with a long history of partisanship between domestic 
intelligence agencies and the Coalition and the detriment that Labor suffered at the 
hands of this partisanship. However, it will also be clear that this decision was not only 
seen through pragmatic eyes but a firm belief within Labor in the legitimacy of 
domestic intelligence work and anti-communism.  To this end, this part of the thesis 
will explore the history of ASIO from its creation until the appointment of the Whitlam 
Government. This chapter will explore the reasons why ASIO was created in 1949 from 
the first domestic intelligence agencies to the importance of the Australian-American 
relationship to the government. It was the Chifley Labor Government (1945-1949) that 
was responsible for creating ASIO in 1949. Although it was reluctant to do so, it valued 
Australia’s relationships with the United States and United Kingdom and did not want 
to jeopardise intelligence flows. However, despite Labor softening its anti-communism 
in 1951, the relationship between ASIO and Labor became fraught with difficulty. 
Under the Menzies Government (1949-1966), a relationship of convenience arose 
between government and agency because of a shared anti-communism. ASIO’s anti-
radical obsession can be traced back to earlier domestic intelligence organisations in 
Australia. ASIO emerged from this environment with close connections to military 
intelligence.  
 10 
Pre-ASIO domestic intelligence organisations (1916-1949) 
 
When ASIO emerged in 1949 it was the first time that one dominant domestic 
intelligence organisation took root. Until that time the Australian intelligence 
community was comparatively unsettled and prone to infighting. Throughout this time 
the dominant concern of these agencies was the threat of subversion, particularly that 
posed by radicals. While the Official History discusses these earlier organisations at 
length it fails to discuss the true nature of these organisations and the continuity with 
ASIO. 
 
From 1916 Australia’s domestic intelligence agency was the Special Intelligence 
Bureau (SIB), which was a “branch of the Imperial Counter Espionage Bureau”.8 
During the First World War the SIB had been involved – along with Military 
intelligence – in the government’s pursuit of radicals. 9   However, the Hughes 
Government (1916-1923) – after a protestor’s egg made contact with the prime minister 
– became conscious of the lack of enforcement behind the executive’s intelligence 
apparatus.10 So, in 1917 the Commonwealth Police was established.11 By 1919, SIB had 
been placed within the Attorney-General’s Department and had become known as the 
Investigation Branch. This Branch ultimately became the Commonwealth Investigation 
Branch and Security Section (CIB).12 Through it all Major Harold Jones – a former head 
of military intelligence – functioned in the upper levels of these organisations before 
becoming its director in 1919. Jones – much like the future director of ASIO, Brigadier 
Charles Spry, in later decades – held his directorship for a long period of time until his 
                                               
8 David Horner, The Spy Catchers, vol. 1 of The Official History of ASIO (Sydney: Allen & Unwin: 
2014), 14; Raymond Evans, The Red Flag Riots; A study in intolerance (Brisbane: University of 
Queensland Press, 1988), 23. 
9 Evans, The Red Flag, 23. 
10 Ibid., 24. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Horner, The Spy Catchers, 16; Jacqueline Templeton, “Jones, Harold Edward (1878-1965),” Australian 
Dictionary of Biography, vol. 9, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/jones-harold-edward-6873. 
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retirement in 1944.13 In 1947 CIB was turned into the Commonwealth Investigation 
Service (CIS).14 The legal ambits of these early organisations were not clearly defined 
and their jurisdictions often overlapped. During the Second World War CIB’s role of 
ensuring “internal security” of Australia was superseded by the Commonwealth 
Security Service (CSS), although up until his retirement Jones continued to resist CIB 
cooperation with this new organisation.15 CSS was disbanded after the war – against the 
wishes of the United Kingdom’s Military Intelligence Section 5 (MI5) – and its powers 
restored to CIB.16 Beyond these intelligence agencies there was a military intelligence 
agency that existed under a number of titles. The Australian Intelligence Corps operated 
until 1914 before being replaced by MO3.17 In 1916 the corps became the Directorate of 
Military Intelligence.18 Part of its operations during the First World War included 
monitoring “the hot bed of disloyalty” being displayed towards the government’s war 
effort.19 This extended to hostility towards commerce, as one agent observed of a trades 
hall meeting: All are united in the desire to sweep away the moneyed class. 20 Fatefully, 
in the 1940s Military Intelligence “expanded its activities” so as to monitor “subversion 
and possible espionage in the general community”.21  
 
These pre-ASIO intelligence organisations were influenced by the political persuasions  
of the officials within them and the governments that administered them. The first 
volume of the Official History addresses this period of time at length. Horner cites the 
work of historian Jacqueline Templeton who was commissioned to write the seventh 
                                               
13 Horner, The Spy Catchers, 14, 16, 601. 
14 Ibid., 42. 
15 Templeton, “Jones.”; Horner, The Spy Catchers, 20. 
16 Horner, The Spy Catchers, 27, 37. 




19 Evans, The Red Flag, 22. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Templeton, “Jones”.; Horner, The Spy Catchers, 17. 
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report of the Royal Commission, Australian Intelligence/Security Services 1900-1950. 
Quoting her work he writes: 
The historian consultant… found little to suggest that the CIB was an effective 
counterespionage organisation, and claimed that Military Intelligence 
‘ultimately gained the ascendancy in the counter-espionage field’. She 
concluded that ‘Australia entered World War II ill-equipped for security and 
intelligence work’.22 
Templeton’s conclusions seemingly fashion an appropriate context from which ASIO 
could emerge triumphant; a stabilising force after years of organisational turmoil. 
However, what Horner fails to disclose about Templeton’s work is the revelation that 
the pre-ASIO intelligence community that was suffering from political partiality. 
Templeton reveals that CIB were sympathetic to Benito Mussolini’s fascist government 
in Italy; actively supporting their propagandistic publications in Australia, as well as the 
complete suppression of opposition – socialist, anarchist, communist – publications.23 
For example, Jones approved the publication of a propagandistic Italian newspaper that 
he described as “subversive” after the government had declared war with Nazi Germany 
and sought economic sanctions on Italy, but before the Pact of Steel and declaration of 
war with the Italian Empire in 1940.24 In the case of Nazi Germany Templeton wrote 
that of the records she could find, it was evident that Nazi newspapers were approved 
for publication up to and possibly past the declaration of war on 3 September 1939.25  
This contributed to the pre-war entrenchment of axis intelligence in Australia. As Hope 
later noted, the Committee of Review into Civil Staffing and Wartime Activities 
reported in 1945: 
                                               
22 Horner, The Spy Catchers, 18. 
23 Jacqueline Templeton, Australian Intelligence/Security Services 1900-1950, vol. 7 of Royal 
Commission on Intelligence and Security (1976-1977). NAA: A8908 7A-7B, Canberra, 118-122. 
24 Templeton, Australian Intelligence, 120; Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 
44, 1935, 1206-1212. 
25 Templeton, Australian Intelligence, 118-119. 
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There were in peacetime a not inconsiderable body of enemy espionage agents, 
German, Japanese and Italian, in this country.26  
Of course, once the threat of Nazis and Italian fascists was taken seriously the was 
widespread internment of immigrants.27 CIB’s commitment to open political discourse 
– and therefore democracy – in Australia must be seriously questioned, not just its 
ineffectual operations. 
 
The government of the day had the power to direct each agency as to their focus. 
Templeton argues that fascist sympathy extended to the governments of that period; 
“[i]t is evident… that advice of the CIB tended at times to be accepted or rejected 
according to the predilections of the government of the day”.28 Horner does not draw 
this conclusion although he provides ample evidence of it. According to the Official 
History “[t]he most pressing security concern in the first months of the war was the 
activities of the [Communist Party]”. 29 This was so because of the Party’s anti-war 
stance, even though it only had some 4000 members in 1939.30 Horner also infers that it 
was the conservative Bruce Government (1923-1929) and its Attorney-General John 
Latham – later one of the longest serving chief justices of the High Court of Australia – 
who had effectively shifted CIB’s focus to “the communist threat”.31 While Horner does 
not explore this he does argue that in 1939 Attorney-General Billy Hughes directed 
“every effort” of CIB towards understanding the “activities of the Communist Party”.32 
Horner also identifies evidence that the Curtin Government (1941-1945) and its 
attorney-general, Doc Evatt, had used CSS during the war for political purposes.33 One 
                                               
26 Robert Hope, Fourth Report [re ASIO], vol. 4. of Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security 
(1976-1977). NAA: A8908 4A, Canberra, 21. 
27 Stuart Macintyre, The Reds (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1998), 403. 
28 Templeton, Australian Intelligence, 123. 
29 Horner, The Spy Catchers, 19. 
30 Ibid., 19, 40. 
31 Ibid., 17. 
32 Ibid., 19. 
33 Ibid., 28. 
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notable omission by Horner is Attorney-General Robert Menzies, who would become a 
pivotal figure in ASIO’s early history as Prime Minister. During the Lyons Government 
(1932-1939) Menzies replaced Latham in the position and served four years from 
October 1934 until March 1939, when Billy Hughes replaced him.34 Menzies, as 
attorney-general, appears to have been influential in the development of a communist 
obsession within the intelligence apparatus.35 Part of his motivation was a fear of an 
alliance between Labor and the Communist Party along the same lines as that envisaged 
in the United Kingdom by international communist Georgi Dimitrov, in 1935.36 
 
There was also significant interagency competition in the pre-ASIO intelligence 
community. Horner believes military intelligence expanded its operations to civilian 
intelligence work due to CIB having a “relatively small staff” and CIS being 
deliberately underfunded to discourage its expansion.37 But, again, there is a broader 
story that Templeton reveals; it was largely the ill-defined roles of both organisations 
that led to “compet[ition]”, as well as CIB being deliberately “forced out of the picture” 
by military intelligence.38 That is, there was an interagency ‘turf war’ in which military 
intelligence was victorious. While it is possible the interagency conflict began under 
Menzies as attorney-general or arose from desires within Australia’s defence 
establishment, military intelligence was not the victor until it was under the directorship 
of Spry. In this regard ASIO’s future director-general knowingly defied the Chifley 
Government and the chiefs of the armed service, as well as the advice of the Secretary 
of the Department of Defence.39 Evatt had made plain to the Parliament and the public 
                                               
34 “List of Attorneys-General,” Attorney-General’s Department, accessed 12 April 2017, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Browse_b
y_Topic/law/attorneysgeneral. 
35 Robert H. Smith, “Haunting relations between the feds and ASIO,” National Review, 3 May 1973, 864. 
36 Smith, “Haunting relations.”; Macintyre, The Reds, 249. 
37 Horner, The Spy Catchers, 49. 
38 Horner, The Spy Catchers, 17, 49.; Templeton, Australian Intelligence, 116-117. 
39 Horner, The Spy Catchers, 38, 47.; Smith, “Haunting relations.” 
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that the government did not wish to have anything more than a minor domestic 
intelligence organisation in peacetime.40 Instead of using Templeton’s description set 
out above Horner uses her less controversial description that military intelligence 
“gained ascendancy” in the interagency conflict, which supposedly originated in the 
defence establishment.41 The way Horner uses Templeton’s work weakens its potency. 
In reality military intelligence under Spry competed with CIB and thus defied the 
government, as Spry believed “that intelligence was too important to be left to 
amateurs”.42 It should also be noted that Horner reveals Spry’s leadership of military 
intelligence 20 pages after his quotation of Templeton’s work on the interagency 
conflict. Thus, the reader’s ability to draw an important fact – that Spry was an integral 
player in the pre-ASIO intelligence community – is diminished. Similarly, he reveals 
that “two [other] key officers [from military intelligence]… later became senior officers 
of ASIO” 29 pages after the Templeton quotations.43 Again, this diminishes the links 
ASIO had with its institutional forbears. The narrative that the Official History 
constructs for Spry is that of the inspired democratic saviour instead of self-righteous 
crusader. This was not the first time Spry was “clearly biased” and fixated on a mission; 
he had “what is almost a burning zeal to lift the status of the Army as a whole”.44 It 
should be noted that despite their ideological bias, the early intelligence organisations 
were not incapable of identifying threats posed to the Australian Government from 





                                               
40 Horner, The Spy Catchers, 37-38. 
41 Ibid., 18. 
42 Ibid., 45. 
43 Ibid., 47. 
44 Ibid., 47-49. 
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ASIO’s inception (1944-1949) 
 
According to the Royal Commission, ASIO came into being because the United States 
and United Kingdom demanded the Chifley Government improve the secrecy of the 
Australian Government.45 It is often accepted that the end of the Second World War saw 
a resurgent threat to Australia and its ‘way of life’ in the form of communism. As the 
American-aligned states – including Australia – began to perceive the Soviet Union as 
the dominant enemy once more, there emerged a cold war which plunged these societies 
into fear. Of course the Cold War and associated fear were in part genuine and in part 
manufactured. It was in the build-up to the Cold War that ASIO was created. The 
Official History attributes the ultimate and direct cause of ASIO’s inception to the 
discovery of Soviet infiltration of the Australian Government during the war.46 This 
caused a breakdown of trust in which the governments of the United States and United 
Kingdom saw the Australian Government as inept at securing information it had 
received from them. 47  The Official History also states other causes of ASIO’s 
formation: combating wartime Japanese espionage, distrust of Australia in the eyes of 
foreign intelligence agencies, the determination of military intelligence, the ineptitude 
of the pre-ASIO intelligence apparatus, the heads of the Department of Defence and the 
Attorney-General’s Department, advice from MI5, Soviet espionage, as well as the 
Chifley Government’s efforts to counter negative perceptions in an election year.48  
 
After the Second World War had ended, the United States – predominantly through the 
United Kingdom – exerted considerable pressure on the Australian Government to 
increase the security of its processes. At that time Australia was receiving classified 
information from the United States. Intelligence code breakers in the United States 
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decrypted some 200 Soviet cables, in part and in full, which indicated information was 
leaking from the Australian Government somehow, demonstrating a probable spy ring 
operating in Canberra.49 The reason Australia received such classified information is 
uncertain. The Official History argues that Australia’s involvement with the Anglo-
American intelligence exchange arose because of the continent’s access to the Asian 
region.50 Yet, the Department of Defence argued at the time that Australia was the 
recipient of “largely one-way traffic” with respect to intelligence information; a 
generous scheme in which the country was lucky to be involved.51 Either way, the 
United States saw Australian practises as open to exploitation by enemy states. The 
result was that the Australian Government was pressured by foreign allies to conform to 
their demands or jeopardise its supposedly advantageous position. The intelligence 
agencies of the United States and United Kingdom appear to have no evidence that 
these leaks were acted upon by the Soviet Union, nor evidence of leaks occurring after 
the war ended; a faith in the science of likelihoods is not evidence.52 These intelligence 
agencies withheld information and deliberately misinformed officials, including 
Chifley, despite urging the government to adopt tighter security measures.53 Meanwhile, 
the Chifley Government steadily adopted United Kingdom policy (approved by the 
United States) on domestic security, including the formation of a new domestic 
intelligence agency, ASIO, as well as foreign affairs towards the Soviet Union.54 
 
The pressures placed on the Chifley Government, within and without the executive, by 
foreign intelligence agencies had a demonstrable effect on policy formulation. One such 
pressure source included the restriction of access to foreign intelligence. As early as 
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January 1948 – despite no evidence of post-war Soviet spying in Australia – British 
officials knew of a decision by the United States army to withhold all evidence it had 
been sending to Australian counterparts. 55  As the year progressed the isolation 
expanded to other American agencies and, eventually, the United Kingdom started 
restricting information flows in response to United States pressure.56 This clearly placed 
pressure on Australian officials. In September 1948, MI5 Deputy Chief Roger Hollis 
reported that Prime Minster Chifley  
blew up and stated that while he was prepared to deal with the security situation 
as he saw it, he would not tolerate US censure any longer...57 
In a letter to British Prime Minister Clement Atlee, Chifley pointed to the hypocrisy of 
the “Great Powers”, all of which continued to suffer from leaks and other security 
breaches. 58  Regardless, the Australian Government continued to be bullied into 
compliance with the desires of foreign governments, which were actively trying to 
circumvent elected representatives of the Australian people.59 While Chifley was not 
opposed to creating ASIO or increasing governmental secrecy, he was at least prepared 
to test the veracity of claims spawning from the Venona project and identify the security 
hypocrisy.60 This was obviously seen as an extravagance. Meanwhile, Hollis reported 
that the United States officials held 
a general distrust of Labour politicians, a particular distrust of Australian Labour 
politicians, and an outstanding distrust of Dr. Evatt and Burton…61 
 
A second form of pressure came in the physical presence of senior MI5 officials from 
the United Kingdom. This presence included that of Director-General Percy Sillitoe and 
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future Director-General Roger Hollis. These officials used the de facto authority of the 
Mother Country to gain direct access to Australian decision makers, whereby they 
manipulated and cajoled less savvy operators.62 This is tied in with a third source of 
pressure, namely that of social norms that positioned British opinion highly and also 
resented that “Australia’s names stinks in the security world”.63 Sir Frederick Shedden, 
the long-serving Secretary of the Department of Defence from 1937 to 1956, was 
crucial as an advisor to Chifley and was identified by the head of MI5 as valuing his 
personal standing with the British bureaucracy.64 Only he and Chifley knew of Venona 
having originated from intercepted cables.65 At the same time, other bureaucrats less 
sympathetic to the United Kingdom were kept out of the decision making process by 
more patriotic Australians. The Secretary of the Department of External Affairs from 
1947 to 1950, John Burton, repeatedly asked Shedden for more details pertaining to the 
investigation for leaks in his department, but was “ignored”.66 Such internal squabbles 
were deemed by British officials as “Australian matter[s]” more appropriately dealt with 
by locals.67 This was so even though MI5 officials partly created such divisions.68 
Another favourite of the British was the Solicitor-General, Sir Kenneth Bailey, who, 
upon returning from the United Kingdom, was convinced of the need for ASIO.69 The 
“final impetus” to establish ASIO came when Hollis visited Australia in January 1949 
and conveyed his unfavourable comparison between British and Australian security to 
Bailey.70 Both Shedden and Bailey were, as Horner argues, key to the development of 
ASIO.71 
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Meanwhile, Chifley complained to Atlee that in the absence of more details it was 
unclear that the leak even came from the department.72 Horner notes that the reliability 
of the Australian Government was declining in the eyes of foreign counterparts “in 
some cases due to rumour and innuendo” or “wildly extravagant reports”. 73 But he does 
not draw the conclusion that Australia’s sovereignty was being jeopardised by the 
United States and United Kingdom. In late 1948, the government attempted to use a 
treaty negotiation – presumably over the Fulbright programme – to bargain for access to 
top-secret information, but the United States ambassador, Myron Cowen, refused and 
outright demanded that a domestic intelligence agency be created.74 In the words of 
MI5, Chifley and Evatt were getting “a practical demonstration of the disadvantages of 
bad security in the loss of U.S. and British intelligence”.75  
 
In September 1948 Chifley decided to establish ASIO “along the lines of M15”, making 
the decision public in March 1949.76 A month later, the Soviet Union changed its cipher 
– after leaks from the United States and United Kingdom – and the project could not 
produce intelligible intelligence.77 Once ASIO was erected its director-general, Justice 
Geoffrey Reed, sought to “assert his right of direct access to [Chifley] and to see Dr. 
Evatt as little as possible”, according to the private discussions of the British High 
Commission at that time.78 Hollis had foreshadowed this in a passage quoted by Horner: 
…[Selecting Reed] has some advantages, particularly in this political cesspool 
of a country. He is a South Australian and a liberal and therefore will not be 
regarded as Evatt’s man or a government stooge… He is merely on leave from 
the High [Supreme] Court, and can therefore return when he likes and is not 
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dependent on his Secret Service job; he can thus resist attempts at Ministerial 
interference, and I gathered from our conversation with him he intends to do 
so.79 
The same communiqué, although not included by Horner, provides insights into the 
mindset of one of ASIO’s creators: 
Meanwhile the staffing of the new Service continues slowly. I was interested to 
see in the draft resolution of the Brisbane District of the Australian Communist 
Party they stated that “a huge security force has been established to spy on and 
disrupt the working class movement”. I only wish it were true. 80 
This demonstrates the underlying motivation that runs through much of the anti-
communism covered by this thesis; the fear of working class political mobilisation. It 
also reflects the somewhat ironic distrust senior intelligence figures held for the system 
of government they sought to defend. The United States originally promised to restore 
intelligence flows to Australia once ASIO was created, but this proved to be insincere as 
it took many years to resume.81 In hindsight this fact alone undermines the logic that the 
Australia Government needed the intelligence flow for its survival, even though it was 
wanted so desperately. 
 
ASIO’s legal confines 
 
From ASIO’s creation until 1956 the legal documents on which the organisation 
operated was an executive charter issued by the governor-general. The first charter, 
issued in March 1949, was “based almost verbatim” on the United Kingdom’s 
equivalent order for MI5.82 Crown Solicitor Fred Whitlam, father of the future prime 
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minister, drafted the terms upon which the Director-General could operate ASIO.83 The 
salient provisions were: 
5. Its task is the defence of the Commonwealth from external and internal 
dangers arising from attempts at espionage and sabotage, or from actions of 
persons and organisations, whether directed from within or without the country, 
which may be judged to be subversive of the security of the Commonwealth.  
6. … It is essential that the Security Service should be kept absolutely free from 
any political bias or influence, and nothing should be done that might lend 
colour to any suggestion that it is concerned with the interests of any particular 
section of the community… 
8. You and your staff will maintain the well established convention whereby 
Ministers do not concern themselves with the detailed information which may 
be obtained by the Security Service...84 
From these terms it is clear there was no scope for political frolicking on the part of 
ASIO, nor any scope for meddling in ideological and political debates in Australia. The 
organisation was to be concerned with the commonwealth’s security, even if the 
political system approved radical changes. However, ASIO’s senior officials quickly 
adopted a different interpretation. In creating ASIO, the Chifley Government “would 
provide a rod for Evatt’s own back in future years”, according to the Oxford History of 
Australia.85 
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II. Bipartisan anti-communism 
…in this country, where the workers rule, and where they have had the Government under their control 
for years, and where they have means of passing any law they please, and where they can, and do, control 
– through their socialistic enterprises – great amounts of capital, ‘going slow’ and ‘sabotage’ are grave 
economic and social crimes, and treason itself against the State. 
                Billy Hughes, National Labor prime minister, 1916.86 
 
In these restless times when subversive doctrines are being preached, and the loyalty of the community 
and the stability of our institutions are being undermined, the widest power to deal with unlawful 
associations is essential in the interests of society. 
                        Stanley Bruce, former Coalition prime minister, 1932.87 
 
… the doctrine of communism is not gaining ground in this country; but even if it were, then the way to 
combat it is to meet argument with argument. 
                                           James Scullin, former Labor prime minister, 1932.88 
 
… never is liberty more easily lost than when we think we are defending it… We are going to fight 
communism in the open. 
                   Ben Chifley, Labor prime minister, 1948.89 
 
 
As we have seen, anti-communism was part of the justification for ASIO’s creation but 
the demands of the United States and United Kingdom were pivotal. In this chapter we 
will see that anti-communism was policy for the parties of government in the 1920s 
until the 1950s. In the next chapter we will see that communism was ASIO’s 
predominant concern in the 1950s until the time of the Royal Commission in the 1970s. 
The obsession with communism in Australia was twofold. First, it arose in part because 
of the Communist Party of Australia’s allegiance with the Soviet Union. Second, it 
arose in part because the parties of government feared the working class would put its 
faith in a radical movement and upturn the status quo. It will be demonstrated that, 
despite rhetorical differences, the major parties typically agreed that outlawing 
communists was a legitimate course of action from the 1920s until the 1951 
referendum. This chapter shows that the Communist Party had generally been 
autonomous in the 1920s, subservient to the Soviet Union in the 1930s, and, after the 
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Second World War, a voluntary servant. It will also show that the Communist Party and 
communists were different groups. Labor’s acceptance – at times, embrace – of anti-
communism goes someway to de-mystify the Whitlam Government’s decision, two 
decades later, to secure ASIO’s existence within the apparatus of the executive. In 
essence, Labor continued to be a reformist party that adopted many of the same 
fundamentals as the Coalition. While Labor’s national constitution refers to “democratic 
socialism” to this day, there is little in Labor’s history to indicate that this was adhered 
to, much like “full employment”, “world peace”, and “an independent Australian 
position in world affairs”.90 This chapter establishes that Labor was anti-communist, 
even if it was not the instigator of legal reform in this respect. 
 
A brief history of the Communist Party, 1920-1949 
 
The history of the Communist Party from its foundation until the creation of ASIO 
reveals an internal contest between those who wanted Australian communism to 
succeed and those who wanted to serve the interests of the Soviet Union.91 In its first 
decade, the 1920s, the party operated autonomously and with a similar degree of 
democracy amongst members as the major parties do in the present time. In its second 
decade the party leadership adhered to Soviet policy rigidly, while in its third decade the 
party had greater autonomy as the interest of the Soviet Union in world revolution 
waned. Crucially, the subservience of the Communist Party to the Soviet Union was not 
the dominant concern of the parties of government at first. Successive governments had 
sought to outlaw the Communist Party as early as 1926. The dominant issue of concern 
in the major parties was initially the radicalism of communism and its threat to the 
status quo. 
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The Communist Party origins 
 
Although the Communist Party was not the first communist party in Australia – the 
other having been created in 1919 – it was the dominant communist party from early in 
its existence.92 The historian Alistair Davidson argues the origins of the party can best 
be understood by Labor’s “non-socialist” tradition.93 To generalise, Labor has a history 
of being eager to abandon its non-existent socialist past.94 From its inception the party 
had practised a pragmatic reformist agenda of ‘labourism’, not socialism; an important 
distinction with important consequences for the working class and capital.95 Various 
scholars have argued that Labor’s history is decidedly more dynamic.96 However, the 
party in government and opposition has not been socialist, even if they had the support 
of workers at the electorate, had socialists in its flock, and occasionally held socialistic 
policies. It was none other than Vladimir Lenin who asked in 1913, 
[w]hat a peculiar capitalist country is this in which Labor predominates in the 
upper house and recently predominated in lower, and yet the capitalist system 
has not been exposed to any danger?97 
L. G. Churchward grounded this absence of socialism in the predominance of the 
middle class in Labor’s leadership: 
Although a considerable measure of class consciousness was a prerequisite for 
the establishment of the Labor Parties, the general objective of these parties was 
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social reform, not socialism… The restrained character of Labor’s objectives 
irked the socialist minority within the party… union leaders and labor politicians 
were drawn from the upper crust of skilled labor, from the “labor aristocracy”… 
they shared the same middle class outlook as the non-Labor parliamentarians.98 
This view is consistent with contemporary communists.99 From its very beginning 
Labor’s links to unions, although essential to its electoral success, did not result in 
working class control of the party.100 Labor’s policies were always “intended to be 
acceptable... by people of divergent political opinions” as opposed to socialists.101 As 
early as 1920, Labor was dominated by its “federal parliamentary wing”, which had 
contained the influence of trade unions as well as the state branches.102 This is why the 
trade unions were unsuccessful in getting Labor support in 1921 for the non-
hierarchical, union-centred, anarchist model of democracy.103 At the 1921 Federal 
Conference there were moves to allow communists into Labor and radical delegates 
were successful in seeking changes to the party constitution, including the insertion of 
the word ‘socialisation’.104 But within four years the communists were ejected from 
Labor.105 The socialisation objective was also effectively qualified “out of existence”.106 
The first Labor government after this change, the Scullin Government (1929-1932), 
demonstrated perfectly how little this constitutional change meant in practise; a 
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depression era government that abdicated policymaking to the banks, which saw their 
salvation in austerity.107  
 
The Communist Party came into existence in 1920 because of the perceived need 
amongst various socialists in Australia for a party that challenged Labor’s electoral and 
intellectual dominance over working class voters.108 This, however, 
was not merely the product of disillusionment with Labor reformism. Its 
economic basis was the intensification of the monopoly trend in Australian 
industry in these years… the increasing exploitation of labour and a marked 
decline in real wages.109 
The revolution of March which birthed local, organic political councils (soviets) gave 
way to the Bolshevik coup d'état in October.110 Regardless, these events inspired 
radicals throughout the world and proved to be as influential as the French 
Revolution.111 While Davidson argues that this decision was made with “the prime 
motivation” being the success of Lenin in Russia, he explains that its members were 
concerned with creating a communist society in Australia as opposed to replicating 
Bolshevism. 112  According to Stuart Macintyre, the party owes its existence to a 
disparate group of radicals – including feminists – forced together, to compromise their 
rigid adherence to doctrine, as a result of the uncompromising efforts by government to 
eradicate radicalism in general.113 This version of the party’s creation is contrary to the 
simplistic view offered in the Official History of ASIO: “the Communist Party… [was] 
formed in Sydney in October 1920 by a group of socialists inspired by reports of the 
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Russian Revolution”.114 (Although Horner offers no citation, this sentence can be traced 
to a 2003 edit of a Wikipedia article).115  
 
The new Communist Party in Australia was distinct from the Russian Communist Party 
because of its democratic model. From 1920 until 1930 the Party was generally 
democratic in its internal operations, with local branches – comprised of local members 
– formulating policies through debate, while members were allowed to criticise 
leaders.116 The transition toward subservience was foreshadowed when the Industrial 
Workers of the World (‘the Wobblies’) were outcompeted by the Communist 
International (Comintern) for influence over the party’s leadership.117 The Comintern 
was an organisation setup by the Soviet State – soon to become the Soviet Union – in 
1919 and, until Joseph Stalin consolidated power, operated on democratic principles.118 
The Communist Party became the official organ of the Comintern in 1922 upon its 
unification with the pre-existing socialist party.119 The years of autonomy continued 
although the leadership increasingly chose to follow Soviet direction and adopted an 
uncompromising, positive view of the Soviet Union.120 Beginning in 1927, but in 
earnest from 1930, the autonomy of the Communist Party was contained and quashed 
when the leadership of the party was replaced by one compliant with Comintern 
directions.121 At the time of the Great Depression the party was “small, isolated” and 
ineffectual.122 In the 1930s Davidson argues the party’s leadership became “over-
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zealous in their commitment to Marxist-Leninism” and its subservience to the 
Comintern greatly weakened its appeal to the working class.123 By 1935 the Comintern 
was “little more than a tool of Soviet foreign policy” and had abandoned its original aim 
of global revolution.124 So it was the Communist Party became less about communism 
and more about securing the influence of a foreign master.  
 
Unpopular puppet or working class saviour? 
 
After the Soviet takeover the Communist Party began pursuing a new purpose; to gain 
greater influence. Since the party was not likely to improve its electoral fortunes it 
began seeking influence covertly, especially in trade unions.125 By using front groups 
the party influenced far more people than it could in an open and honest way.126 During 
this time its policies also shifted into line with those of the Soviet Union. For example, 
the party advocated appeasement in 1939 when the Soviet Union signed the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany, but then advocated war when the Pact was 
betrayed in 1941.127 The relationship the Communist Party had with the Comintern 
proved to be a significant burden to its efforts to capture working class voters and Labor 
members.128 This is clearly evident when we consider that during the Nazi invasion of 
the Soviet Union, when communications broke down between agent and master, 
membership swelled with new communists who re-introduced internal debate.129 The 
party’s union influence peaked in 1945 at an estimated 270,000 people during the war, 
possibly as high as “nearly 40 per cent of unionists” and “a majority of 90… delegates” 
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in the Australian Council of Trade Unions.130 For the sake of context, Australia’s 
population in the early 1940s comprised around seven million people. 131  Party 
membership surged from around 4500 in 1940 to around 23,000 by late 1944, in part 
because the Communist Party began trying to work within the union movement instead 
of in opposition to it.132 The Official History attributes this rise in support during 
wartime to the Soviet Union’s decision to join the allied war effort and the party’s 
successful attempts to change perceptions that it was a puppet.133 Nevertheless, this 
presence in the union movement would soon begin to ebb; communists retained 
leadership of a number of unions for some time.134 In 1943 the Comintern was 
dissolved, meaning the party would lack the official leadership and direction it had 
before the war.135 Once communications were restored the leadership adopted a new 
master – the Communist International Bureau (the ‘Cominform’) – rigidly following its 
publications.136 This voluntary subservience was contrary to communist parties in other 
countries, which tended to embrace self-determinism.137 Other scholars have doubted 
whether this was voluntary in nature.138 In 1945 the membership declined to some 
16,000, reaching a mere 5000 in 1948.139 Davidson argues that once more subservience 
to international leadership undermined the party’s popularity amongst freethinking 
communists. 140  Jordan attributes this to the spread of anti-communism through 
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society. 141  In turn various anti-communist groups, especially within the Catholic 
community, began to out compete the Communists for union influence.142 Labor set up 
official Industrial Groups from 1945 to “directly represent the party in trade unions” so 
as to undermine Communist Party influence.143 At the same time the party, whose 
leadership wanted greater union activism in politics, alienated communist unionists and 
never experienced the kind of control over the unions they desired.144 Even so, pursuing 
power in the trade union movement proved to be the Communist Party’s undoing, 
according to Davidson. 145  That is because control or partial control of these 
organisations did not (and would not) translate into political power of the kind needed 
to remove capitalism.146  
 
Outlawing communists and communism  
 
Broadly speaking, there was a bipartisan embrace of anti-communism that arose out of a 
belief that the ideology was a threat to the political and economic status quo. The 
parties of government employed different rhetoric on the topic, yet often found common 
ground with respect to policy. Certainly, Labor agreed that something needed to be done 
to remove the threat, but the contention rested in whether banning communism was a 
legitimate course of action. Despite this, Labor more often than not agreed that a ban 
was worthy of implementation, although it was never whole-heartedly embraced. 
Tellingly, the dispute within the Communist Party on its allegiances to the Soviet Union 
appears to have been of no concern to either party; such details do not appear to have 
influenced policy. This suggests that its allegiance with the Soviet Union was assumed 
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to be constant. In all, there were nine attempts to outlaw the party. Of the five major 
occasions a ban of the Communist Party arose – 1926, 1932, 1940, 1950, and 1951 – 
Labor, in spirit, supported all but two efforts. As already shown, Soviet Union control 
of the Communist Party was present in 1932 and 1940. According to jurist Sam 
Ricketson there were possibly other more subtle attempts made in 1920, 1925 and 1934 
– in addition to those undertaken in the 1940s – dealing with foreigners in Australia or 
criminal processions of specific individuals, but these will not be discussed here.147  
 
The Wobblies: 1916-1919 
 
The syndicalist Wobblies had influence over the first two years of the Communist 
Party’s existence. However, the contest between the establishment and socialists already 
existed in Australia well before 1920. The IWW in Australia grew rapidly in the early 
twentieth century with its “militant direct-actionist” approach to politics.148 In 1916, 
Prime Minister Billy Hughes left Labor – along with many other Labor politicians – to 
join the conservative benches. Soon after, the reformed Hughes Government succeeded 
in passing the Unlawful Associations Act of 1916 which banned the IWW because the it 
had attracted significant support in the working class and had undermined the 
government’s efforts to introduce conscription.149 Hughes explained that the IWW 
ambition to cause a general strike – the dreaded tool of unionists – was the 
government’s prime motivation for the ban; it was “an open declaration of war” 
comparable to other war crimes.150 The Act contained a preamble explaining the IWW 
had “been concerned in advocating and inciting to the commission of [various] crimes 
                                               
147 S. Ricketson, “Liberal Law in a Repressive Age: Communism and the law 1920-1950,” Monash 
University Law Review, vol. 3 (1976): 103, 105, 109. 
148 Churchward, “Introduction,” 35; Macintyre, The Reds, 46. 
149 Davidson, The Communist Party, 8; Raymond Evans, The Red Flag Riots; A study in intolerance 
(Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1988), 13; Macintyre, The Reds, 46-47. 
150 Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 51, 18 December 1916, 10098. 
 33 
and offences”.151 It was clearly a judgement beyond the power of the legislature. The 
Act also outlawed “[a]ny association which, by its constitution or propaganda, 
advocates or encourages… the taking or endangering of human life, or the destruction 
or injury of property”.152 The Act’s sunset clause rendered it inoperative six months 
after the war ended.153 Despite sharing IWW’s anti-conscription belief, Labor supported 
the government’s coordinated “police surveillance” of the “evil” movement. 154 
However, the Federal Labor leader, Frank Tudor, opposed the bill on grounds of legal 
pragmatism; existing laws dealt with the situation while proposed inchoate offences 
“will not cure the disease that is now present in the body politic”.155 Conversely, the 
trade union movement was opposed to political suppression and was subsequently 
targeted by military intelligence.156 Under the legislative regime Australia’s “official 
suppression of radicalism and dissent… matched – and to some degree surpassed – the 
American” regime.157 Influential members of the commonwealth and state governments, 
and the business community emulated the United States government’s promotion of 
“vigilantism” amongst return veterans leagues in order to incite further suppression.158 
These groups were organised by the executive, particularly through SIB, military 
intelligence and state police forces.159 One senior military intelligence office explained 
the policy rationale as follows: 
‘Direct Action’ is an American product… If a town was smeared with filth in 
America, someone would dangle from the arm of the nearest lamp-
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post…[P]atrols would be formed to see that property is not destroyed. There is 
nothing illegal in assisting the police to maintain order…160 
Under the state’s eye, loyalist forces amassed large numbers of supporters, stockpiled 
armaments, and engaged in violent demonstrations against persons and property.161 The 
state’s intelligence agencies spread misinformation to sympathetic newspapers, co-
operated with conservative party staff, and ran agents within IWW; one agent ironically 
chaired Trades Hall meetings in Brisbane.162 The historian Raymond Evans argues that 
the executive’s lack of knowledge on matters of ideology is displayed in this period of 
Australian history: 
By combining the often-competing interests of ‘labour extremists’, anarchists, 
pacifists and Quakers, Irish Roman Catholics and German ‘enemy agents’ into a 
co-ordinated disloyal assault… the official view was inspired more by a war-
enhanced sense of paranoia than any objective assessment of socio-political and 
ideological realities.163 
While it is accepted that there was generally a deficiency of such knowledge, evidenced 
in particular by officers of the executive, the prime minister was certainly aware that the 




The first major attempt to outlaw the Communist Party occurred in 1926 when the 
Bruce Coalition Government (1923-1929) – claiming an historic electoral mandate with 
significant working class support – succeeded in passing amendments to the Crimes Act 
which granted the government power to declare groups “unlawful associations” if they 
                                               
160 Evans, The Red Flag, 63, 72. 
161 Ibid., 54, 56, 63, 71, 75. 
162 Ibid., 66-67, 71. 
163 Ibid., 25. 
164 Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 51, 18 December 1916, 10100. 
 35 
advocated “the overthrow of the Constitution of the Commonwealth by revolution or 
sabotage”.165 The law also applied if a group advocated the “destruction or injury of 
property”, including that “used in trade or commerce”, and “[a]ny person who by 
speech or writing advocates or encourages” the same behaviour. When interpreted 
broadly the Act allowed for the destruction of “[a]ny book” by the state that expressed 
banned opinions.166 It gave the government the power to restrict a “serious industrial 
disturbance prejudicing or threatening trade or commerce with other countries or among 
the States”.167 These legislative changes were draconian, but the Bruce Government had 
won office on “law and order” issues in a time of heightened “industrial unrest”.168 
Labor did not vote for the 1926 amendments, but many of its MPs and Senators 
abstained including its leader, Mathew Charleton, who had offered Labor’s support to 
the provisions outlawing seditious groups.169 Charleton had encouraged the government 
to apply these proposed provisions to the Australian fascist movement as well, 
demonstrating the breadth of Labor’s interest in political suppression.170 Earlier in the 
1920s Labor had learned to trust communists in its membership, especially those that 
held membership with both parties. By 1923 a majority within the Labor membership 
saw through the infiltration and sought to jettison communists, succeeding in doing so 
the next year.171 Labor’s leadership also sought to send a clear message to the working 
class at that time: communism was not the answer to their problems.172 In 1929, the 
Bruce Government was defeated by Labor because it was seen as having been 
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excessively generous to employers in their war against the unions.173 The shirt-lived 




In 1932 the Lyons Coalition Government (1932-1939) successfully amended the Crimes 
Act to “strengthen” the 1926 changes so as to shift the power to declare associations 
unlawful to the courts.175 The amendments also expanded the scope of the ban by 
making it an offence to permit a meeting of an unlawful association in any venue or 
broadcast any subversive content.176 Most importantly, it took away the right to vote or 
stand in elections of any member of an unlawful association so long as there was a 
corresponding law in the relevant state.177 According to jurist Gabrielle Appleby, the 
Lyons Government was concerned with the prospect of working class revolt as a result 
of the Great Depression.178 Labor did not support these amendments because the 1926 
amendments already provided sufficient power – although they felt this should only 
apply to people not groups – and the traditional onus of proof was being reversed.179 As 
in 1926, Labor had again chosen a nuanced position, presumably to avoid the 
appearance of supporting the struggle of communists. In 1932, communist Francis 
Devanny was declared unlawful under the updated provisions and imprisoned.180 He 
appealed to the High Court in Devanny’s case which found in his favour.181 McKnight 
argues the events of 1932 instilled in the Communist Party and Comintern a desire for 
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an “underground” organisation to protect the movement from future attacks.182 As well 
will see, this secrecy was in turn used as evidence against the Communist Party, 
especially in the late 1940s and early 1950s. However, Labor was proactive in its anti-
communism. In the early nineteen thirties Labor adopted a strict policy towards the 
Communist Party and its efforts to infiltrate civil society; “Each time the [Communist 
Party] planted root in Australian society… [Labor] tried to dig it up”.183 The Lyons 
Government ultimately failed to ban the Communist Party, despite it succeeding in 
changing the Crimes Act.184  
 
1940 (and 1940s) 
 
In 1940 the first Menzies Government (1939-1941) decided to issue an executive order 
banning subversive associations that spread “unlawful doctrines” in the early years of 
the Second World War. 185  Such an order was made at the request of Military 
Intelligence.186 This was done because the Communist Party was against the war 
effort.187 The government, through regulations permitted by the National Security Act of 
1939, decreed: 
Any body corporate or unincorporate, the existence of which the Govenor-
General… declares to be in his opinion, prejudicial to the defence of the 
Commonwealth or the efficient prosecution of the war, is hereby declared to be 
unlawful.188 
In effect, anyone or any group could be declared illegal at any time if the Executive so 
desired. This time, “[u]nlawful doctrines” were those that “were advocated by a body 
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which has been declared to be unlawful” or any that “are prejudicial to the defence of 
the Commonwealth or the efficient prosecution of the war”.189 The regulations gave any 
police officer above the rank of sergeant the discretionary power to enter premises to 
search and seize any material and use whatever force needed to achieve this.190 In 
possibly the biggest police operation in Australia to that date, the police raided “party’s 
offices and the homes of all known members” removing “truckloads of documents”, 
including a copy of Shakespeare.191 In Western Australia, a future senior figure in 
ASIO, Ron “Black Snake” Richards, saw over a dozen communists imprisoned.192 
Ultimately, the government succeeded in having well over 50 communists 
imprisoned.193 A minority of wartime internments were people who displayed signs of 
radicalism, be it communist party membership or even union membership, but were 
kept in the same camps as fascists, which had disastrous consequences.194 Labor did not 
campaign against the government on these regulations even though the government had 
reversed the onus of proof for declared persons.195 However, after Operation Barbarossa 
– the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany – commenced in June 1941, this 
regulation was unenforced as the Communist Party began supporting the war effort.196 
The Curtin Labor Government (1941-1945) rescinded the order two months after it 
came to power in October of 1941 when internal disquiet subsided after the Communist 
Party committed to fulfilling certain conditions.197 The High Court declared the 1940 
regulations invalid in 1943.198 Now in Opposition, Menzies realised he had made an 
error of judgement, saying government should only “out-argue, not out-law, 
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communism”.199 Menzies acknowledged in 1951 that the ban had triggered a 400 per 
cent increase in Communist Party membership within two years, as well as massively 
increasing readership of its newspapers and pamphlets.200 As shown above, the Official 
History reached a different conclusion to Menzies and argues that Labor had not 
realised by 1948 the electoral peril it faced at the hands of the communists: 
[T]he Government was coming to realise that it was in a fight with the 
Communist Party, but it was not yet willing to employ measures that might 
infringe civil liberties.201 
The problem is that membership, as demonstrated above, receded dramatically from 
1945. And the Communist Party received a miniscule percentage of the vote for the 
lower house at the 1946 election, running only in Western Australia, South Australia 
and Queensland.202 A more accurate account of the threat posed to Labor is that posed 
by the Coalition in its imminent anti-communist crusade. As for Labor’s unwillingness 
to engage in a fight, Davidson argues that the Chifley Government used its time in 
office to “obliquely… crush” communism through various legislative amendments and 
successful prosecutions under sedition laws.203 Certainly, if one accepts that Labor had 
not already advocated the infringement of civil liberties – contrary to primary and 
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1950 and 1951 
 
The second Menzies Government came to office in 1949 with a policy to ban the 
Communist Party, which was soon put before Parliament in the form of the Communist 
Party of Australia Dissolution Bill of 1950. Under the proposed law, it would be illegal 
to 
support or advocate the objectives, policies, teachings, principles or practises of 
communism, as expounded by Marx and Lenin.204 
This proposed ban, impressive in its expanse, attracted the far-off disapproval of the 
New York Times and the Times of London.205 Even the mentor of B. A. Santamaria 
(who is discussed below), the anti-communist Archbishop of Melbourne, Dr. Daniel 
Mannix, believed the government had overreached in its efforts to contain the 
communist threat.206 The jurist George Winterton suggests the change of policy in the 
Liberal Party, from not advocating a ban to advocating one, could have arisen from a 
combination of Country Party insistence, political opportunism, and genuine Cold War 
fear.207 Menzies biographer, A. W. Martin, argues that genuine fear of communism 
resulted in a build-up of internal pressure within the Liberal Party.208 While Menzies is 
said to have opposed abolition this time, once the policy shift was made he became a 
“fanatic[al” believer; the communist threat was so immense he abandoned “even… the 
British system of justice”.209 The Labor Opposition wanted communism to be perused 
through existing (draconian) legislation, then unsuccessfully negotiated for the law to 
grant judicial review of declared associations  – as Menzies had originally proposed – 
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and the burden of proof restored.210 After a considerable delay, Labor used its majority 
in the Senate to allow the bill to pass, as anti-communists within Labor connected to 
Santamaria’s Movement (see below) wanted a ban.211 In the end, Labor voted with the 
government even though the unions opposed it.212 Evatt boldly told colleagues the Act 
would be struck down by the High Court.213 His views proved to be accurate, in no 
small part because of his subsequent actions.  
 
Evatt, without informing Chifley, agreed to represent “the communist controlled 
Waterside Workers Federation” in its High Court challenge of the new law.214 Like his 
brother Clive 17 years earlier in Devanny’s case, he represented declared communists 
before the High Court and won.215 The High Court handed down its decision in 
Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth after nine months of deliberation. The 
bench decided six to one that the Act was invalid, although it found unanimously that 
the Constitution provided the “Commonwealth [with the] legislative power to protect 
itself from subversion”.216 Winterton warns that the “civil liberty aspects” of High 
Court’s judgement “should not be overstated”, as the judgement was fundamentally 
about the judiciary restoring its peacetime constitutional powers.217 Appleby similarly 
argues that on the issue of banning communism the High Court charted a course 
whereby it avoided the contentious political questions – in particular the rights of 
political minorities – to focus on preserving the power of the judiciary.218 The Menzies 
Government was not finished. The government decided to hold a referendum on 
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constitutional changes that would ensure the legality of the legislation if it passed 
Parliament second time. Initial opinion polls showed 73 to 80 per cent support for the 
changes.219 The hard-fought referendum was lost by 50.56% to 49.44%, three states 
against to three states in favour.220 
 
The bona fides of anti-communism 
 
It is easy to dismiss the anti-communism of the Coalition and Labor, as well as the 
Australian electorate more generally, as a product of Cold War fear-turned-hysteria. As 
we will see in the next chapter, the Cold War did not emerge suddenly. It took time 
before the United States government was fully aware of the propagandistic potential of 
a capitalist versus communist battle. Anti-communism existed for many years prior to 
the Cold War. For example, outlawing communist parties was not an action unique to 
Australian politics; in 1935 only 22 of 67 Comintern controlled parties around the world 
were legal, with Nazi Germany being a particularly anti-communist state.221 There was 
a genuine fear of communism because if it gained a foothold in the working class, the 
political and economic status quo could have been uprooted. This explains why the 
efforts to ban the Communist Party and supress other radical groups were partly 
designed to safeguard commercial interests, as legislation expressly provided for. The 
problem with the hysteria argument – that the Coalition, Labor, the electorate and ASIO 
from 1949 were consumed by extreme fear and mass panic – is that it was at odds with 
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the actual threat posed by communists in Australia after the war.222 As Blaxland 
explains: 
[A]though the [Communist Party]’s activities were legal, ASIO did not 
adequately recognise this… [The party]’s work consisted almost entirely of legal 
political activities, including industrial struggle to improve working conditions, 
safety standards, social services and Aboriginal land rights, which ultimately 
focused on introducing socialism through democratic means.223 
The same has been argued by historian Phillip Deery with regard to membership.224 In 
the history of Australia the Communist Party only secured one member in any 
Australian parliament; Fred Patterson, who served two terms in Queensland Parliament 
from 1944 until 1949.225 However, there is another explanation for the extent of anti-
communism in the major parties from the 1920s until the 1950s; it served their political 
interests. There was an electoral advantage to be yielded by the Coalition by stoking 
fears in the electorate. Conversely, Labor feared that it would lose substantial votes 
from its traditional pool of support, from anti-communist Catholics and the working 
class. 226  The next chapter will demonstrate that Labor’s shift away from anti-
communism under the leadership of Evatt was detrimental in this regard. Although the 
damaged sustained by Labor was largely self-inflicted, the Menzies Government and 
ASIO maximised the pressure within Labor; their role cannot reasonably be dismissed 
as simple naiveté.  
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III. ASIO’s anti-radicalism 
 
 
History and not only ancient history, shows that in countries where democratic institutions have 
been unconstitutionally superseded, it has been done not seldom by those holding the executive 
power… [T]he power to legislate for the protection of an existing form of government ought not 
to be based on a conception… to assist those holding power to resist or supress obstruction or 
opposition or attempts to displace them or the form of government they defend. 
    Owen Dixon, Justice of the High Court, 1951.227 
 
The numerous attempts by the executive– acting through the legislature – to outlaw the 
Communist Party and the ideology of communism were undemocratic. As we have 
seen, the parties of government shared an anti-communism in which this kind of action 
was seen as legitimate. This chapter will discuss ASIO and its operations from the 
1950s until the early 1970s in order to demonstrate how the organisation’s anti-
communism (and, eventually, anti-radicalism) negatively affected Labor. It will be 
shown that ASIO shared the same anti-communism as the Menzies Government and its 
Coalition successors. From this shared view arose a relationship of convenience from 
which both derived mutual benefit; the organisation continued to pursue its self-
righteous interpretation of its mission, while the government netted political gains.228 It 
is important to consider the extent to which the government and ASIO sought to ensure 
institutional propriety given the actual or foreseeable benefit derived. Without this 
consideration a scholar is condemned to overlook the probable in pursuit of the 
absolute; a standard of proof not even practised at common law.229 Particular caution 
must be exercised here as conspiracy has been a major feature of scholarly discourse 
with respect to the Petrov affair.230 Below it will be argued that despite being alert to 
this history – especially since many of its senior ministers had lived it – the Whitlam 
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Government embarked on a course that would entrench ASIO, albeit a reformed 
version. 
 
Protectors of the ‘Commonwealth’? 
 
The Official History states that ASIO was “unlike the police” in that it “had no 
executive function” because its officers “could not apprehend and arrest people”.231 
However, ASIO could wield de facto power through its dealings with the civil liberties 
of citizens, its use of intimidation tactics, and its influence over policy making. ASIO’s 
officers could infringe the “civil liberties” of Australians and did so if they perceived it 
necessary to solve a dispute “in the Commonwealth’s favour”.232 We are also told that 
the organisation solved “moral dilemmas” spurning from prospective civil liberties 
breaches in the interests of the “Commonwealth”, even if it was against the interests of 
citizens “despite any ambiguity as to the veracity of the evidence”.233 ASIO’s senior 
officers could have interpreted ‘Commonwealth’ more broadly to mean the Australian 
nation as a whole.234 This would have been untenable because a government agency 
would have had a legal obligation to challenge the Australian Government to defend the 
Australian citizenry if a conflict arose. But, rightly under the system of government, 
ASIO was first the protector of the institutions of government, not the people.235 In 
practise, the executive was the primary beneficiary since it is in charge of policy 
formulation and implementation with respect to general welfare.236 The problem is that 
ASIO did not constrain its activities to the protection of government processes. Instead, 
it also came to see itself as the protector of the politics of government. In this way the 
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organisation could interfere in politics without believing it was compromising its central 
purpose; the defence of the Commonwealth.237 
 
The role of Cold War politics 
 
The climate of anti-communism after the Second World War was linked to the 
beginnings of what the author George Orwell originally called the “Cold War”.238 In 
Australia, anti-communist sentiment was widespread by the late 1940s – to the extent 
that Labor agreed with the Coalition – with a growing fear that the communist peoples 
of Asia threatened the country’s existence. 239  But, as the 1951 referendum 
demonstrated, the people were split on the question of whether a ban was appropriate. 
The escalation in tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union after the war 
drew in other states, including Australia. The discovery in Australia of a Soviet 
intelligence network that had successfully penetrated the United States, United 
Kingdom and Australia “was critical to the early development and direction of the Cold 
War”.240 The Official History argues that to understand “the early history of ASIO” one 
needs to understand “the political and social climate of the early Cold War period”.241 
Evidence cannot give way to conspiracy: 
[T]he Cold War… security threats of the time are now popularly dismissed as 
either fringe and harmless or overblown in the imagination of a conspiratorial 
element of the Australian body politic. Such a perspective is ahistorical and not 
based on a dispassionate consideration of the evidence.242 
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According to the Cambridge History of the Cold War the Cold War began as a 
European geopolitical crisis before it became an ideological contest between 
communism and capitalism.243 To be clear, the ideological contest was not inherent to 
the geopolitical conflict. 
 
As the following discussion demonstrates the Truman Administration (1945-1953) was 
aware of the political potency of an ideological contest and consciously decided to shift 
away from the reality of the threat in Europe. In January 1950, at the direction of 
President Harry Truman, the secretaries of state and defence were asked to consider the 
foreign policy objectives of the United States holistically in light of Soviet nuclear 
capabilities.244 In April 1950, the National Security Council gave Truman a report, 
NSC-68, which quickly became “official doctrine”.245 The report did three things. 
Firstly, it argued for a more ambitious pursuit of a US-led world order:  
[T]he absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This 
fact imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership. 
Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster 
a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish… 
to create and now develop the Inter-American system… [Containment of the 
USSR] is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion.246 
Secondly, it made plain that while the Soviet Union was a threat it was not a serious 
match for the economic, technological and military potential of the United States at that 
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time, even though the latter was far from full potential.247 Thirdly, it argued that the 
United States should propagandise the ideological contest: 
The full power which resides within the American people will be evoked only 
through traditional democratic process: This process requires… sufficient 
information regarding the basic political, economy and military elements of the 
present situation… [I]t will then be possible for the American people and the 
American Government to arrive at a consensus… The initiative in this process 
lies with the Government… The democratic way is harder than the authoritarian 
way because, in seeking to protect and fulfil the individual, it demands of him 
understanding… in the increasingly complex… world. It demands that he 
exercise discrimination: that while pursuing through free inquiry the search for 
truth he knows when he should commit an act of faith; that he distinguish 
between the necessity for tolerance and the necessity for just suppression.248 
The United States government would convey its perspective of the situation to the 
populace, but emotion and censorship would ensure consensus. Of particular 
importance to Australia was the proposal by the council that the United States should 
undertake a “strengthening of the British position” to ensure “the stability of the 
Commonwealth [which] is not to be impaired and if it is to be a focus of resistance to 
Communist expansion in South and South-East Asia”.249 The political advantages to the 
Cold War were not lost on the Coalition.250 It was only in the 1980s the United States 
consciously broadened the objective to focus on asserting American values on the 
“popular culture[s]” of its allies in order to “promote US interests”; that is, 
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“consumerism”.251 Menzies claimed that the Soviet Union had “made perfect the 
technique of ‘Cold War’”.252 As we have seen, the United States understood that Soviet 
power had peaked and that a propaganda war within its sphere of influence would 
ensure its global dominance. It is also worth noting that Australia was to a degree 
pushed into the Cold War; Australian involvement in the Korean War was secretly 
negotiated between the United Kingdom and United States, and contrary to the express 
wishes of Menzies.253  
  
The election of 1949 
 
The 1949 election came down to an anti-communist party in Labor against a 
communist-annihilationist party in the Coalition. 254  This difference enabled the 
Coalition to effectively argue that Labor was ideologically incapable of dealing with 
communism in Australia.255 As part of its policy platform Labor advocated preserving 
free speech “no matter how repugnant” and, at the same time, a “campaign of 
destroying the influence of the Communist Party wherever such exists throughout 
Australia”.256 The Coalition – apparently against Menzies wishes – shifted position in 
1948 to again advocate abolition:  
… the time has gone… for treating communism as a legitimate political 
philosophy… If elected… [t]he Communist Party will be declared subversive 
and unlawful and dissolved… Subject to appeal, the Attorney-General will… 
follow the party into any new form and attach illegality… No person now a 
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member… [will] be eligible for any office in a registered industrial 
organisation.257 
With the aid of that new dark arts from the United States – Public Relations, a concept 
developed by the propagandist Edward Bernays – the Coalition received 51 per cent of 
the two-party preferred popular vote to the Labor Party’s 49 per cent.258 Tellingly, the 
Communist Party received a mere 2.1% of all votes cast for the Senate.259 The Coalition 
won office in a landslide in terms of the number of lower house seats won, but it did so 
by acquiring most of the 49 new seats that had been added at the election for 
constitutional reasons.260 Horner offers a different view:  
Australians, who had lived through the Second World War when the threat of 
invasion seemed frighteningly real, were determined to confront and defeat what 
they perceived as a new and equally dangerous threat... They knew that… 
Australia’s war effort was disrupted repeatedly by striking unionists labelled as 
‘extremists’ or ‘communists’ by non-Labor leaders… [T]he Cold War climate, 
with belligerent rhetoric emanating from Moscow, Peking and Washington, and 
fears of outbreak of another world war, needs to be taken into account…261 
Anti-communist sentiment obviously resinated with most Australians. Indeed, the bank 
nationalisation plans of the Chifley Government had been defeated by an unprecedented 
campaign army of bank employees and a “lurid ‘scare’ campaign” by the Coalition, 
which succeeded in framing the debate as a contest between demonic socialism and 
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capitalist democracy.262 But the 1949 election result does not indicate the kind of 
consensus and homogeneity of fear described by Horner. The Cold War experience in 
Australia “was a more pallid version of that in America” even though the Communist 
Party of Australia had greater influence than the Communist Party USA.263 However, it 
was the incoming government that soon allowed nuclear weapons testing in Australia – 
which had disastrous consequences for indigenous and servicemen – and even explored 
the construction of nuclear weapons at ANU; the white tower of the physics department 
can to this day be seen from the Senate-wing offices of Parliament.264 
 
ASIO’s direction under the Menzies Government 
 
Under the stewardship of the second Menzies Government, ASIO came to see its role as 
the protector of the politics of government as well as the protector of the institutions of 
government.265 As the Official History describes, “ASIO’s officers saw themselves as 
front-line warriors (even if they did not use that term) in a war against a twofold enemy 
– the Soviet Union and the CPA [Communist Party]”.266 This was in addition to the 
organisation “responding to a strong direction from the [Menzies] Government” in this 
respect.267 There arose between the agency and the government a mutual reason in 
fighting communists at home. After all, “ASIO’s political masters… were very pleased 
to receive” its reports and the Coalition parties in opposition had “used the [Communist 
Party’s] alleged influence” within the union movement “as a stick to beat the Labor 
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Government”.268 It must be reiterated that the Official History states that ASIO was 
acting on the direction of the Menzies Government: 
ASIO was actually directed to do so by the Government, but critics claimed that 
ASIO supported the conservative side of politics. The question of ASIO’s 
alleged bias will need to be addressed.269 
But the same work also states that the organisation agreed with the directions being 
issued. Hence, 
 [a]s far as ASIO officers were concerned, all communists and ‘fellow travellers’ 
were tarred with the same brush and were legitimate surveillance targets.270  
If ASIO was being directed to anti-communism by the government, it nonetheless 
believed that such directions were the right one. In the absence of evidence 
demonstrating conscious collusion, the next line of enquiry becomes the extent to which 
the government and ASIO sought to ensure the organisation’s proper function. In 
essence, the question is, what would a reasonable government have done knowing 
ASIO’s actions could benefit it politically?  
 
Within six months of winning the 1949 election Menzies installed the former head of 
Military Intelligence, Charles Spry, as the new head of ASIO operating under a new 
executive charter.271 This contained much of the previous charter with only minor 
alterations; new provision was made for “maximum co-operation” with all security 
organisations of Australia, including state police special branches.272 By installing Spry 
as director-general, ASIO became militant in its pursuit of communism and securing 
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Australia’s alliances.273 In military intelligence Spry had worked diligently with MI5, 
“promis[ing] monthly reports on Communist[s]”.274 As Horner describes, “[h]e ran the 
organisation more on military lines”, unlike his predecessor, and recruited “many 
more… [f]ormer military officers”, and maintained the “use [of]… military rank[]” 
within the organisation. 275  He also “established military-like procedures and 
organisations structures and ruled his staff both autocratically and paternally”; he had 
“what [was] almost a burning zeal to lift the status of the Army as a whole”.276 It is 
evident from these depictions of Spry that he was not inclined towards moderation or 
objectivity. This helps to explain why anti-communism drove ASIO. It also helps to 
explain why anti-communism became anti-radicalism more generally.277 
 
The Labor split of 1955 
 
The detriment suffered by Labor at the hands of the Menzies Government and ASIO is 
clearly demonstrated by the events of 1954 and 1955, in which Labor lost a significant  
body of supporters to the anti-communist party that eventually became the Democratic 
Labor Party (DLP). Once the “legislative means” to eradicate the Communist Party “did 
not prove possible”, dashing the “hope[s]” of the Menzies Government, ASIO became 
the primary weapon in the government’s continued campaign.278 The organisation 
accepted this role willingly, despite Spry possessing concerns as to the organisation’s 
lack of legislative foundation, which would be corrected in 1956.279 As we have seen, 
the bona fides of anti-communists needs to be questioned given the post-war collapse in 
support and power, as well as the attack on all communists regardless of the legality of 
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their actions or the sincerity of their beliefs. The Labor split of 1955 had early origins 
but for the purposes of this thesis the immediate causes will be discussed. A scholar 
does not have to stray far from the evidence presented by the Official History to see that 
ASIO and the Menzies Government appeared then, as now, to have consciously elicited 
a mutual benefit from the defection of Vladimir Petrov. To argue (or imply) that two 
intelligent and experienced people such as Menzies and Spry did not perceive the image 
of impropriety or the potential of a mutual benefit is to vest them with an innocence 
bordering on incompetence.280 It is submitted that both were aware of the gain but did 
very little to prevent its delivery.  
 
The Petrov affair 
 
On 10 February 1954, Spry revealed to Menzies that a senior member of the Soviet 
diplomatic mission in Australia was now “more likely” to defect than previously 
indicated.281 By mid-February it was known to ASIO that Petrov had to defect by early 
April at the latest.282 Negotiations as to the details of the defection were discussed at 
length over March.283 On 3 April Petrov defected.284 Spry advised Menzies to call for a 
royal commission on 4 April, which he claimed decades later only produced “lukewarm 
interest” from the latter although he “required little convincing”.285 On 13 April 
Menzies announced the defection and the creation of the Royal Commission on 
Espionage, and the appointment of three sympathetic judges as commissioners, to 
Parliament; he waited for Evatt to be away from Canberra.286 On 19 April Petrov’s wife 
defected triggering an outpour of positivity for the government in the press and 
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internationally.287 Ten days later on 23 April the writs were issued for an election on 29 
May.288 Contrary to Cabinet’s deliberations on February 12, the Official History, A. W. 
Martin and Robert Manne, this was not when elections were “due to be held” nor was it 
“the last possible day” because the absolute deadline for issuing the writs was 22 June, 
meaning the election could occurred sometime in July.289 Due to the 1953 half-Senate 
election, which was held a year before, the 1954 election only involved the lower 
house.290 Menzies’ 1970 claim that “the whole matter was coincidence” cannot be 
accepted.291 Indeed, onlookers could see the political advantage to be netted. The British 
High Commissioner at the time informed his government, “on any balanced view” the 
Petrov affair would damage Evatt.292 Brendan Bracken, a British cabinet minister and 
Churchill confidant, thought it a “gift” of “quite a number of votes”.293 The Australian 
press also noted the advantages for the government.294 Petrov had revealed connections 
between Soviet spies and the office of the then Labor leader; a fact known by the press 
during the election.295 Similarly, MI5 believed Menzies felt compelled to act so as to 
prevent a Soviet-infiltrated Labor government.296 Meanwhile, ASIO created a specific 
section to “support[] the royal commission” given its close connection to the 
evidence.297 In hindsight, it can be seen that the Petrov affair galvanised Australian anti-
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communism, which would far outlive actual communist power and influence.298 But it 
was a muted anti-communism as a result of Evatt’s efforts to ward off the government’s 
ban.299 
 
1954 election – Petrov Commission – 1955 election 
 
In the early days of the campaign senior ministers and party elders used Petrov against 
Labor.300 But Menzies quickly instructed every Coalition candidate not to mention 
Petrov.301 Menzies did not utilise the information Petrov had revealed about the Soviet 
connections of Evatt’s staff during the campaign.302 However, the Coalition “played the 
Communist issue very hard”, according to Manne.303 From 1951 Coalition propaganda 
had attempted to as Evatt as a “Communist champion”.304 Evatt had to assure the 
electorate that Labor had been more effective than the Coalition at imprisoning 
communists when in office.305 The first Petrov Commission hearing began twelve days 
before the election.306 The election saw Labor win an historic 50 per cent the primary 
vote but not gain enough seats to form government.307 However, Adam Carr argues that 
had Labor contested safe-Coalition seats it would have probably lost on primary and 
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secondary votes.308 Manne argues that Menzies waited until April 1954 in order to 
capitalise on the emerging economic recovery and the royal visit, as opinion polling 
from late 1951 until December 1953 indicated a major swing against the Coalition.309 
By 1954 Labor was losing support because of its internal conflict.310 The fortunes of the 
Menzies Government were certainly not diminished by the Petrov affair.311 It has also 
been argued – by Gough Whitlam no less – that the inflationary policies of Labor had 
proved unpopular in the campaign and under Coalition attack.312 
 
After the election the Petrov Commission progressed and Evatt’s credibility was 
gradually diminished in the eyes of the public and Catholic community, largely due to 
his polemical self-defence and defence of his accused staff, as well as his 
unsubstantiated attacks on the government, his open correspondence with the Soviet 
Union, his attacks on the Industrial Groups and his previous support for the Petrov 
Commission.313 Evatt’s attacks on ASIO rendered damage to its reputation and would 
have only stood to bolster its partisan actions.314 Indeed, Spry expressed a wish to sue 
Evatt for defamation but Menzies helped dissuade him.315 Spry also told Menzies that 
his rebuttal of Evatt in Parliament gave him “considerable satisfaction”.316 At the same 
time it is understandable that Evatt would embark on such rhetoric given the political 
stakes. An interim report was handed down to counter Evatt’s accusations in October 
1954.317 The final report was released on 14 September 1955, confirming the existence 
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of a Soviet “spy ring in Australia”, seemingly connected to Evatt’s office.318 It is clear 
that Petrov offered the Australian Government genuine information and confirmed the 
veracity of the post-war Soviet intercepts, even if those intercepts contained no more 
than raw (unreliable) intelligence.319 But it cannot be overlooked that the security 
problems with Evatt staff had been known about for years prior, at least since mid-1948 
when he was attorney-general.320 As for Petrov’s information, the Official History 
argues that it demonstrated “ASIO [had] overestimated the capacity and efficacy of the 
Russians’ intelligence operations in Australia”.321 As for the royal commission that 
followed, Hope confirmed its findings with respect to Soviet spying in Australia were 
correct and that such spies “operat[ed] in Australia up to the time of Petrov’s 
defection”.322 By mid-1955 the Labor split had occured, in large part because of Evatt’s 
poor understanding of the party dynamics and his barrister-like self-reliance.323 On 19 
October, the day of the last parliamentary debate on the findings of the Petrov 
Commission, Menzies requested an election from the Governor-General. Martin argues 
– despite perceiving Menzies innocence in 1954 – that this demonstrates Menzies was a 
“master tactician”. 324  On 7 November 1955, after Evatt’s disastrous October 
performances in Parliament and Menzies damning rebuttal, the writs for another 
election were issued.325 Menzies delivered the news in Parliament to correspond with 
prime time radio, “misleading” the public about Evatt’s communist affiliations.326 The 
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beginnings of the DLP influence were felt with a sizable Coalition victory.327 It should 
be noted that the Communist Party received 3.64 per cent in the Senate; its electoral 
high water mark.328  
 
Conspiracy, opportunism, or naiveté? 
 
According to Spry, Evatt’s idea that Menzies “manipulate the timing” of the defection 
“to assist him in the forthcoming election” is “the height of absurdity”.329 But this 
defence was a straw man for it does not address the very real possibility that Menzies – 
undoubtedly one of the greatest political operators of the twentieth century – capitalised 
on the favourable circumstances. The Official History explains Spry’s actions as having 
arisen from his “concern[] about the survival of his Organisation” because it was under 
“attack from the alternative government”.330  
 
On the evidence it cannot be justifiably claimed that Menzies and Spry colluded nor that 
Menzies orchestrated the defection. But a reasonable interpretation of these events 
would point to an acceptance, at the very least, on the part of Menzies and Spry of the 
mutual benefit both clearly stood to receive. There was a solid chance that the events of 
April would deliver the Coalition an electoral victory, especially given the potency of 
communism and the Soviet Union in the electorate; something stressed by the Official 
History. It would not have been unreasonable or reckless to delay the announcement of 
the Petrov Commission until after the election, nor offer the Opposition a chance to 
partake in the announcement and the selection of commissioners. It could have also 
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been contemplated that a royal commission was not needed, especially since ASIO was 
supposed to operate away from public scrutiny. Similarly, time was not of the essence, 
as the election would have been delayed by two months, enough time for Menzies to 
negotiate a solution with Evatt. Of course, Evatt and Labor posed a risk in that 
information could have spread to the Soviets. But parliamentary democracy cannot be 
suspended. Further, it is hard to see what advantage the Soviets would gain by learning 
through Labor what Menzies would say to Parliament.  
 
Instead, Menzies allowed the image of the Petrov affair and the Royal Commission to 
speak for itself, thus avoiding damaging accusations, while the Coalition pointed to 
Labor’s anti-communist deficiencies. For its role, ASIO would ensure the Royal 
Commission served as its mouthpiece with the near certainty that Labor would be 
damaged enough to keep it from office and, therefore, undermining it and its mission. 
But Petrov brought more benefits than either could have envisaged, as Evatt’s 
predictable loss of composure gave Menzies in 1955 the landslide, historic election 
victory he had sought. All the while, agency and government did nothing to counter the 
image if impropriety – which only fuelled the gains given Evatt was their opponent – 
nor mitigate the undue advantage the situation actually presented. In April 1954, the 
benefit stood to include a Coalition victory, a weakened Labor Party and ASIO’s 
continued anti-communist crusade.  
 
Reactionary forces: The Movement 
 
The communist fear resulted in a number of reactionary groups over the decades. In the 
early 1930s the fascist New Guard Movement had some 55,000 members. 331  A 
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founding member and masked leader of this group was the then Chief Commissioner of 
Victoria Police, Major-General Thomas Blamey.332 In the 1940s, a new group called the 
Association – under Blamey again – formed a civilian militia designed to combat a 
potential communist uprising; some 130,000 people were members.333 Blamey was 
replaced as leader by another notable wartime figure, Lieutenant General Leslie 
Morshead.334 Both groups attracted the attention of the then intelligence agencies.335 
However, it does not appear that ASIO was concerned about one particularly influential 
group, the Catholic Social Studies Movement (‘the Movement’), believing it to be 
consumed by conspiracy.336 Equally, the Movement thought ASIO ineffectual against 
the “Coalition of the Left”.337 The Movement was created in the 1940s and served as a 
“semi-clandestine” organisation which engaged in many of the same practises as the 
Communist Party but to greater effect.338 According to Paul Ormonde, it aimed to purge 
the Catholic community, the church hierarchy, and Australian society at large of the 
twin evils of communism and socialism.339 This was so even though it correctly 
perceived a wane in Communist Party support in the late 1940s.340 Over the next decade 
the Movement, especially through the Industrial Groups, undertook what Santamaria 
described as the “cleansing” of trade unions of communists by systematically recruiting 
faithful workers in order to place pressure on Labor to adopt stronger anti-communist 
measures.341 Evatt at first tried to work with Santamaria’s, but eventually decided to 
oppose the Movement and in so doing provide context for the departure of a number of 
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Labor MPs.342 After the Labor split, a new “de facto Catholic” political party emerged, 
the DLP, which drew votes away from Labor until 1974, especially in the Senate.343 
ASIO’s lack of interest or concern in the Movement is striking, especially considering 
its penchant for communist-like subterfuge, clandestine interference in unions as well as 
a major political party, and the strong connection (at least initially) it had with the 
Vatican pseudo-state.344 It is important to remember that ASIO believed the Communist 
Party was not founded on a serious view of the world. It is evident the organisation took 
a lenient approach to clandestine groups that were undermining its more important 
targets. 
 
ASIO in the 1960s and early 1970s 
 
At the time of the 1958 election Spry perceived Labor as “acting in a way that could 
have threatened national security”. 345 But, Horner assures us, Spry “could have done 
much more damage to the ALP and showed considerable restraint in not doing so”.346 In 
the lead up to the election Spry and Menzies – as well as MI5’s Roger Hollis – 
pondered what actions would be required to preserve the Petrov papers if the Evatt’s 
Labor Party were to win an election.347 Menzies unilaterally gave the papers to the 
United States and United Kingdom.348 In the 1960s ASIO continued to remain focused 
on the Communist Party even as it continued to dwindle in significance, seemingly 
believing it capable of resurgence.349 This included university campuses because they 
did not “enjoy immunity”, especially since some organisations had not ruled out 
                                               
342 Murphy, Evatt, 302; Dyrenfurt & Frank Bongiorno, A Little History of the Australian Labor Party, 
111. 
343 “Federal Election Results 1901-2010,” Parliamentary Library; Ormonde, The Movement, 103. 
344 See Geoffrey Robertson, The Case of the Pope (London: Penguin, 2010).  
345 Horner, The Spy Catchers, 471. 
346 Ibid. 
347 Ibid., 470-471. 
348 Ibid., 471. 
349 Blaxland, The Protest Years, 78-79, 118. 
 63 
violence as an option per se.350 While the Communist Party was the “largest…extreme 
party”, the Official History argues there were “other equally if not more subversive 
groups” ASIO overlooked.351 For example, claims by the Yugoslavian government that 
there was an emergent terrorism threat posed to it from the Croatian community in 
Australia were thought “exaggerated” by ASIO.352 It is also important to appreciate the 
shift that had started in the Cold War by this time. From 1960, the Cambridge History 
estimates that there were more instances of “torture, assassination and other atrocities” 
that occurred as a result of decisions made by the United States government compared 
to decisions of the Soviet government.353 That is, once Stalinism faded the United States 
became the lead perpetrator of human rights violations during the Cold War. 
Nevertheless, the anti-communism of ASIO and the Australian Government expanded 
in scope during the 1960s. 
 
The Vietnam War 
 
The suppression of critical – often radical – opinion undertaken over the preceding 
decades enabled propagandistic messages about Vietnamese communism to thrive.354 
By the 1960s and early 1970s when the anti-war movement was at is peak, mission 
creep saw ASIO shift focus towards the Vietnam War Moratorium.355 The Moratorium 
also became a convergence point for many other socio-political grievances that had 
accumulated since the war.356  The connection between dissidents and communist 
subversives was the threat of foreign communism spreading from Asia, as well as a 
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suspicion that the Moratorium was organised by the Communist Party. 357  Like 
communists, anti-war protestors were seen as subversives bent on attacking the 
Commonwealth and, therefore, democracy.358 ASIO’s transition to the Moratorium 
movement was also political, according to McKnight: 
Politically, [ASIO’s practise of providing advice] allowed the government to 
reduce the protest activity to communist-inspired campaigns and, in a more 
partisan way, to criticize the Labor Party and leading Labor figures who 
participated in the protests.359 
Once more ASIO’s operations breached the divide between defence of the 
Commonwealth and protection of the Coalition government.360  The contempt felt 
toward the Moratorium was mutually felt within government, with Attorney-General 
Billy Snedden infamously accusing protestors of  “pack-raping democracy”.361 In terms 
of ASIO’s operations, the line between supporting the government and supporting the 
political party in office continued to be blurred in the 1960s. Attorney-General Tom 
Hughes – father-in-law to former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull – was informed by 
ASIO before a May 1970 march “that 68 Labor MPs had sponsored the proposed 
demonstration” and that “members of the Communist Party… held official positions in 
the organizing committees” of the movement.362 As a result Hughes “authorized ASIO 
to provide information” to the Coalition – which it subsequently did – on the 
moratorium movement.363 ASIO had also informed the same attorney-general that a 
“university student” was “considering taking legal action… and was going to seek 
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advice from an opposition MP”.364 The Official History argues ASIO “failed to draw… 
distinction” between the threat of communism and the emergence of “the protest 
movement”.365 Once more, it explains that “[ASIO] was not an independent actor, and 
was not working without government sanction”.366 Given the anti-communism driving 
ASIO its independence would have surely produced the same result. 
 
It is important to note that Labor was not radical in the 1960s. In a similar way to its 
anti-communism of earlier decades, Labor’s position on the Vietnam War was a 
generally supportive one. Labor reacted to the anti-war movement as it grew in 
popularity, with many of its senior members becoming involved by the early 1970s. But 
during this time the party did not adopt an anti-war policy, per se.367 The announcement 
by the Menzies Government in May 1962 that “military advisors” would join United 
States “advisors” being deployed by the Kennedy Administration (1961-1963) was met 
with “passive” acceptance by Labor, as the leadership – especially deputy leader Gough 
Whitlam – wanted to avoid “accusation of anti-Americanism”.368 Official historian of 
the war, Peter Edwards, argues the government was “secretive and arrogant” when it 
agreed in 1965 to send two battalions to Vietnam.369 Again, the concern of communism 
was paramount to policymakers.370 At the 1966 election Labor opposed the war because 
of the reintroduction of conscription and suffered as a result at the election, although it 
did so with heavy qualification.371 Under Whitlam as opposition leader, from 1967 until 
the election of 1972, the party effectively supported the war through its ambiguity, 
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although the party membership insisted on withdrawal if peace talks were agreed to by 
the United States.372 Labor’s ambiguity meant the Moratorium “revitalised” the party’s 
supporters and sympathisers. 373  This kind of nuance-cum-obfuscation was not 
uncommon during the war. For example, the New York Times opposed the manner in 
which the war was waged, not the underlying sentiment.374 By the 1972 election the 
McMahon Government had “completed Australia’s military withdrawal from South 





At the time of ASIO’s creation, the Chifley Government intended that the organisation 
operate without ministerial interference in terms of its operations and raw intelligence 
collection. Attorney-General Evatt explained to Parliament: 
To all intents and purposes the Director-General of Security is free from 
ministerial direction. That arrangement is essential in order to maintain 
minimum internal security…376 
But during the 1960s ministerial interference in ASIO’s operations was established 
practise, despite passive-aggressive resistance from senior officers.377 According to 
McKnight, “all Attorneys General” between 1962 and 1972 had access to ASIO’s raw 
intelligence, a practise undertaken especially “when the government was under political 
pressure”.378  He believes that a “prime factor” in tensions between Labor and ASIO 
arose out of the perceived “hypocrisy” of the organisation’s official position – not to 
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make public comment – and the unofficial position, handing information to 
“government members”.379 He explains that “almost all” of this conduct was “at the 
request of the government”, especially through attorneys-general.380 There was also a 
“long-standing practice” of providing “backbench MPs” with “public information… not 
based on covert intelligence sources”.381 Even if backbenchers are in the same party as 
the members of the government, they remain political figures outside the executive. 
ASIO’s complicity in this practise is not to say it was unaware of a possible perception 
of impropriety. This is evident in the detailed accounts of meetings between directors-
general and prime ministers and attorneys-general kept by ASIO between 1954 and 
1976.382 McKnight describes this log as “an insurance policy against future accusations 
of misconduct”. 383 One could equally see it as evidence that ASIO knew it was engaged 
in misconduct but wanted to have sufficient evidence to establish its contemporaneous 
discomfort. McKnight argues the 1956 Act undermined the autonomy of ASIO by 
blurring the extent to which the attorney-general and prime minister were entitled to 
direct the organisation through its director-general.384   
 
McKnight continues this argument in relation to a minute written by Spry in 1966 after 
a meeting with Prime Minister Harold Holt: 
I then went on to explain… that in my view statements regarding security should 
be reduced to a minimum and there would be some merit in the future that where 
I was asked for security information by a Minister and I considered it had 
political ramifications, I could say to the source of the enquiry that I felt this 
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should be discussed with the Prime Minister before statements were made upon 
it. 
Spry was not revolting against the undue influence of an oppressive minister. Indeed, he 
was merely offering the chance of a later suggestion to the Prime Minister about his 
possible involvement; he was not guaranteeing such action, nor was he suggesting 
access to the information would be refused in any way. It took Spry until 1968 to ask 
Prime Minister John Gorton for permission to provide the Leader of the Opposition, 
Arthur Calwell, with regular briefings.385 This suggestion was “rebuffed” by Calwell.386 
 
ASIO in the last years of the Coalition’s long time in office had become a political 
research unit of a kind. McKnight argues the McMahon Government (1971-1972) was 
the worst for interference: 
In this period the extent to which a minister could direct the security agency to 
provide security information for partisan purposes was taken to its furthest 
limit.387 
A 1971 ASIO minute, recording the first meeting between the new attorney-general, 
Ivor Greenwood, and Director-General Peter Barbour, reveals a subservience on the part 
of ASIO, and obfuscation. It was recorded that Barbour informed Greenwood, “the 
preparation of material for the purpose of informing the public was not strictly part of 
the functions of ASIO”. While Greenwood “agreed… he pointed out that it was a 
function of ASIO to advise Ministers and that Ministers could perform the exposure”. 
McKnight explains: 
Greenwood’s response to Barbour’s warning neatly highlighted the mechanism 
which had been used for years by the government to release politically useful 
material collected by the security service.388 
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This kind of conduct lends insight into what the director-general was thinking, but it 
does not establish innocence. On the contrary, it demonstrates that he knew the minister 
was acting inappropriately but proceeded to comply regardless. Despite being alert to 
the political nature of the request, ASIO immediately supplied Greenwood with “a 
stream of reports… including raw intelligence”. 389  The organisation did attempt 
resistance in “two instances in 1970” when Barbour “resisted requests to provide 
information which was clearly partisan”.390 But “such resistance was patchy”.391 Two 
attorneys-general over this time conveyed a desire to avoid the appearance of 
partisanship on the part of ASIO, yet continued the practise at an elevated rate.392 In 
1971, Barbour claimed to have said to Greenwood that he found it “scarcely surprising” 
that Labor was divided on whether to abolish ASIO because it “had no opportunity to 
be informed of ASIO’s work”.393 Given the amount of political information shared to 
Coalition governments this can hardly have been the case. It is also contrary to 
established practise in the United Kingdom, where the opposition is informed of MI5’s 
work, which has arguably led to greater bipartisan support for it over a longer period of 
time.394  
 
The Official History argues the government had an appropriate “arm’s-length 
management” of ASIO – a “studied indifference” – because its “political masters did 
not want to know anything about… methods of obtaining the information”.395 However, 
it does not overlook the presence of political influence in the pre-ASIO organisations:  
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The unfortunate and long-lasting effect of [the Hughes Government (1915-
1923)] approach was that some politicians believed they were justified in using 
intelligence organisations to attack their political opponents. And perhaps even 
more damaging, the belief arose among those concerned about civil liberties that 
the SIB and its successors [including ASIO] had been established primarily to 
conduct political surveillance. This belief was to persist in some quarters for 
almost a century…396 
McKnight offers a more balanced conclusion: 
In effect ASIO was pressing for and occasionally exercising a degree of 
professional autonomy which allowed them to judge what was a security matter 
and to whom they should give advice regardless of the minister’s wishes.397 
The argument is somewhat inconsistent, as ASIO could not have been pressing for 
autonomy and only offering patchy resistance. On McKnight’s evidence it seems more 
accurate to argue that the organisation possessed deference to the government, 
stemming from a shared worldview.  If ASIO was unable to avoid embroiling itself in 
the political machinations of government, its policy to “resolve… doubts in the 
Commonwealth’s favour” must have compounded the problem.398 Moreover, the Royal 
Commission on Intelligence and Security found that ministerial interference was a 
problem in the management of ASIO, as chapter nine demonstrates.  
 
Labor’s internal quarrel 
 
The Labor Party membership was divided on the issue of whether to abolish ASIO if 
the party succeeded at the next election. An abolition motion, lodged by Bob Gould, 
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was defeated at the 1971 Labor Conference by only one vote.399 The chairman, Lionel 
Murphy, was responsible for casting the deciding vote because of a tie, arguing that 
ASIO “filled a necessary function and needed simply to be made accountable”.400 
Although this failed, another policy succeeded: the establishment of an administrative 
appeals tribunal to oversee organisations within the intelligence and security apparatus 
and the ministerial oversight of ASIO. 401  As chairman of Labor’s Legal and 
Constitutional Committee, Murphy played an integral role in drafting the 
recommendations that became part of the party platform.402 As late as 1973 the 
Victorian Branch of the Labor Party – under the stewardship of future foreign minister 
Gareth Evans – narrowly defeated an abolition motion.403 A future Cabinet minister 
Clyde Cameron launched a “major attack” on “Government secrecy”, according to the 
Australian, less than a month before the 1972 election in a speech made to the Institute 
of Personnel Management.404 Cameron declared, “[t]he survival of democracy does not 
require the adoption of some of the evils of the police state”.405 In order to remedy 
ASIO’s transgressions, he said “a Labor Government will establish an administrative 
court of appeals… to lay down regulations governing the conduct of members of ASIO 
and other security organisations and to hear, determine and report to Parliament on the 
breach of any such regulations”.406 One of Whitlam’s key advisors, Jim Spigelman – 
future Chief Justice of the NSW Supreme Court – published a book in 1972 arguing 
strongly for greater transparency and accountability in government.407 When Gough 
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Whitlam came to office on 2 December 1972 – the first Labor government since 1949 – 




                                               




IV. Scholarly Perspectives on the Royal Commission 
 
The focus of research by scholars has been the significance of the Royal Commission. 
On this scholars agree; Hope’s first inquiry was important. But there is disagreement on 
the extent to which it improved ASIO and the Australian intelligence community more 
generally. It is also clear that until now no work has been done that specifically focuses 
on the reason the Royal Commission came to be. This chapter will consider how 
scholars have viewed the Royal Commission in the years since Hope handed down his 
findings and recommendations. Particular focus will be paid to a select group of 
scholars who have made notable contributions to this discourse. As such, David 
McKnight, the Official History of ASIO, and Jenny Hocking will be discussed in turn, 




Associate Professor David McKnight’s 1994 work, Australian Spies and Their Secrets, 
is one of the most comprehensive accounts of the origins of the Royal Commission. 
McKnight charts the history of ASIO from its inception. According to McKnight’s 
account, the Royal Commission arose as a result of the government’s long-term 
mismanagement of the issue of reforming ASIO and the short-term trigger of the Cairns 
dossier in 1974. After the controversy of the Murphy raid – involving Attorney-General 
Lionel Murphy – in March 1973 had dimmed by the following August, Whitlam 
announced that he was “considering the appointment of a judge to inquire into 
ASIO”.409 Eight months later the Whitlam Government was re-elected with an inquiry 
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into ASIO as part of its policy platform.410 But, as this thesis shows, it was not until 
nine months had passed that the re-elected government decided to act. A leaked ASIO 
document on Deputy Prime Minister Jim Cairns was published by the Bulletin, 
attracting widespread concern. 411  As a result, this “directly led” to the Royal 
Commission being established.412 It will be shown that this general timeframe of the 
inquiry’s origins is accurate. 
 
While McKnight does not discuss the origins of the Royal Commission in detail, it is 
evident that he believes the inquiry marked a significant moment in ASIO’s history.  
For him, Hope “was drawn into the world view and mystique of security intelligence” 
and ultimately failed to bring about fundamental reform of the organisation.413  
The great failing of Hope and his small staff was that they treated ASIO as if it 
was some sort of hallowed institution so delicate that any public cross-
examination or even rap on the knuckles would damage or destroy it... Hope’s 
main problem was that he lacked intellectual boldness and failed to tackle 
fundamentals… He also took a conscious decision to muffle his public 
criticisms and translate them into a bureaucratic code, though in secret his 
reports were more scathing… The prime failing of the Hope Inquiry was its 
promotion of the traditional notion of subversion in a new guise, the concept of 
‘active measures’… a term largely drawn from the CIA.414  
The failure of Hope, according to McKnight, in part arose because the inquiry itself was 
secretive but also because of ideological factors: 
[T]he best and most effective antidote to what was essentially propaganda was 
the sunlight of openness, democracy and free debate both within the public and 
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within policy making bodies. But this was inimical to intelligence organisations 
whose self-interest and ideology coincided in a prescription which involved 
surveillance, stronger security agencies and suspicion of those with different 
views… Hope constantly stressed the great care and judgment needed by ASIO 
in investigating and surveilling subversion. But in reality subversion was a will 
o’the wisp, defined according to the political prejudices and culture of a security 
agency at any given time.415 
What McKnight is arguing is that the inquiry conducted by Hope did not conduct itself 
according to democratic ideals; a fundamental flaw. It could therefore not identify the 
inherently undemocratic nature of ASIO as well as its purpose, maintaining the 
organisation’s delusion. But he sees the Royal Commission as having been significant 
to the reform process: 
Hope helped reform ASIO in spite of being captured by the intelligence 
mystique… The results of the Hope Inquiry, especially when viewed with 
critical hindsight are deceptive. Even though he offered a new lease of life for 
ASIO the very fact that the inquiry was undertaken at all meant ASIO had 
ultimately to be formally accountable to governments and to the people not just 
to the secretive establishment within Australian and overseas security circles.416 
One of the most important arguments in McKnight’s 1994 is that ASIO was heavily 
involved with the CIA. Indeed, he argues the organisation’s very existence is owed to 
Australia’s foreign policy subservience: 
[ASIO] persists as part of annual tithe which Australians pay to be members of a 
Western defence alliance, primarily with the United States. Its creation in 1949 
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was the price demanded by Britain and the US for continuing access to defence-
related rocket technology.417 
This conclusion is not inconsistent with the argument made by the Official History. He 
also criticises the obsequious nature of Hope’s report on ASIO in that it “reads as a kind 
of bureaucratic code in which all sorts of errors, excesses and incompetence are hinted 
at but never spelt out”.418 
 
In subsequent work McKnight moderates his position on the significance and 
contribution of Hope’s first “far-reaching” inquiry, as well as his view of ASIO more 
generally.419 According to him, “[p]artisan activity by the security agency was largely 
attributable to strong ministerial control rather than agency autonomy” even though “the 
agency also developed its own political agenda”.420 He attributed this conclusion to his 
own “extensive archival research” but also the Royal Commission’s report:421  
“One of the overall aims of the inquiry… was to prescribe the correct balance in 
the relationship between a security agency and a government”.422  
McKnight argues that neither the “political control” over ASIO nor the degree of its 
“autonomy” were clearly defined at the time the Royal Commission was setup.423 But 
“Hope clearly recognized the agency was not out of control [quotations removed]”, 
rather there was too much political interference on the part of the government who had 
been issuing “directives”. 424  For McKnight, “[m]ost scholars interpreted Hope’s 
recommendations as merely boosting the powers of the agency and thus exacerbating 
the problem” whereas other scholars “insisted that ministerial control must be 
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strengthened, unaware that it had played a large role in the politicization of ASIO”.425 
That is, he sees the debate as divided between scholars who think the Royal 
Commission rightly resulted in greater legal autonomy of ASIO and scholars who think 
it should have recommended greater oversight by increasing the powers of the 
Attorney-General. However, he only cites one scholar, journalist David Marr, to 
substantiate this ‘debate’. Nevertheless, his argument is persuasive because the 
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 – passed in response to the 
fourth report – culminated in a second royal commission finding that “the balance had 
swung too far in favour of [ASIO’s] autonomy”.426  
 
According to McKnight, the central issue in ASIO’s pre-Royal Commission history was 
the difficulties with democratic oversight within the Westminster system. 427  In 
Australia, the executive wields considerable influence in the legislature. This is so 
because the governing party must command the confidence of a majority of the 
members of the lower house.428 As such, a majority government can exercise greater 
influence in order to diminish the role of the legislature in matters of ministerial 
responsibility and parliamentary oversight. McKnight sees ASIO’s “undoubted partisan 
behaviour [as]… largely stemmed from close ‘democratic’ control by ministers who 
sought to take advantage of the power and secrecy of the security agency”.429 
Conversely, he argues that oversight of intelligence agencies in the United States is 
easier to achieve because of the clearer separation between the executive and legislature 
in their system.430 McKnight allows for “a great many shared assumptions between 
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ASIO and its ministerial heads”.431 Yet, he rejects the notion of an ideological marriage 
of convenience: 
[T]he instances of (rather ineffectual) resistance by senior ASIO figures to 
 blatantly political requests indicates that the problem ultimately lay in 
 untrammelled political control. If anything the problem was too much 
‘accountability to ministers’. 
When the interests of agency and government converged, there was cooperation; when 
the interests diverged, there was passive-aggressive resistance. He also dismisses the 
1971 attempts within Labor to make the abolition of ASIO policy as “ignorance”.432  
 
Official History of ASIO 
 
The Official History has significantly improved the primary source evidence available 
to scholars studying and researching ASIO’s early history. The Official History is 
divided into three volumes, with the first and second volumes being of particular 
relevance to this thesis. Volume one, The Spy Catchers, is written by Emeritus 
Professor David Horner and covers the history of ASIO until 1963. Volume two, The 
Protest Years, is written by Professor John Blaxland and covers the history of ASIO 
from 1963 until 1975. Volume three, The Secret Cold War, is written by Blaxland and 
Doctor Rhys Crawley and covers ASIO’s history from 1975 until 1989. The entire work 
is edited by Horner.  
 
The Whitlam Government’s time in office is seen as being a significant period in the 
history of ASIO, with the emergence of the Royal Commission as its climax. Blaxland 
introduces the inquiry at the end of volume two: “ASIO knew that its outcome would 
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have a fundamental effect on its structure, operations and perhaps even existence”.433 If 
those within the organisation felt it posed an existential threat they were surely 
paranoid, as such feeling was at odds with the rhetoric of the Whitlam Government and 
Labor: 
Despite the high drama, ASIO’s fate was never really under threat, but the 
careers of several senior ASIO officers clearly were.434  
Blaxland believes that “Whitlam and Murphy” had “settled into the job” by 1974 and 
“rightly saw that ASIO’s raison d'être remained valid”.435 There is recognition that the 
Whitlam Government was neither anti-ASIO nor opposed to domestic intelligence 
gathering: 
The Whitlam Government departed from the foreign policy and intelligence 
script of its predecessors. Yet while many policies were challenged and several 
overturned, there remained a number of significant continuities; this included an 
enduring recognition of the important role ASIO had to play as an instrument of 
state.436 
In 1975, “ASIO would stand at the cusp of a period of significant reform”.437 But the 
Royal Commission was not alone in driving ASIO reform; the organisation itself had 
already “foreshadowed recommendations” made by the Royal Commission.438 And the 
Whitlam Government was also instrumental: 
ASIO… had its foundations shaken to the core by the Whitlam Government and 
particularly… Murphy. The Whitlam Government came to office with a strong 
agenda for reform… [T]he organisation was slowly becoming more centrally 
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positioned as part of the Australian federal government bureaucracy, being 
accepted by both sides of politics.439 
As we will see the attorney-general - and, later, Hope and Whitlam – similarly believed 
that reform on ASIO had advanced considerably by the time the Royal Commission 
handed down its reports. 
 
As considerable weight is placed on the independence of the work by ASIO, the 
Australian Government, and the official historians, it is prudent to consider the degree 
of independence in which was written. With the approval of the first Rudd Government 
(2007-2010) the work was commissioned in 2008 by Director-General of Security Paul 
O’Sullivan “to coincide with” the declassification of parts of the Royal Commission’s 
reports.440 According to O’Sullivan and the public call for tender, the prospective 
history would be written by “suitably qualified individuals or organisations who will be 
able to write a balanced, independent history using information sourced from ASIO’s 
archives”. 441  The resulting contract between ASIO and the Australian National 
University (ANU) – after it won the tender process within two days – remains 
classified, although a cost of $1,757,981 was declared. 442  Horner attests to the 
independence of the project at the beginning of the Spy Catchers where he describes 
how this was ensured: the project had “full and unfettered access to ASIO’s records”, 
operated at ANU in order “to keep some academic distance from [the organisation]”, 
and insisted on “not accept[ing] any direction from ASIO as to how [the research team] 
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would tell the story”.443 In fact, Horner went as far to reject the idea that an official 
history could be biased: “an official history of an organisation is not the organisation’s 
view of its history and its assessment of its own achievements”.444 This thesis accepts 
that the work is independent of ASIO, but it is clear that the work is written from a 
sympathetic worldview. It is also demonstrable that it was written with the present day 
organisation in mind, as we are assured that “ASIO’s officers were, and are, normal, 
dedicated Australians”.445 Horner explains that the research team, tasked with distilling 
conclusions from ASIO’s archives, did not focus on “issues [that] seemed less 
important when viewed from within ASIO” even if they were “widely publicised” at the 
time.446 This presents a problem in that he also promises to counter “half-truths” 
perpetuated and perpetuating.447 As we will see in chapter nine, Hope found that ASIO 
had often been distracted from its central objective. Similarly, some secondary sources 
are overlooked despite Horner’s commitment “to engage with the view and arguments 
about ASIO that have appeared in books and articles over the past three decades”.448 
Most notably, he overlooks Professor Jenny Hocking’s Terror Laws.449 It should also be 
considered that the Official History is already influencing political and historical 
discourse. This was demonstrated by George Brandis, former attorney-general, in 2014 
when he lauded ASIO’s the late director-general Charles Spry: “a very great 
Australian… who did more than almost any other official in the service of the 
Commonwealth to protect our democratic institutions”.450   
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Hocking’s Terror Laws 
 
Another scholar of significance to the history of the Royal Commission is Professor 
Jenny Hocking, who has considerable research experience on the history of the Whitlam 
Government. Her most notable contribution to the history of ASIO was her 2004 work 
Terror Laws which discusses the progression of Australia’s domestic intelligence and 
security apparatus on the issue of terrorism since the 1970s. The Royal Commission, 
from its origins to its findings, does not form the focus of her work.  
 
From Hocking’s perspective the inquiry arose quickly but was “not unexpected” given 
the Whitlam Government’s pre-election commitment to launch a judicial inquiry.451 
Initially, the government wanted to call some kind of inquiry into ASIO when it came to 
office, but circumstances changed. The change in circumstances occurred because of the 
March 1973 Murphy raid on ASIO offices.452 She explains: 
[T]he security sector, which had for years operated free of any ministerial 
guidance, saw in Murphy’s actions, and in the words of the former head of CIA 
counter-espionage James Jesus Angleton, an attempt ‘to destroy the delicate 
mechanism of internal security’. The melodramatic imagery of the ‘raid’, as it 
became immediately labeled (Murphy always preferred to call it a ‘ministerial 
visit’), provided an instant diversion from the issues precipitating the seizure of 
files…453 
Hocking clearly perceives the Attorney-General’s actions as falling within his 
ministerial duties. But Hope took a different view on both the extent of ministerial 
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oversight of ASIO and the legitimacy of Murphy’s raid.454 For her the change in 
political circumstances prevented an inquiry at that time: 
It was a measure of the political unacceptability of Murphy’s ministerial visit 
that no inquiry into these issues occurred at that time – though the impact of the 
event was so significant that the later establishment of the Royal Commission… 
can be seen as a delayed response to it.455 
As we shall see, the raid had been a disastrous gamble. 
 
The immediate trigger for the Royal Commission was the publication of a leaked ASIO 
document. The document in question was a profile on Deputy Prime Minister Jim 
Cairns undertaken by an ASIO officer. She states that it became public in June 1974 and 
immediately became 
an invaluable insight into ASIO’s attitude towards… popular dissent (in 
particular the relationship between protest and terrorism), its perception of the 
nature of liberal democracy, and its corresponding conception of activities and 
ideologies which presented a threat to the viability of a democracy.456 
Unlike the Attorney-General’s raid on ASIO offices in March of the previous year, this 
document gave the government a political advantage. It was, as Hocking writes, “[a] 
more acceptable premise on which to base the inquiry’s eventual establishment”.457 She 
explains: 
The Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security was set up in August 1974 
at a time of some turbulence in government and security relations. This 
turbulence underscored the expectation that the Royal Commission would 
suggest radical changes in the operations and accountability of Australia’s 
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security services, and possibly even the abolition of some. Speculation that the 
commission would result in at least a major administrative reorganisation was 
strengthened by the announcement that Mr Justice Hope… would head it. Hope 
was considered ‘an acknowledged small l-liberal’, ‘a champion of civil 
liberties’… The prospect of the inquiry being highly critical of the security 
services was further bolstered by continuing revelations of the widespread 
abuses overseas by security services…”458 
This thesis will argue that “radical change” was not expected by the press, the United 
States, or the Whitlam Government. 
 
With regards to the Royal Commission more generally, Hocking is critical. One of her 
main concerns is that Hope admits to having overlooked ASIO’s past conduct. This was 
despite a clear intention by the Whitlam Government, through the terms of reference, 
for Hope to consider such conduct. Hope explained in the fourth report that ASIO’s 
records were shambolic and that he believed his “task is to make recommendations for 
the future rather than to seek to track down the truth or otherwise of past errors”.459 
Hocking shows that Hope’s view was in direct conflict with the inquiry’s terms of 
reference. 460  She does not accept the resource constraints placed on the Royal 
Commission as a legitimate excuse. Hope also had a moral obligation to resolve ASIO’s 
history on behalf of the organisation’s alleged victims, as well as an obligation to the 
public more generally to come to terms with the organisation and its role in Australia’s 
democracy.461 Another major concern of Hocking’s are the “sweeping exemptions from 
ministerial control” Hope recommended.462 She shares Murphy’s belief that greater 
ministerial control of ASIO was necessary under the principle of responsible 
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government in the Westminster system.463 Conversely, she appears to believe that Hope 
was advocating legal positivism because he allowed legislation to determine the extent 
of ministerial control.464 To that end, Hope recommended that the ASIO Act be amended 
to make the director-general’s extensive discretionary powers clearer.465 Hocking also 
believes that the Royal Commission was limited by the circumstances in which it 
operated: 
The report of 1974 Hope Royal Commission has had a significant influence on 
the operations of Australia’s security services. Although there have been many 
criticisms of its findings and recommendations, the fact that this Royal 
Commission was the first major inquiry into these organisations, coupled with 
the clandestine character of much of their activities, meant that there was little 
other information available with which to construct alternatives.466 
She believes that it began a process of “legitimizing… past transgressions and ensuring 
their continuation”; what had once been ASIO’s “depart[ure] from ‘legality’” was to 
become “a post hoc justification for criminal activity by… the state”.467 While the 
1970s and 1980s brought “unprecedented inquiry and public scrutiny, resulting in great 
changes in ASIO’s functions and operations”, the end result was “the promotion of” the 
malleable crime of “terrorism as the major contemporary basis for domestic security 
operations”.468 For the sake of completeness, it should be noted when it comes to the 
commentary on the Royal Commission, Terror Laws takes vast sections of text from a 
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1984 article Hocking wrote as a postgraduate student without expanding on its research 
(and without acknowledgement).469  
 
Other scholarly perspectives 
 
There have been a number of other scholars who have made contributions towards the 
scholarship on the Royal Commission. Again, the focus of research has been on the 
impact of Hope’s findings and recommendations. Almost all scholars have perceived 
the Royal Commission as a turning point in Australia’s democracy, whereby the 
intelligence apparatus transformed from its semi-legal existence into a legitimate 
manifestation of executive power in a representative democracy.  
 
Professor Mark Finnane sees the Royal Commission as having begun a “process of 
reform” the legitimised the intelligence apparatus after a decade of heightened 
contention.470 This was achieved by the Parliament introducing greater oversight into 
the executive’s activities with regards to intelligence work.471 He argues that Labor has 
been the driving force of reform in the area of intelligence because it erected the two 
Hope royal commissions.472 For this, he identifies a trend through Australian history. 
Starting at federation in 1901, political discourse on the “safety of Australia” has always 
been divided between the secrecy necessary for intelligence gathering against the need 
for public accountability and scrutiny.473 He concludes that Australians in the age of 
terror should seek solace in a greater degree of “balance” between “national security 
priorities [and] defending inherited liberties” in political rhetoric, as compared to the 
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United States.474 But, he wrote that his research did not seek to determine what “impact” 
the Royal Commission had on “the operations and accountability of ASIO”. 475 
Nevertheless, he clearly believes Hope strengthened oversight functions for the benefit 
of future generations. 
 
Former intelligence officers Warren Reed and Christopher J. Ward see the Royal 
Commission as having failed to ignite the kind of reforms it recommended. This failure 
is attributed to the secrecy of the Royal Commission’s findings and recommendations, 
as well as the director-general at that time, Justice Edward Woodward.476 Reed and 
Ward argue that the Royal Commission, however, began the “transformation of [ASIO] 
into a 20th-century intelligence service, far removed from the quasi-military structure” 
which had characterised the organisation until that time. 477  Yet, the Royal 
Commission’s significance to the present day organisation is minimal given 
the great changes that have occurred in the global community since the Hope 
Royal Commission took place. The rise of China and its impact on Australia are 
possibly the major challenge… and the continuing threat of Islamic 
fundamentalism…478 
The authors also argue that the systemic problems of “[m]ateship, cronyism and the 
political wish to avoid embarrassment” continued to diminish ASIO’s counter-
intelligence effectiveness in 2008.479  Hope was constrained because his terms of 
reference stopped him from establishing whether ASIO had been compromised by 
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Soviet intelligence, as United States and United Kingdom counterparts believed (see 
chapter nine).480 To these ex-officers the Royal Commission had a powerful effect: 
Stripped of its veneer, the 1977 Hope Report must surely rate as one of the most 
damning documents in the history of intelligence… Seen from our point of view 
as former intelligence officers (one in ASIO) who served during the period of 
the Royal Commission, the Hope report contains both an accurate and painful 
summation of conditions then evident in the organisation…481 
The authors are inaccurate on the origins of the Royal Commission. They erroneously 
claim that it arose after the Murphy raid and after Director-General Peter Barbour was 
removed.482 The authors express concern at the “unwarranted criticism” ASIO received 
in the past, including the media’s response to the 2008 declassification.483 
 
Another former ASIO agent, Bill Calcutt, believes the two Hope royal commissions 
lifted the “cloak of absolute secrecy” by attracting public interest to ASIO.484 Part of 
what it revealed to the public was the nature of intelligence work as being based not in 
facts but interpretation and inference; a distinction he argues has once again been 
blurred during the War on Terror.485 Doctoral candidate Andrew D. Brunatti believes 
the most significant impact of the royal commissions was the apportionment of 
managerial “responsibility” within Australia’s intelligence community.486 He argues 
they “helped formulate and cement a community focus that was increasingly accepted 
by the principal actors” so that, instead of the apparatus being comprised of competing 
                                               
480 Reed and Ward, “Australian Intelligence,” 33, 38. 
481 Ibid., 35. 
482 Ibid., 34. 
483 Ibid., 31. 
484 Bill Calcutt, “The Role of Intelligence in Shaping Public Perceptions of Terrorism,” Journal of 
Policing, Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism 3, no. 1, (2008): 32. 
485 Ibid., 33-34. 
486 Andrew D. Brunatti, “The Architecture of Community: Intelligence Community Management in  
Australia, Canada and New Zealand.” Public Policy and Administration 28, no. 2, (2012): 122. 
 89 
agencies, it was reformed to ensure cooperation and cohesiveness. 487  Thus, the 
Australian intelligence community was born in the 1970s and 1980s, as a ‘community’ 
had not existed before. A negative view of Hope’s work is held by jurist Ben Saul to the 
extent that the Royal Commission impacted on refugees. He believes the Royal 
Commission had ramifications for refugees coming to Australia in more recent decades 
because Hope argued that administrative appeals could be made after adverse 
assessments of a person are made by ASIO. However, this right of appeal would not 
extend to those without citizenship or permanent residence, even though terrorists can 
be ‘home grown’.488 As we shall see, this was Whitlam Government policy before it 
was Hope’s. According to Garry Woodward, the Royal Commission arose out of the 
“probably inevitable frictions between the government and ASIO” after the 1972 
election.489 He frames the decision in the context of Australia’s foreign policy: 
Australia was now contributing to the international community not as a servant 
but as a respected and interesting partner. This is a significant role for a small 
country which must live by its wits and pursue its national interests through 
persuasion .490 
Further to this, the new government’s approach to its own intelligence community 
in turn sharpened prejudices against Whitlam and his colleagues harboured at 
the Nixon-Kissinger levels and below in Washington.491 
This thesis will demonstrate that the United States saw the Royal Commission, at least, 
much more positively than the Murphy raids. 
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V: Contemporary perspectives on ASIO and an inquiry  
 
This chapter will briefly discuss public discourse from the time in order to understand 
the immediate context in which the decision to launch the Royal Commission was 
made. To achieve this the thesis will predominantly focus on broadsheet newspapers for 
four reasons. Firstly, the major journalistic commentary in this period was provided by 
through medium. Secondly, notable television and radio interviews from the time were 
widely discussed in their pages. Accessing archived television and radio interviews 
would have also consumed considerable time. Thirdly, tabloid newspapers did not cover 
ASIO or intelligence issues and, when they did, often did so with hefty cliché. The 
National Library’s collection of press clippings about intelligence from the time, 
although incomplete, contains very few tabloid articles to warrant arduous research of 
microfilm collections. Fourthly, as discussed below, less than a third of the populace 
knew of ASIO.  
 
Age old debates, especially the legitimacy of government power to interfere in 
democracy, can be read into the commentary although most commentators appear to 
have been only aware of the partisan political ramifications. Importantly, what press 
coverage shows from 1974 was that contemporary commentators distrusted ASIO and 
believed that an inquiry of some kind was needed to determine necessary reform. All of 
the newspaper editorials that commented on the situation desired reform, while some 
commentators questioned the need for a domestic intelligence agency at all. On balance, 
editorials and opinion writers were sympathetic of the Whitlam Government’s position. 
This public consensus gave the government an opportunity to implement the policy it 
formulated before the 1974 election. Many journalistic commentators and opinion 
writers believed that the government was aware of “the danger of having an intelligence 
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service that identifie[d] its future as rosier under an alternative Government”.492 A 
distinction must be drawn between criticism of ASIO’s efficacy and criticism of 
domestic intelligence gathering in general. Most criticism of ASIO pertained to the 
organisation’s efficacy. Few editorials, journalists and other commentators went so far 
as to question whether domestic intelligence gathering was a legitimate practice within 
a representative democracy. This is not surprising when we consider how entrenched 
our institutions of government are. ASIO’s obsession with radicalism does not appear to 
have enlivened much concern either. This is in contrast to the organisation’s 
partisanship, which animated many commentators. In 1974 Australia’s press was 
predominately controlled by business whose financial interests and shareholders would 
not have been served by the expression of outrage about ASIO’s suppression of 
socialism and communism.493 The commentary was also driven by politically engaged 
persons, as over two-thirds of the populace knew of ASIO; an opinion poll taken 
months after the highly publicised Murphy raids indicated this.494  
 
For the purpose of this chapter it is important to know of two events, which will be 
discussed more completely later. In March 1973, Attorney-General Lionel Murphy 
launched a raid – as it quickly became known – of ASIO’s Canberra office and its 
headquarters in Melbourne. Murphy wanted to acquire information he believed had 
been kept from him deliberately; an action he saw as in violation of his rights as 
minister overseeing ASIO. In June 1974 a leaked ASIO document discussing Deputy 
                                               
492 Maximilian Walsh, “The Affair of the ‘Faceless Seventy’,” Sun-Herald, 26 August 1973, 17, 44; 
Russell Schneider, “Spies in Our Midst: Who’s Watching the Watchers?,” The Australian, 25 June 1974, 
9; Niki Savva, “A new spy mystery: what is MO9?” Australian, 24 June 1974, 1; Clancy, “Behind MO9,” 
National Times, 1 July 1974, 5; Brian Toohey, “Just what is MO9? McMahon blows the whistle on 
spies,” Australian Financial Review, 24 June 1974, 3, 8; George Negus, “Labor’s New Dilemma Over 
ASIO”, Australian Financial Review, 12 July 1974, 16; Allan Barnes, “Whiltam gets two birds with one 
stone,” Age, 17 Feburary 1973, 15; Fred Brenchley, “Bring out your dead – ASIO thinks they are a 
security risk,” National Times, 5 March 1973, 9. 
493 Cf. Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent. 
494 Australian, “Secret service really secret,” 26 May 1973, 4. 
 92 
Prime Minister Jim Carins was published in the Bulletin. As a result, the government 




News Corporation, as it is now known, founded the Australian in 1964 as a “thinking” 
person’s newspaper concerned with individualism and “the nation’s welfare”.495 At this 
time it was seen as an advocate for “the progressive cause” and attracted Australia’s 
“knowledge class”.496  The editorial had endorsed Labor at the 1972 election and 
praised the Whitlam Government for its economic stewardship shortly after the 1974 
election. 497  However, the Australian began pursuing the electoral defeat of the 
government in 1975.498 The editorial gave a scathing critique of ASIO stating that 
evidence of the organisation’s “virtues” must have been limited to its classified 
material, given so “few… [were] on public display”.499 The paper believed that ASIO 
arose in 1949 out of a need to establish credibility with the United States and the United 
Kingdom by “target[ing]… Australian citizens who opposed [them], or who were in any 
other way openly antagonistic to our friends in Washington”.500 But ASIO’s actions “at 
the height of the Cold War” were justified and reform of this “primary objective” was 
essential.501  It is also noted that the organisation had remained fixated with the 
communist threat: “[t]imes changed, but ASIO did not.” The paper called for a “new” 
apparatus as “no security institution which is seen to be a joke can be called either 
efficient or secure”.502 ASIO had not adapted with changing times.503 It is clear that the 
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Australian was written with an understanding of realpolitik; democracy was necessarily 
subject to the demands of more power foreign states and the government had acted 
legitimately.  
 
While its concern was for ASIO’s deficiencies there was also a belief that democracy 
should be allowed to expand: 
Part of its function must be to suggest new and modern guidelines for the 
conduct of a security organisation in a world which is no longer polarised 
between Stalin and the West; where citizens can no longer be held to be un-
Australian for opposing Establishment views; and in which our notion of 
Australian democracy is as much at danger from right extremism as it is from 
left extremism… The future of Australian democracy depends more on the 
preservation of free speech than it does on the surveillance of those who use it. 
That is the principle, carelessly overlooked by the old ASIO, which must guide 
the new one.504   
Thus, a new line should be drawn between legitimate and illegitimate exchange of 
political views. As with many commentators, the editorial saw an inquiry of some kind 
as integral to reform; a position it had held since the Murphy raid when it had compared 
ASIO to the Gehlen.505 
 
According to journalist Russell Schneider in the Australian, the pre-election promise to 
hold an inquiry into Australia’s intelligence apparatus had bipartisan support at the time 
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of the Bulletin leak: “[t]he general feeling among both Liberal and Labor backbenchers 
was that ASIO’s professional standing must come under scrutiny if its other 
assessments were based on the same source material as that on Dr Cairns.”506 He 
speculated that “some members of the Government” would press for “a more defined 
statement of the duties and obligations of the intelligence sleuths”.507 The cross partisan 
appeal was not isolated to the backbench. The former Coalition Prime Minister Billy 
McMahon was quoted as lending support for an inquiry into ASIO, anticipating that “a 
Royal Commission of some sort” was possible.508 In the same interview McMahon 
denied knowing ASIO had investigated political figures during his brief time in office 
and also “complained of the lack of information he received from [the organisation]” 
more generally.509 These comments were made on 23 June after the Bulletin published 
another leaked document in which ASIO described the McMahon Government (1970-
1971) as having abandoned liberalism in favour of “a crude form of pragmatism”.510 
The “radical… liberal” Labor senator, James McClelland, stated that “ASIO for years 
regarded itself as an agency whose principal duty was to protect Australia from a Labor 
Government”.511 The Australian’s coverage of the Select Committee on Civil Rights of 
Migrants in late 1973 is particularly enlightening. One extensive article of September 
1973 quotes the Vice-President of the Council for Civil Liberties, Ken Buckley, at 
length: 
[ASIO’s] members are recruited from a Right thinking – capital R for Right – 
Old Boy network. It’s time Australians were given the right to know more about 
a body virtually accountable only to itself… [T]here obviously is a case for an 
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organisation to cope with threats like Black September, militant terrorists and 
espionage… Instead [ASIO] has been preoccupied with the political opinions of 
ordinary Australians.512 
Buckley, who had worked in British wartime intelligence, was an influential left-wing 
economist and unionists who was involved in establishing the National Tertiary 
Education Union (NTEU).513 The Council for Civil Liberties used the occasion to call 
for ASIO’s disbandment, presumably in favour of the creation of a new organisation 
focused on political violence.514  
 
The Australian also reported voices against an inquiry. Opposition Leader Bill Snedden 
indicated his approval of ASIO’s conduct in gathering information on politicians, 
defending the practise because “[t]here would be records of political events kept by 
ASIO and there would have been political events in which I figured during my career in 
Parliament”.515 He made no distinction between a commentary on “political events” and 
dossiers on individual politicians.516 However, the same paper reported Snedden’s 
opinion in 1973 as having been markedly different; he believed ASIO had become a 
Labor’s political police.517 Another paper quoted Snedden calling for an inquiry into 
ASIO.518 His later view was shared by a colleague, Ivor Greenwood, who had been 
attorney-general under the McMahon Government and, briefly, under the Fraser 
Government (1975-1983). He told the Australian: “I don’t think that ASIO would have 
been doing its duty not to have examined closely the activities of Dr Cairns and the 
                                               
512 Australian, “End the secret ‘menace’ of ASIO, committee urged,” 6 September 1973, 9 
513 Tony Stephens, “Radical economist and thinker championed civil liberties,” Sydney Morning Herald, 
21 July 2006, http://www.smh.com.au/news/obituaries/radical-economist-and-thinker-championed-civil-
liberties/2006/07/20/1153166516473.html. 
514 Australian, “End the secret ‘menace’.” 
515 Russell Schneider, “Order to Destroy ASIO Files on MPs Likely,” Australian, 21 June 1974, 1 
516 Ibid. 
517 Australian, “End the secret ‘menace’.” 
518 Canberra Times, “‘Raid’ on ASIO: Inquiry call on alleged complaint,” 6 August 1973, 3. 
 96 
groups around him during those moratorium days”.519 Greenwood’s past is notable for 
his decision to defy the Menzies Government (1949-1966) in order to defend the rights 
of a colleague accused of being a communist sympathiser, as well as his opposition to 
homosexual criminalisation.520  Blaxland notes this contradiction and explains that 
Greenwood had “an interest in civil liberties but an uncompromising approach to law 
and order”; the same inconsistent view held by former Deputy Leader of the Liberal 
Party Neil Brown.521   
 
The opinion pages reveal a dispute between journalist and economist Gregory Clark and 
notable Australian National University professor, Hedley Bull, over the presence of “ex-
intelligence types” within the university’s Department of International Relations.522 
Clark also asserted that a recent death of a colleague had been linked to intelligence 
work. Bull rejected these claims: 
I… can state categorically that I know of no attempt by ASIO or any other 
intelligence organisation either to secure or to prevent appointments in this 
department… The person to whom Mr Clark refers is undoubtedly Dr J. E. 
Brimmel, a senior research fellow… who was killed in a car accident while on 
fieldwork in Thailand in February 1968… Mr Clark’s statement illustrates the 
same tendency that has been displayed in the recently published ASIO files, to 
base smears and innuendoes on mere surmise and idle gossip.523 
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This dispute shows how ASIO had become a pariah of sorts by the middle of 1974, with 
reputable scholars – Bull was certainly no radical – and institutions determined to fend 
of accusations of familiarity with the organisation.  
 
Other perspectives contained within the pages of the Australian reveal broader angst 
about Australia’s security situation. Former Director of Military Intelligence Brigadier 
John Gordon Hooton, who had recently resigned from the army, shared his dire views 
on Australia’s defence preparedness with the Constitutional Association of Australia, 
saying the country faced the greatest threat to its survival since the Kokoda campaign: 
[t]he dangers of having an intelligence system in which the professional military 
voice is minimal and well-meaning diplomats, assessing the success of their own 
efforts, have the principal influence are clear.524  
In his opinion 
…a considerable range of threats could occur – including not only attempted 
invasion and occupation, but also economic domination, unreasonable demands 
for production and trade, incursion into land territories and exploitation of 
territorial waters. 525 
Hooton said that his resignation from the Army in early 1974 was over the Whitlam 
Government’s neutering of the intelligence apparatus and his resulting “ex-
communication”. 526  He said that this frustration towards the government was 
widespread because a “24 percent increase in resignations from all Army ranks in the 
first three months of [1974]” occurred as a direct result.527 The former Director, 
appointed by Minister for the Army Malcolm Fraser in March 1967, had an impressive 
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career in the military, including time as an attaché in Washington and the award of 
CBE.528 There is a question as to Hooton’s state of mind at the time. In later years it was 
revealed that he had resigned in order to care for his family, all members of which 
suffered from the sudden onset of a degenerative illness.529 This raises the possibility 
that his inflammatory opinions were distorted by the pressures in his personal life. 
However, Hooton had a history of controversial outbursts dating to the “early 1960s”.530  
 
The National Times 
 
The National Times was more radical in its assessment of ASIO and the kind of inquiry 
that should review it because “[s]ecret services are by nature and by definition 
conspiratorial”.531 An editorial argued “[t]here should be no need for the inquiry to be 
carried out completely behind closed doors” and that the Whitlam Government should 
resist “pressure” from foreign allies when considering what to do with the 
organisation.532 Instead of an inquiry focusing on the Bulletin leak, it was “[m]uch more 
important” for it to establish “exactly what the objectives of our secret services are and 
how well the services are supervised”.533 The questions the paper wanted addressed, 
given the threat ASIO posed to democracy, were broad: 
An inquiry into the secret services has to begin at the very beginning: What do 
we need in the way of such services? What objectives should they pursue? How 
should they be supervised? How can ministers be best kept informed of the 
nature of the agencies’ secret work? How captive are our services to US and 
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British counterpart agencies? How much influence do the intelligence services 
have on foreign and domestic policy?534 
These kinds of questions were much more expansive than those ultimately posed by the 
government in the terms of reference. Obviously, such questions could not have been 
addressed without a well-resourced royal commission, especially one with 
commissioners that knew “a considerable amount about our foreign relations, have a 
healthy respect for the need for democratic institutions and an approach which is not 
sympathetic to the old boys network and the basic belief that everything a government 
does must be kept secret”. 535  As to the selection of royal commissioners, “expert 
assistance” was needed instead of “a judge without specialised help”.536 As we will see, 
the Royal Commission was under resourced and the royal commissioner was a judge 
without specialised knowledge but with a civil liberties background. 
 
The National Times also conveyed academic opinion on ASIO. Political scientist Don 
Aitkin – who later became Vice-Chancellor of the University of Canberra – “bet… that 
security organisations… attract into their employ people whose psychological bent is 
strongly inclined towards order”.537 He said ASIO as a self-fulfilling prophecy because 
its mere existence necessitated an enemy that would be its raison d'être.538 For him, 
ASIO could not function if it were apolitical; its focus was the preservation of “order” 
in its war against radical “change” and was therefore already political.539 In a letter to 
the editor the political scientist and Marxist economist Bruce McFarlane – who became 
the Professor of Politics at the University of Adelaide – argued the “Petrov-McCarthyite 
wave” had pressured a generation of left wing academics into timidity: “it is well to 
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remember the atmosphere of those days”.540 Another article by the chairperson of the 
Committee for the Abolition of Political Police, Joan Coxsedge, argued that Murphy’s 
softening towards ASIO – as evidenced in the Government’s rhetoric after the Bulletin 
leak and in the terms of reference for the Royal Commission – was the result of 
departmental capture; where a minister becomes a mere spokesperson for the 
bureaucracy).541  
 
In the months after the Murphy raid journalists Fred Brenchley questioned the reformist 
image of the Whitlam Government on the issue of ASIO and the intelligence apparatus: 
The Labor Government, while outspokenly reformist in many directions, has 
been strangely reticent about Australia’s intelligence network, and particularly 
the role of intelligence in diplomacy. For a party which has pictured itself as 
harassed by ASIO for years… this is indeed curious.542 
According to Brenchley “considerable speculation” existed on how the apparatus would 
be reformed, either the creation of “a single bureaucratic monolith” intelligence agency 
or “a pluralistic intelligence network”.543 His colleague, Andrew Clark, pushed for a 
bolder policy of “open government”, even though he accepted it could result in more 
confusion and public frustration at the executive’s intelligence gathering activities.544 
 
The head of the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University 
of Sydney, Professor Henry Mayer, known for his radical tendencies, offered a 
pragmatic view of ASIO’s legitimacy: 
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Just what is the point of having a special and fairly expensive body concerned, it 
is said, with “security”… [Given the threat of] nuclear war, the very notion of 
clinging on to secrets has long been absurd… [T]here is less and less agreement 
on what it is that our society stands for, what are its dominant and prevailing 
values… [T]here is also less and less certainty in knowing what sort of attitudes 
and actions in fact subvert a society or a system… To them it merely subverts 
marginal things and helps to maintain basic things in the present system… [If 
ASIO was politically objective its employees] would be brilliant and genuine 
social scientists with a knowledge of society and its laws.545 
Mayer’s views do not preclude a reformed intelligence organisation from existing, 
especially one that draws its employees from a broader range of perspectives.  
 
At the time of the Murphy raid, Robert Mayne reported on ASIO material leaked to the 
paper. It would have almost certainly been the same material published by the Bulletin 
that caused an outrage in June 1974: 
[The files] show an organisation which appears to see a monolithic left-wing 
conspiracy ready and waiting to take over Australia, aided by a large battalion of 
stooges, fifth columnists and others awaiting the call. One paper in particular 
seem to sum up the ASIO philosophy…  
“The Australian free enterprise system is a number one target for destruction in 
the ideologies and programs of action being promoted by both the ‘Old Left’ – 
the mass movements of protest and dissent, the radical and revolutionary student 
and other youth organisations, and the ‘Socialist Left’ in the ALP… However 
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many ‘New Left’ groups, with or without the support of the ‘Old Left’ action via 
mass demonstrations of a militant nature:  
(a) Those who see direct action as part of the democratic parliamentary 
process... 
(b) Those who seek direct action as a long-term means to revolution via the 
training of revolutionaries or as a way of creating revolutionary situations in 
society... 
(c) Those who use direct action as a means from generating politically 
motivated acts of violence... 
In the long run, the revolutionaries’ programs are designed to create an ‘anti-
establishment public’ which will operate as ‘extra-parliamentary opposition.’ 
Naturally, the free enterprise system, at all levels is a prime target…”546 
Obviously, ASIO’s demonstrable distain for the exchange of radical opinion is 
inconsistent with its supposed goal of defending democracy. 
547 
There are striking similarities in content and identical wording to the documents 
published 14 months later by the Bulletin to much controversy. These documents are 
discussed below. Presently, it is worth noting that no controversy seems to have arisen 
from the National Times publication in 1973, especially since it emerged so soon after 
the Murphy raids. It could be that the focus on the documents which detailed ASIO’s 
anti-radicalism – as opposed to the 1974 publication which focused on documents 
discussing mainstream political parties and luminaries – was not seen as noteworthy. 
Yet, the actual significance of the publication of April 1973 was much greater than that 
of June 1974. ASIO was first and foremost concerned with maintaining the economic 
status quo at the expense – quite consciously – of democracy. Conversely, the latter was 
                                               
546 Robert Mayne, “How ASIO sees the world – and Australia,” National Times, 2 April 1973, 6-7. 
547 Mayne, “How ASIO sees the world.”. 
 103 
more sensational to a social clique preoccupied with the cut and thrust of daily politics. 
Indeed, many of the politicians, like Cairns, are no longer widely known whereas 
political suppression on behalf of economic interests is of a timeless import. Journalist 
Max Suich saw the leak of April 1973 as evidence of ASIO’s anti-democratic 
tendencies: 
Such an organisation [with the ability to stage a “counter propaganda 
operation”] is completely beyond the bounds of justifiable action by ASIO 
(though disturbingly if it had the director General’s permission it was not 
outside its legal rights). In carrying out this operation, ASIO demonstrated its 
inability to discern the difference between violent words and violent actions and 
failed to recognise the legitimate rights of a citizen in a democratic country to 
hold extreme political views… When does ASIO feel that its role is to mount 
counter operations against the views of political organisations? ASIO agents 
have boasted in the past that their organisation has played a part in breaking up 
the National Socialist movement in Australia.548 
A brief comparison can be drawn here with the United States at the same time. When 
documentary evidence emerged that demonstrated the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) had engaged in a widespread campaign (called COINTELPRO) of political 
suppression of radicals – even involving the deaths of black activists – press coverage 
was very muted.549 At the same time the Watergate scandal – in which one party of 
government attempted to stifle another at an election – consumed press attention, 
resulted in an historic resignation of a US president, and captured public imagination for 
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decades.550 The informant, Deep Throat, who instigated the Watergate revelation was 
the Deputy Director of the FBI.551 The extent to which ASIO and the FBI engaged in 
similar anti-radicalism is beyond the scope of this thesis. But there was a disparity of 
press coverage between the two publications that raises questions about the extent to 
which the press was committed to democracy in the 1970s.  
 
The Australian Financial Review 
 
The Australian Financial Review was started in 1951 under John Fairfax & Sons as an 
“adjunct” to the Sydney Morning Herald dedicated to financial news.552 By 1974 it had 
become an effective advocate for economic neoliberal reform; the interests of capital.553 
An editorial of this paper was concerned with the balance between organisational 
oversight and the risk of politicising the organisation:  
Fundamentally, there is an almost irreconcilable conflict between the necessity 
for ensuring proper accountability for secret security services in a democratic 
society while at the same time providing safeguards against their excessive 
politicisation – the very real danger that they could become simply the stand-
over or investigative arm of the party in power.554 
Clearly, the paper implied that ASIO had come close – presumably under the previous 
government – to becoming such a partisan tool.555 The most important passage in the 
editorial goes to a broader question: “whether such organisations are needed at all in the 
context of present-day Australian society” given ASIO’s origins as a mechanism used to 
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“convince” the United States and United Kingdom of the government’s ability to keep 
secrets secure during the fight with communism.556 However,  
it seems obvious that there are vast areas of national security which would be 
much better looked after by the police than they are by self-perpetuating secret 
empires. 557 
The paper demonstrated a willingness to accept a more nuanced solution to what it saw 
as the ideological and political contamination of ASIO. The suggestion that the police 
should be vested with greater responsibility for national security matters overlooked the 
highly questionable conduct of state police special branches, as revealed by the Inquiry 
into the Records held by the Special Branch of South Australian Police conducted by 
Justice Michael White in 1978.558  
 
The Financial Review also derided the culture of opportunism and retribution within the 
intelligence apparatus, as well as its employees who had been drawn from “the ranks of 
university drop-outs… the old boy net-work of the public school system and the ranks 
of the military”.559 This recruitment pool was “hardly fertile ground for the men ASIO 
needs”.560 The paper was not opposed to ASIO’s existence: 
There is a very good case for having an internal security organisation in 
Australia. However, the latest exposure of the work of the Australian Security 
and Intelligence organisation in “The Bulletin” suggest that the institution we 
now have is dangerously off-beam in identifying its role… [The earlier Cairns 
leak]  managed to convey the impression that the internal security organisation 
we now have is preoccupied with undergraduate right-wing obsessions. The fact 
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that the former Attorney–General, Senator Ivor Greenwood, considers such 
activities as the Cairns dossier on the part of ASIO to be entirely justified on the 
basis that its character obliges it to engage in matters covering the expression 
“subversion” is indicative of the partisan cloak that organisation has elected to 
wear… [ASIO’s] first and most mundane role should be involved in preserving 
and policing the integrity of the bureaucracy… [There is a] need for any internal 
security organisation to be open to as much public scrutiny as possible. Power 
does corrupt. Power exercised in secret is a much more corrupting influence.561 
It is the inefficacy of the organisation that inspires the Financial Review’s lack of faith 
in ASIO. According to the paper, the world had advanced beyond ideological conflicts 
towards pragmatic considerations; “industrial espionage,” “economic security” and 
“resource security” were the real threats to national security and the proper focus of 
domestic intelligence efforts.562 Declaring a post-ideological age conceals an underlying 
philosophy, consciously or no. The paper saw ASIO’s threat to democracy emanating 
from the organisation’s privileged position in the shadows, away from public scrutiny. 
The editorial offered the following advice on the terms of reference: 
The electorate’s right to know must be balanced carefully against the slogan 
security is ever ready to invoke, that of national security.563 
The scepticism expressed here is telling; even proponents of an intelligence and security 
apparatus thought the phrase ‘national security’ had been over-utilised by government. 
Whereas the paper had seen greater ministerial oversight as the solution to the ASIO 
problem in a 1972 editorial, an inquiry was needed in 1974 to find the solution.564 
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The reports from the Australian Financial Review by Brian Toohey suggest that an 
inquiry was seen by those within the bureaucracy as a mechanism that could deal with 
ASIO’s political bias: 
Some government officials say the standard of work displayed by… ASIO, in 
the recently revealed report on Dr Cairns has focused new attention on the need 
to examine the ideological pre-conceptions behind the operations of the overseas 
network.565 
It was evidently believed by some within the bureaucracy that ideological bias 
contaminated more than ASIO. Another Financial Review journalist, George Negus, 
who had been Murphy’s press officer at the time of the raid, considered the Whitlam 
Government’s commitment to its own policies. Aside from its pre-election commitment 
in 1974 to hold a judicial inquiry into ASIO, there had been a commitment before the 
1972 election  
to make an annual report to Parliament on the working of (a) ASIO and any 
infringement of the regulations and action taken in regard to such infringements 
and (b) the Telephonic Communications (Interceptions) Act.566 
By the time of the article’s publication, “[w]ell into the second year of Labor 
Government”, no annual report had been tabled in Parliament.567  However, neither 
Murphy nor Whitlam were willing to comment on their progress.568 The paper also 
discussed the preference of the “Defence establishment” for an intelligence agency 
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The National Review 
 
The Nation Review emerged in 1972 from a merger between the anti-Vietnam war paper 
Review and an independent paper, Nation.570 Thus, an “irreverent larrikinism” was born 
and the paper became known by its adopted mascot, a cartoon ferret.571 An editorial of 
the Nation Review shortly after the Murphy raid in early 1973 saw an inquiry into ASIO 
as the first step of a reform process: 
Whether this body can be reformed from above and contained by formal 
changes in the regulations is a matter for doubt. The first step would be to set up 
a special committee into its past activities, made up of experienced lawyers, to 
give the committee full access to the records, and to have it write a white paper 
as a submission to Parliament.572 
That is, once the history of ASIO’s formidable years was settled the reform process 
could begin. However, as we will see, Hope declined to investigate ASIO’s history even 
though he was directed to do so by the terms of reference. In June 1974 the Nation 
Review had shifted positions and seemed confident in ASIO’s pending demise at the 
hands of a “judicial inquiry”: 
The last phase of ASIO’s brief and inglorious 25 year career is not about to 
begin… Over the past 18 months the monster has been assaulted from the left, 
betrayed by the right, exposed by its own mania for secrecy and deserted by an 
incredulous public. It now lies washed up and stinking on the beach of 
Australian political history, an evolutionary curio which was unable to adapt 
itself to the demands of modern democratic politics… The main reason, 
however, why ASIO failed to win public support is not because the director-
general was unable to make public statements… nor because it became a captive 
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of right-wing political forces… but simply because it was an anti-democratic 
secret bureaucracy with too much power, too much money and no public 
accountability.573 
The antiquated organisation was no longer capable of being reformed because it was 
inherently compromised by its conflict with democracy. The editorial also argued that 
the organisation was rife with “factionalism” between “ex-military communist chasers” 
and less influential “DLP orientated men and the liberal arts graduate type[s]” aligned 
with Barbour.574 It is hard to reconcile the paper’s belief that ASIO was a “fiefdom 
beholden only to its director-general” when it was also divided by such factionalism.575 
Nevertheless, this paper proffered a unique perspective on ASIO by calling for its 
disbandment. 
 
The journalist Mungo MacCallum, memorably described by Whitlam as the “tall, 
bearded descendant of lunatic aristocrats,” pointed to Coalition hypocrisy in his 
National Review commentary at the time of the Murphy raid.576 
The most ironical thing about it all is that the same groups who spend so much 
of their time saying that the Labor party is subject to outside control by non-
elected men, and this is a bad thing, are now advancing the grotesque 
proposition that the elected representatives of the people should not have access 
to information collected by the paid servants of the people. 
In an article beneath MacCallum’s was a similar charge of hypocrisy, this time 
regarding ASIO’s budget. 577  Interestingly, the correspondent alleges Spry was 
“travelling from his home in Mont Albert… to Kensington road” in early 1973, despite 
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his having left the organisation in 1970.578 The location in question “overlooking Como 
park” was ASIO’s “phone tapping headquarters for Melbourne”. 579  Also in the 
newspaper was an article by research student Robert H. Smith, who saw hysteria on the 
question of ASIO’s history: 
For some strange reason Australians… tend to feel that they have as nefarious a 
security service as some of the “banana republics” of the world. In general, our 
political climate has been singularly unexciting and we should be grateful that 
we have had no endemic political rivalries which have necessitated secret police 
methods being utilised. Australians do not really fear the midnight knock…580 
Smith’s democratic relativism does not appear to have been a popular perception, 
especially after the events of the Murphy raid. 
 
The Sydney Morning Herald 
 
At the time of the leak the former prime minister, McMahon, gave a series of interviews 
offering his perspective on ASIO. The conservative-leaning Sydney Morning Herald 
devoted generous column inches to his views: 
My general idea is that every democratic country must have an intelligence 
service of the highest quality and with enough people of real ability to be able to 
do the jobs that are vitally important to the security and the defence of the 
country. I do not believe that the various agencies should be centralised into one 
organisation…. I don’t want the intelligence agencies weakened. I want them 
strengthened and their independence sustained… In the case of a democratic 
community like ours the role ought to be passive and not active intelligence. To 
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the best of my knowledge this has been the attitude of Australian Governments 
since 1949… [That is] it shouldn’t get involved in any Bay of Pigs escapades.581 
His view would later prove to be not dissimilar to that of Hope. McMahon was also 
questioned about his support for an inquiry into ASIO and the intelligence apparatus, to 
which he answered: 
I felt from the time I was Prime Minister that there should be an overall look at 
the total intelligence service operation in order to ensure that they are living in 
contemporary times and that they are able and willing to adjust their activities to 
meet the contemporary needs of the country… I became increasingly disturbed 
about… some aspects of the operations of the services… I wanted an inquiry… 
But I felt at the time that conditions, that the position was so sensitive that I 
could very easily create more difficulties than would be solved.582 
The idea that ASIO should be reviewed in order to ensure its appropriate function also 
became policy in subsequent decades. As to who should head the inquiry and the terms 
of reference: 
It is my strong view that it would be preferable to choose a person with a 
knowledge of the workings of the Government in so far as its defence, security, 
intelligence, police operations and other kinds – police and subversive 
operations – are concerned.583 
In this last regard McMahon’s view did not prevail. It is possible that this confessional 
interview was an attempt to rewrite history in an effort to pre-empt a negative finding 
by the prospective inquiry.584 But, more importantly, it demonstrates the beginnings of 
the bi-partisan consensus on ASIO, at least in public. 
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Hooton’s opinions appeared in the columns of the Sydney Morning Herald a month 
earlier than in the Australian. He was reported to have warned the public, “[c]urrent 
policies must be disregarded if Australians are to live with a feeling of freedom”.585 The 
rhetoric of the former Director of military intelligence was offered from a privileged 
position within society; an opinion with implied access to information beyond the 
security clearance of almost every person reading his comments. It is reasonable to 
assume that his assessment was grounded in the knowledge he had acquired whilst 
working at the highest levels of the intelligence apparatus. Hooton’s remarks 
demonstrate the power imbalance that existed at the time between someone in his 
privileged position and the vast majority of people who can only trust his 
interpretations. In hindsight it is clear his opinions were hyperbolic.  
 
The Canberra Times 
 
The Canberra Times started in 1926 as a national newspaper in time for the transition of 
Parliament to Australia’s new capital.586 In 1964 John Fairfax & Sons acquired the 
paper in order to challenge the new national, but Canberra-based, Australian.587 Its 
efforts to become less of a “subs-paper” – one predominately dependent on external 
agencies for news – were still not achieved by 1974.588 With respect to ASIO, the 
editorial of the Canberra Times was defensive: 
The death knell of [ASIO] was sounded when the Attorney-General… paid his 
celebrated visits… Now the Prime Minister has administered what looks like the 
coup de grace to ASIO… It is unusual for a Prime Minister to attack a public 
servant [Barbour] in a public forum. It is clear, in light of the chain of events 
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that begun in March, that ASIO has been mortally disabled… The practical 
conclusion is that ASIO has to be reconstructed…589  
Despite perceiving the ASIO problem as having arisen since the 1972 election, the 
editorial arrives at a similar position to those of other newspapers in that salvation was 
seen in a reformed organisation that would be answerable to Parliament. The Canberra 
Times also called for an “independent judicial inquiry” to investigate “how and why an 
important element of Australia’s national security apparatus has been so grievously 
damaged”.590 Earlier, at the time of the Murphy raid the paper thought that ASIO or a 
replacement organisation could not survive the Whitlam Government.591 Echoes of the 
paper’s support for ASIO and its past conduct can also been seen in an editorial which 
praised “the good sense” of former Director of Military Intelligence Hooton in his 
efforts to alert people to the continuing importance of the Cold War.592  
 
It was reported in the Canberra Times that the Democratic Labor Party believed 
Murphy was “opposed to ASIO gathering information on the activities of the extreme 
left”. 593  Like Hooton and Varang in other papers, a former intelligence officer, 
lieutenant colonel Noel Truman, was reported by the Canberra Times to have told ABC 
Radio that the judicial inquiry should consider the impact of adverse security checks on 
people who could not defend themselves against allegations made by ASIO.594 After 
Whitlam released the titles of the leaked ASIO documents, the paper explored ASIO’s 
internal assessment of the Ustaša (then spelt Ustasha) threat in July 1972: 
Elements in Australia appear determined to promote a fascist conspiracy theory 
wherein the wartime Ustasha organisation in Yugoslavia was the dominant force 
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in the Croation nationalist movement… As a result of its investigations, ASIO 
was unable to gather sufficient evidence to prosecute any person connected with 
any significant act of violence against Yugoslav establishments or in the 
Yugoslav community in Australia… Anti-communism was an accidental by-
product of recent events and was not common to all Croatian nationalists…  
“Similarly the nazi-influenced Ustasha element within the nationalist 
organisation tends to be over-emphasised by some observers… 
[N]ationalists now emphasised that their objective was a democratic, 
independent Croatian state. Nazi doctrine prevalent from 1941 to 1945 
had no intrinsic connection with Croatian nationalism.”  
Croatian organisations in Australia and other countries were not a cohesive body 
and were apt to be riven by internal factionalism. In the majority of cases both 
the organisations and individuals disavowed violence…595 
 Viewed from the present time, where ‘lone-wolf’ terrorist attacks are a major concern 
of government, ASIO appears far more concerned with ideological struggles as opposed 
to the actual threat of political violence. It is also interesting to note that this article does 
not mention Murphy, a key proponent of the ‘fascist conspiracy theory’ at this time, as 
we will see.  
 
An anonymous correspondent to the Canberra Times on 25 June 1974 argued that 
ASIO leaked the document in conjunction with McMahon’s disclosure – of a further 
secret organisation known as “MO9” – in order to provoke the government into 
instigating its inquiry.596 The Official History does not offer evidence of this. But it is 
conceivable that ASIO’s senior officers wanted to mitigate damage to its reputation by 
controlling the story before someone else leaked it. McMahon himself is unlikely to 
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have leaked the ASIO documents given one of them offered an uncomplimentary view 
of his brief time in office. Greenwood speculated that Whitlam had been responsible for 
leaking the Cairns document, presumably done to force an inquiry.597 Yet, the National 





Melbourne’s afternoon Herald (now Herald Sun), which started in 1840, was the main 
newspaper of the Herald and Weekly Times.598 It was this paper that reported on the 
fateful story of the Khemlani loans affair in 1975 which destabilised the Whitlam 
Government. 599  Activist Joan Coxsedge – perceiving widespread support for the 
continuance of intelligence organisations – opined that even an independent agency 
staffed by bureaucrats would be unable to purge itself of class bias.600 Further, she 
argued that the police could deal with political violence and that secret organisations 
had no place outside a totalitarian regime. Coxsedge later become the first Labor 
woman elected to the Victorian Legislative Council in 1979. 601  Greenwood was 
interviewed by the Herald’s John Hamilton in June 1974.602 He denied any involvement 
with the leaks to the Bulletin and stated he had “never seen” the one assessing Cairns, 
though he acknowledged having read at least one of the documents on Whitlam’s list of 
titles when he was attorney-general.603 Greenwood wanted to know why phone-tapping 
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warrants had dropped from the 50-60 per month he estimated he signed in office to 19 
in March of 1973.604 As to ASIO and an inquiry more generally he said: 
Where is the line between political dissent and subversion?... The quality of the 
work ASIO did when I was Attorney-General showed a very sound and 
conscious appreciation of the rights of the individual and the necessity to steer a 
line between dissent and political subversion [sic]… [T]he most effective guard 
[in a democracy] is the law and you must restrain the activities of these people 
within lawful bounds… You must have an efficient security service…605 
He also pointed to ASIO’s lack of policing powers as evidence of this: [ASIO] merely 
gathers “a mass of scrappy information, rumors, tips and so on and sift[s] them out”. 606  
An unnamed “ex-intelligence agent” told the Daily Telegraph that ASIO had become a 
“secret political police” as a result of the Coalition’s long period of office.607 In the 
opinion of journalist John Burney ASIO demonstrated its willingness to enter into a 
symbiotic relationship with the Coalition during the Petrov Affair.608 He prophesised 
that the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security would result in “the end of the 
line for the old boy in the raincoat and the porkpie hat”. 609  
 
Most commentators were in agreement that the Australian Government needed a 
domestic intelligence agency in some form. However, it is evident that some 
commentators, especially academics, were divergent on whether Australia should have 
a domestic intelligence agency. Conversely, newspaper editorials were in consensus, 
believing that an inquiry was needed to rectify an intelligence agency that was 
necessary to Australia’s security. What this demonstrates is that the Whitlam 
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Government’s decision to erect the Royal Commission in 1974 commanded high levels 
of support within the press, possibly reflecting wider support in the business community 
given the ownership of newspapers generally. It also demonstrates that there was a 







VI. Labor and terrorism 
 
As we have seen, ASIO was created by Labor. This part of the thesis will demonstrate 
that in the build-up to the 1972 election Labor’s position on ASIO was unambiguous; 
the organisation was essential to Australia’s national security in a time of global terror. 
It will also be demonstrated that Labor in government moved to secure ASIO by 
reforming the organisation so as to improve is efficiency. The architect of this process 
was the attorney-general, Lionel Murphy, would made plain the government’s belief 
that domestic intelligence gathering and combating political violence, directed to person 
or property, was a legitimate practise. The Royal Commission was integral to this. It 
should be noted that existing secondary source scholarship already addresses the views 
held within Labor to ASIO from the 1940s to 1970s, as well as the views of non-Labor 
victims of ASIO.610 
 
Part of the legend of the Whitlam Government comes from the election campaign of 
1972 and the tremendous atmosphere surrounding the seemingly inevitable demise of 
long running Coalition rule.611 However, one of its first acts in office stands apart from 
this progressive atmosphere. The Whitlam Government quickly moved to support 
efforts by the United States to counter global terrorism. The United States was 
motivated by the terrorist attack that occurred at the Munich Summer Olympics of 
September, 1972, which provoked the wrath of its ally, Israel. Australia also 
experienced terrorist attacks in the same month at the hands of Croatian fascists 
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targeting Yugoslavians. Within three days of taking office in December 1972 the new 
government co-sponsored a United States led effort in the United Nations General 
Assembly to coordinate a response. But these efforts largely failed.  
 
 In subsequent months the Whitlam Government turned its attention to a visit from the 
communist prime minister of Yugoslavia and the threat posed to him by certain 
Croatian terrorist groups in Australia. The government’s distrust of ASIO came to the 
fore, culminating in the attorney-general’s raid of the organisation’s offices in the belief 
that information was being concealed. By the attorney-general setting out on a frolic of 
his own he discovered that ASIO was not engaged in conspiracy. A further political 
miscalculation enabled the press to capture part of the event, damaging the fledgling 
government. By setting out a chronology in detail it is clear that the government decided 
that instead of acknowledging the miscalculation, it was prudent to maintain an air of 
competence. The result was a cognitive dissonance of sorts in which the government 
was at once “a timorous foe, and a suspicious friend” to ASIO.612 The attorney-
general’s indiscretion rendered the reform of the intelligence community both 
politically untouchable and urgent. 
 
The terror of September 
 
Acts of violence committed in aid of political objectives are not an uncommon feature 
of twentieth century politics. In September 1972 the fear of global terrorism motivated a 
short-lived response in the US-aligned countries, foreshadowing the importance this 
issue would attract in later decades. The Munich massacre of 5 September motivated the 
United States government to pursue the threat posed by terrorism. In Australia the 16 
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September Croatian terrorist attack in Sydney greatly energised Labor in its political 
debate with the McMahon Government in the months leading to an election. 
 
The Munich massacre and the United States  
 
In this terrorist attack the pro-Palestine Black September Organisation held a group of 
Israeli athletes and coaching staff at the Munich Summer Olympics hostage. In total, 17 
people died in part because the West German government was caught unprepared, 
despite having been forewarned.613 On 6 September Israeli representatives met with the 
Secretary of State to discuss how the United States would respond to terrorism.614 The 
Israeli representatives were assured that a strong policy stance would materialise which 
included pressure on European governments to more “effective[ly]” pursue “Arab 
organisations linked to terrorist organisations”.615 President Richard Nixon wanted to 
“deal[] with the worldwide problem of terrorism” and facilitate the “collection of 
intelligence worldwide”.616 He made it clear that the United States government would 
seek to obliterate terrorists because 
[t]he use of terror is indefensible. It eliminates in one stroke those safeguards of 
civilisation which mankind has painstakingly erected over the centuries… It 
threatens the very principles upon which nations are founded… [U]pon what 
foundations can we hope to establish international comity?617 
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Terrorism threatened the stability upon which economic growth rested. Nixon also 
feared it could result in direct attacks on American corporations abroad.618  From now 
on the United States would not negotiate with terrorists.619 While this response seems 
strong, the commitment wavered in the face of the Non-Aligned Movement; states 
neither aligned nor against the United States or Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the issue of 
terrorism continued to attract the concern of the United States and its allies for at least a 
year after the events of Munich.620 
 
Croatian terrorism in Sydney 
 
One and a half weeks after the Munich massacre two bomb attacks occurred in Sydney 
at the instigation of Croatian nationalists. These anti-communist, pro-fascist groups 
were targeting Yugoslavians in Australia. The attack injured 16 people with no 
fatalities. At the time it was believed the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood may have 
been operating in Australia, a view officially put to the Australian Government by the 
Yugoslavian government in communiqués of 1972 and 1973.621 When Parliament 
resumed Labor sought to suspend standing orders so that it could debate the issue of 
terrorism and the manner in which the McMahon Government had addressed it. Around 
this time there had also been a terrorist attack in Yugoslavia which involved six 
Australian citizens.622 Conceivably, the issue was of importance to Labor at that time 
because it served two functions: Labor could appear stronger on national security than 
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the Coalition while at the same time laying the ground work for the reform of ASIO. 
Labor, under Whitlam, believed that a domestic intelligence agency was needed but that 
it had to be efficient, especially on the issue of terrorism and the rise in domestic terror 
attacks.623 By 1972 ASIO had begun to take the issue of terrorism, particularly in the 
Croatian community, more seriously.624 
 
ASIO in Whitlam’s first months 
 
Labor’s policy platform in 1972 barely mentioned the political violence of September. 
Indeed, it was said by Whitlam that while Australia faced terrorism “for the first time in 
our history” it was “mercifully still only a shadow”.625 With respect to ASIO, Labor 
promised to introduce an administrative appeals tribunal to oversee cases where people 
were adversely affected by negative security reports by ASIO.626 It also provided for an 
annual report on ASIO to be tabled in Parliament as well as for the organisation to be 
brought under ministerial control.627 The Canberra Times reported that Murphy’s stated 
intention was to implement Labor’s administrative appeals tribunal within a week of his 
tenure as attorney-general.628 
 
On 2 December 1972 Labor was elected to office for the first time in some 23 years, 
officially taking office from 5 December. As the archivist and historian Ian Hancock 
wrote, 
                                               
623 Blaxland, The Protest Years, 136, 144, 146. 
624 Ibid., 147. 
625 Gough Whitlam, “It’s Time for Leadership,” (speech, pre-election policy, Sydney, November 13, 
1972). 
626 Bruce Juddery, “How reliable is the information in the secret files?” Canberra Times, 30 March 1973, 
2. 
627 David Solomon, “Senator Murphy marshals his arguments,” Canberra Times, 27 March 1973, 2. 
628 David Solomon, “Control of ASIO to be tightened,” Canberra Times, 7 December 1972, 1, 14. 
 123 
[n]ever before in Australian history, and never since, has a government been so 
prepared for comprehensive and fundamental reform, so determined to 
implement it, and so bent on doing it without delay.629 
Whitlam and Murphy’s first dealings with ASIO demonstrated that the government 
would continue the practise of interference in the organisation’s operations. Whitlam 
informed Director-General of Security Peter Barbour that ASIO was “not to be too 
concerned with Communist activity in trade unions” as the government would “handle 
communists in the unions through the unions themselves”.630 Murphy ordered ASIO to 
stop all telecommunications intercepts orders after reviewing those in effect.631 Almost 
immediately after the election the new government’s relations with ASIO were 
questioned in the press. On 22 December 1972 an editorial in the Sydney Morning 
Herald questioned Whitlam’s refusal to have his personal staff checked by ASIO, 
especially since ASIO itself was not an issue during the campaign; although this was 
later denied by the Prime Minister. 632  By January the Melbourne Observer was 
reporting a “shakeup” within ASIO being undertaken by the new government as part of 
retaliatory measures, although no details were provided.633  However, the Official 
History demonstrates that a deal was reached between Whitlam and Barbour in which 
staff would be vetted in exchange for ASIO’s support of a new appeals tribunal.634 In 
early February the government overturned a decision made by ASIO before the election 
to not grant a visa to a Polish businessmen who had lived in the United Kingdom for a 
decade previously.635 This was seen by some in the press as “a clear sign” that Labor 
would not be beholden to ASIO.636 The new prime minister was also reported to have 
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requested information from ASIO on “the operations of Australia’s military, security 
and intelligence services”, after having received very little information as Opposition 
leader.637 Indeed, Barbour’s visits to Canberra to meet with the Attorney-General 
became commonplace almost immediately after Labor took office.638  
 
Answering the hue and cry  
 
The United States attempted to address the issue of global terrorism through the United 
Nations with the help of its allies, including Australia. Although terrorism would not 
assume the importance it did to policymakers from the 1980s, the events of late 1972 
are instructive.639 The Whitlam Government wasted no time in answering the hue and 
cry of the United States. 
 
Seeking solutions through allies 
 
Israel did not want the United States to pursue terrorism through the United Nations, 
believing in part that this would boost the organisation’s prestige and result in defeat at 
the hands of Arab member states. 640  The United States nonetheless pursued a 
multilateral response in December, primarily wanting to erect a committee to report on 
ways to combat rising terrorism. The draft resolution was however withdrawn before it 
could be defeated in the General Assembly.641 Three days after taking office the 
Whitlam Government co-sponsored a draft resolution “proposing [the] drafting of a 
convention on measures to prevent international terrorism and establishment of an ad 
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hoc [committee]”.642 As before, the draft resolution was not put to a vote because of 
lack of support.643 Notably, this second draft resolution was also co-sponsored by 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, New Zealand, Nicaragua, and the United Kingdom; all of which were 
allied with the United States at that time.644 However, these draft resolutions failed to 
win the support of countries in the non-aligned movement, including Yugoslavia, whose 
interests the Whitlam Government would soon seek to protect.  
 
On 18 December the General Assembly passed a resolution which substantially 
undermined the attempts of the United States to lead the multilateral efforts against 
global terrorism. The resolution: 
1. Expresses deep concern over increasing acts of violence which endanger or 
take innocent human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms… 
2. Reaffirms the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of  
all peoples under colonial and racist régimes and other forms of alien 
domination and upholds the legitimacy of their struggle… 
3. Condemns the continuation of repressive and terrorist acts by colonial,  
racist and alien régimes in denying peoples their legitimate right to self-
determination and independence and other human rights and fundamental 
freedoms…645  
Australia, along with Canada and the United Kingdom, voted against this resolution 
because “it did not underline the urgency and seriousness of terrorism throughout the 
world”.646 This was despite the understanding – as expressed by soon-to-be Foreign 
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Minister Don Willesee – that the America-led efforts “might impede genuine 
revolutionary movements throughout the world”.647 The government’s support of the 
draft resolutions stand in stark contrast to later scholarship which supports the 
conclusion reached by the Opposition in 1973: that the Whitlam Government wanted to 
align itself with the Third World at the expense of the alliance with the United States 
and United Kingdom.648 Indeed, the government was not entirely in line with these 
allies and had caused the former significant angst.649 But it needs to be considered 
whether the angst from the Nixon Administration in the United States was proportionate 
to the actual disobedience committed. Whitlam later implied that his government had 
aligned with the Third World, as “it was important that Australia should vote [in the 
General Assembly] the right way” on “colour issues and colonial issues” in the 
government’s first days.650 To Labor, unsanctioned political violence was terrorism; it 
was illegitimate. 
 
Australia’s independence from the Unites States 
 
The Whitlam Government’s conflicts with the Nixon Administration and the CIA 
caused tremendous angst in both countries, especially in 1975.651 Hocking argues that 
Whitlam brought an end to the “supine bilateral relationship”.652 However the bilateral 
relationship between the governments of the United States and Australia was not 
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fundamentally jeopardised, nor did it become an exercise in morality. As Blaxland 
explains: 
An 11 January 1973 assessment by the Americans made clear that Australia’s 
basic alliance with the United States did not appear in jeopardy, notwithstanding 
that Whitlam’s avant-garde domestic policies and assertive independent foreign 
policy would introduce ‘complications…[’].653 
The relationship continued to provide considerable benefits to the Whitlam 
Government, especially in terms of intelligence work.654 For example, it gained access 
to the Earth station at Pine Gap – a significant US-controlled facility used for 
intercepting satellite communications – which it used to acquire commercial 
intelligence during bilateral trade negotiations with Australia’s major trading partner, 
Japan.655 In later years, commercial intelligence from the facility became of significant 
value, sometimes almost exclusively, to business.656 The Whitlam Government’s action 
on terrorism and its steadfast support of US-led efforts to bring about multilateral action 
earned it public praise from the United States.657 Journalist Laurie Oakes observed in 
1973 that Whitlam had an established history of supporting maintenance of the bilateral 
relationship.658 In fact, Whitlam had said, “[o]ne does not forego an alliance until one 
has a better arrangement… We badly need the American alliance”.659 The Oxford 
History of Australia argues that Whitlam never lost sight of the importance of the 
ANZUS alliance.660 Perhaps most telling of all, when the Fraser Government assumed 
office in December 1975, the relationship immediately became cordial, further 
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demonstrating the superficial depth of the aforementioned angst.661 Contrast this with 
the many years it took even the Menzies Government to re-establish intelligence ties 
with the United States. 
 
Government rhetoric is instructive with respect to the bilateral relationship in early 
1973. Minister for Defence and Deputy Prime Minister Lance Barnard told Parliament 
on 28 February that – without undermining the exchange of “classified information” – 
the government would “consider whether the national interest and independence are 
jeopardised by the continuance of the agreements” with the United States; they would 
be “making a fresh start”.662 More specifically, the Australian Government wanted “to 
know what was being done” in the facilities and have access to “all data” collected.663 
As we have seen, the United States saw its intelligence sharing as a major feature of its 
foreign policy. Willesee, reaffirming this position in the Senate, said:  
The policy of [Labor] in respect of United States institutions in Australia has as 
its basis that each must be justified on the basis of an assessment of Australian 
national interests… [The ANZUS] alliance is of benefit to Australia… in the 
long term eventuality of some possible attack on Australia.664 
The Assistant Minister for Defence, Reg Bishop, was clearer still: 
Our leaders should be able to say: All right, you have a base on Australia’s coast 
which could become a very important and vital base in any sort of offensive 
operation. Therefore we want to know about it. We want to be involved...665 
What the Whitlam Government was reiterating in public was that it wanted to shift 
policy away from passive acceptance of United States operations in Australia towards 
active participation in those same operations. Labor was not unaware, either, of the 
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economic importance of maintaining security ties with the United States. A 
backbencher, Tony Mulvihill, put it so: 
I do not think that any Australian should take a jingoistic attitude but Australia 
has never had to grovel for any economic favours from the United States…666 
Whitlam’s advisor in office, biographer and eulogiser, Graham Freudenberg, describes 
the episode in Australian history: 
I could imagine no greater compliment could be paid to the Whitlam 
Government than that we were also distinguished enough to be on Nixon’s hate 
list… Fundamentally, there were no basic changes made by the Whitlam 
Government in our relations with the United States. Except, we were determined 
to assert our independence as an ally.667 
These words are hardly radical. Instead, they indicate a government that wanted more 
responsibility in the relationship with the United States, not less. The United States 
would not allow this to occur without extracting a higher price.  
 
Terrorism and ASIO 
 
By March 1973 the issues of global terrorism and ASIO reform converged. The 
scheduled arrival of the Yugoslavian prime minister, Džemal Bijedić, at 20 March, 
ignited a chain of events that would result in one of the defining moments of the 
Whitlam Government; the Murphy raids. Labor had pursued the issue of terrorism 
before the election, but the link with ASIO’s reform was yet to be set out in detail. The 
organisation had in no small way contributed to the party’s wilderness decades; it was 
to them a question of political necessity that ASIO be depoliticised. When Attorney-
General Lionel Murphy sensed a connection between ASIO and the threat of terrorism 
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posed to Bijedić he reacted in haste. Most importantly of all, his subsequent speech to 
the Senate makes plain the Whitlam Government’s desire to use ASIO and the 
Commonwealth Police in much the same way its predecessors had.  
 
The Murphy raids 
 
With the pending visit of the Yugoslavian prime minister it was now the Opposition’s 
turn to pressure the government on the terrorist threat. 668  Murphy committed in 
Parliament on 1 March to make a statement about Croatian terrorists in Australia in the 
near future.669 In response to questioning he told Parliament: 
If persons wish to come to Australia and to live among us they ought to leave 
these quarrels behind them. The Australian public ought not be subjected to 
terrible outrages such as were suffered in Sydney when bombs were used and 
innocent Australian citizens were injured. They ought not to suffer from quarrels 
which have nothing to do with them.670 
Terrorism in Australia, at this time, was the encroachment of other peoples’ problems 
into the domestic sphere. In the Senate, Murphy was asked to confirm the veracity of 
comments made by President Josip Tito of Yugoslavia: 
We would have no trouble with Croats in Yugoslavia if they were not stirred up 
and helped by terrorists from Australia, but we will fix them. We have already 
sent agents of our secret police to hunt them down… We will send more agents 
to Australia. We will crush these people. We will destroy them root and 
branch.671 
Murphy appeared to be unaware of these comments: 
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There may be information in the files of the Attorney-General’s Department or 
of some other organisation... I will look into those matters… I think it would be 
clear that Australia would not permit illegal activities on behalf of any power in 
Australia and would not accept the continued presence in Australia of any agents 
for a foreign power who were conducting unlawful activities here.672 
Murphy would soon go fishing for information. The “other organisation” alluded to by 
Murphy was almost certainly ASIO.673 Asked on 14 March by the Opposition if 
Murphy’s personal “interest in human rights” provoked concern of Bijedić record, he 
pleaded ignorance, having no “special knowledge”.674 
 
Parliament rose on 15 March to return on the 27th. At midnight on the 16th Attorney-
General Murphy launched what quickly became known as a raid of ASIO’s Canberra 
office because he believed the organisation to be withholding information in violation 
of his authority as minister.675 He was accompanied by his advisor, Kerry Milte, a 
Melbourne barrister and former Commonwealth Police official who had direct 
knowledge of what was known by the bureaucracy about the Croatian fascists, including 
the catholic Ustaša.676 While inspecting files in ASIO’s Canberra office, Murphy 
discovered an interdepartmental minute from a meeting of 2 March which comprised 
officials from ASIO as well as the departments of Foreign Affairs, Attorney-General’s, 
and Immigration.677 The minute was reported to have revealed an intention not to advise 
the Whitlam Government beyond the information contained in the official response 
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given to the Yugoslavian government.678 This would eventually be proven to have been 
an inaccurate interpretation. Outraged, Murphy sought to fly to Melbourne at dawn on 
16 March in order to inspect files at ASIO’s headquarters, but was delayed due to 
complications getting a flight.679  In the meantime Commonwealth Police officers 
reportedly searched “houses around Canberra at 3:00am”, including the home of Franjo 
Till, an “invalid pensioner”.680 Till alleged he recognised the interpreter as a member of 
the Yugoslavian secret service known to the Croatian-Australian community.681 The 
government subsequently denied the truth of these specific reports, although Murphy 
acknowledged that non-Commonwealth property had been searched.682 Thus ensued the 
following order of events: Barbour was informed of Murphy’s intentions at 5:20am and 
arrived at the Melbourne headquarters at 6:45am, 27 Commonwealth Police officers in 
plain clothes arrived “with orders to seal all file containers” at 7:40am in order to 
“preserve and ascertain certain information”, finally, Murphy arrived at 9:45am and 
instructed three officers with “special acquaintance with matters of Croatian terrorism” 
to assist him.683 It was initially reported that ASIO’s switchboard had been disabled or 
interfered with, however the government later denied these reports as well. 684 Various 
files were inspected by Murphy and his staff – without the police – until 12:40pm, when 
the inspecting party left. The party replaced original documents but took “Photostat” 
copies with them.685 No warrants were obtained for the searches because it was 
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Commonwealth property.686 Most importantly, Murphy failed to locate evidence of a 
conspiracy. 
 
The attorney-general left behind him a trail of negative press to which the new 
government was as yet unaccustomed, tarnishing its positive image in the press and 
public.687 Murphy blamed his press officer, George Negus, for having alerted the 
press.688 Murphy was roundly criticised for his “highhanded” response.689 As one 
journalist put it, he was “exposed as a political grandstander” who had given ASIO “a 
tactical advantage in its relations with the Labor Government”.690 Another journalist 
perceived an “attack [on] the very fabric of democratic representative government”.691 
Writing in the National Review, Mungo MacCallum mixed pseudo-psychology with 
recent political memory in his critique: 
There has always been an authoritarian streak in [Murphy]… [He] has an 
unfortunate habit of seeing any criticism of what he is doing as some sort of 
campaign against him… The confrontation [with ASIO] came, as it was almost 
bound to, over the question of whether or not there is an organised Ustasha 
movement in Australia. This has been a bugbear of Murphy’s for some time… 
The whole thing seemed to become something of an obsession with 
Murphy…692 
Robert Mayne in the National Times saw Murphy’s failure to “pin anything serious on 
ASIO” as having given significant political ground to the organisation.693 The Canberra 
Times editorial was concerned for ASIO’s international reputation having been raided 
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by police under the direction of a “frustrated minister”.694If the press coverage was 
accurate Murphy’s political incompetence had undermined the government’s agenda. 
But according to McKnight, “[a]t great political cost, he had discovered that ASIO was 
simply incompetent”. 695  In turn “Labor had become a security threat” from the 
perspective of some senior ASIO, who began leaking information to the Coalition.696 
The wave of terrorist fear was by no means isolated to Murphy and his staff at this stage 
however; the prime minister’s office was “bulletproofed” as a precaution.697 The raid 
also alerted the United States to seriousness of the Yugoslavian government’s claim that 
it was possible for terrorists to gain entry to the United States through their Australian 




Five days after the raids, the Yugoslavian prime minister arrived in Australia for his 
official visit “amid a barrage of death threats and newspaper hysteria”.700 Press reporters 
were searched and apparently encouraged “not to move suddenly” so as to avoid 
attracting unwanted attention from the protective detail.701 That day, Barbour met 
Whitlam at the Lodge to discuss the raids. 702 The details of this conversation were not 
made public at this point and Whitlam publicly declared “no complaint” had been made 
by ASIO.703 A planned visit to Port Kembla steelworks was cancelled because of the 
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threat posed by Croatian employees.704 Murphy’s “pregnant wife”, Ingrid, went “into 
hiding” because of threats levelled at her husband.705 In a speech to his guests Whitlam 
was reported to have said: 
I have nothing but contempt for those who, often knowingly, have allowed it to 
grow and to grow. It is… unfortunate that a minority of [‘Yugoslavian’] 
migrants, enjoying the rights we offer for the free expression of views, have 
sough to aggravate old suspicions and hatreds, by importing the methods of 
terrorism into this country… My Government is determined to stamp out this 
terrorism.706 
He was clearly speaking of previous Coalition governments, unafraid of exposing a 
foreign dignitary to domestic politics. In a choice between offending a Yugoslavian 
official and alienating Croatian migrants, the sensitivities of his dinner guest were more 
important. He was reported by another newspaper to have said at the same function: 
It has taken regrettably long for the Commonwealth police force and ASIO to 
adjust themselves from such momentous activities as the pursuit of draft dodgers 
and Vietnam demonstrators to the new situation where we ought to provide our 
interest in terrorist activities in our midst.707 
The prime minister’s apparent attack on organisations within the Australian 
Government indicates the extent of hostility. When Bijedić left Australia on 22 March 
Murphy heaped praise on the Commonwealth Police commissioner for orchestrating 
their successful protection; ASIO did not receive mention.708  
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The government seeks to clarify  
 
On the day of the raids Murphy issued a press release offering an explanation for his 
decision: 
I was accompanied by Commonwealth Police Officers involved in 
investigations of Croatian Terrorist activities in this country. I inspected certain 
files. Measures have been taken for the safety of the forthcoming visit by the 
Yugoslav Prime Minister… I have directed maximum co-operation between law 
enforcement and security bodies. The most stringent security measures are 
necessary… because of the existence in our midst of Croatian revolutionary 
terrorist organisations. These were tolerated by the previous Government which 
even denied their existence… The Government is determined to stamp out 
terrorism.709 
The former Coalition attorney-general, Ivor Greenwood, was quick to reveal that he 
believed ASIO had similarly kept information about Croatian terrorism from him. The 
difference, he claimed, was that he had “not [been] prepared to break the law to get 
it”.710  
 
It seems ASIO was concerned about the alienation of Croatians in Australia more 
generally. After a meeting between Murphy and Barbour on 25 March, a press release 
stressed: 
Senator Murphy is eager to dispel suggestions that police investigations are 
directed at other than a very small number of hard core extremists.711 
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This was stating what Murphy had said previously.712 The press release also made clear 
the government’s dependence on ASIO for monitoring alleged terrorists.713 It was 
reported that Cabinet had argued over the extent of information about terrorists that 
Murphy should disclose publicly, with Whitlam predominantly concerned with 
protecting the identities of alleged terrorists and Murphy concerned with sufficiently 
establishing the threat in the public’s imagination.714 The government also sought to 
solidify the legal position of the attorney-general with respect to ASIO. Governor-
General Paul Hasluck signed an administrative order on 26  March which placed ASIO 
“under the responsibility of the Attorney-General, for administrative purposes”.715  
 
On 27 March the Senate returned and the Opposition quickly utilised its influence to 
move a suspension of standing orders so as to bring forward the attorney-general’s 
much anticipated statement on Croatian terrorism, which he planned to deliver later that 
day. His long speech was rich with insight and, as such, is quoted at length here: 
I have never accepted the proposition that we must get used to political 
terrorism, involving bombings, murder, intimidation and that democratic 
governments are powerless to supress such activities… There was a curious 
defeatism and lack of initiative in successive Liberal governments’ reaction to 
these outrages…  
Following receipt of this aide-memoire [from Yugoslavia], the 
Commonwealth and State police conducted a series of raids in Melbourne and 
Sydney during the month of August and a great deal of material was seized. It is 
to be assumed that the first law officer of Australia, the Attorney-General, would 
be kept informed by the police of the results of their investigations…  
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On taking over the office of Attorney-General, I considered it my duty to find 
out for myself whether this was true and to inform the Senate and the people of 
Australia of the facts. The impending visit to this country of the Prime Minister 
of Yugoslavia gave special urgency to this investigation since, if the true picture 
was different from that painted by the previous Government, the present 
Government was entitled to entertain grave fears for the safety of our 
distinguished guest and would be duty bound to take adequate precautions for 
his safety. I am now in a position to state categorically that the Liberal Attorney-
General’s oft-repeated assertion that there is no credible evidence of the 
existence in Australia of organised Croatian extremism cannot be sustained. The 
contrary is true and was true at the time he made such statements…  
This long-anticipated speech, which was delivered after one of the defining moments of 
the Whitlam Government’s history, raised a logical inconsistency; if the previous 
government was responsible for concealing terrorist activity then ASIO could have 
seized the opportunity to raise its evidence with the new government. But Murphy’s 
raids of ASIO indicated that he believed the organisation was complicit in the cover-up. 
He was now attempting to align the government with ASIO against the previous 
government: 
These documents [I am seeking to table in the Senate] come from the files of the 
Attorney-General’s Department, the Commonwealth Police and the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation…  
The Commonwealth Police… conclusion was as follows: 
… In the light of intelligence gathered by this Force over the past nine 
months, the allegations of its continued existence by the Yugoslav 
Government must be taken seriously… 
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[T]he conclusion reached by the Commonwealth Police and conveyed to the 
Attorney-General’s Department as early as 17th August 1972, was…  
It… does contain a core of almost irrebuttable fact. 
In addition, the Director-General of ASIO on 7th September 1972 stated in 
reference to the aide-memoire in a letter to the Attorney-General’s 
Department… 
Overall the Aide Memoire and enclosures contain sufficient accurate 
material to suggest that it would be ill-advised to dismiss the allegations 
as either exaggeration or fabrication until such time as the results of 
current inquiries are known. 
ASIO never retreated from that stand and subsequently agreed with me that the 
aide-memoire contained a core of irrebuttable truth…716 
Murphy’s concern was predominantly for the manner in which previous attorneys-
general dealt with Croatian terrorism; the actual existence of a terrorist organisation was 
secondary. Country Party senator Tom Drake-Brockman correctly pointed out to 
Murphy that Greenwood’s possession of irrebuttable information undermined Murphy’s 
basis for raiding ASIO in search of more information.717  
Murphy mentioned a number of examples in his speech which shed light on the kind of 
policy response that the Whitlam Government envisaged: 
A rather surprising beneficiary of the former Attorney-General’s benevolence is 
one Zdenko Marincic… He first attracted police attention on 29th November 
1970 when he removed a Yugoslav flag from the balcony of the Southern Cross 
Hotel in Melbourne during Yugoslav National Day celebrations and burned it. 
For this offence he was convicted on 9th February 1972 and fined… [H]e 
returned to Australia on 24th May 1972 and was immediately arrested and 
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charged the next day with having a firearm in his possession... He was convicted 
and sentenced to 9 months imprisonment… He was also in possession of a 
booklet in the Serbo-Croatian language containing instruction on sabotage and 
of the names and addresses of [3 fighters named in the aide memoire]… Surely 
it is a reasonable inference that Marincic went to Germany to join the Bosnian 
incursion or at least to help equip it… the Department of Immigration 
recommended Marincic’s deportation [because]… 
Such action… will have a salutary effect upon those Croatians who use 
Australia as a base for pursuit of their ideals and will also provide the 
Yugoslav authorities with a positive indication that Australia neither 
supports nor condones extremism. 
I venture to suggest that they are sentiments with which the overwhelming 
majority of Australians would agree… 
In a long and carefully argued submission to the Minister for 
Immigration… Senator Greenwood [wrote of Marincic’s suggested 
deportation]… 
this is a matter of balancing the likely harm to Australia against the 
consequences of deportation. It is relevant in each case to note the 
country to which a person will be deported. I have indicated the 
traditional and accepted rule – applicable not only in the past in this 
country but also in the USA and the UK – that deportation or extradition 
does not take place where a person is likely to be dealt with for his 
political opinions by the country to which he is sent. I believe that this 
outweighs all other considerations in this case. 
…Marincic is still among us. However misguided one might consider an 
Attorney-General who placed the interests of an obvious terrorist ahead of the 
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interests of the Australian people, there might be some who would be impressed 
by the countervailing libertarian considerations on which his submission is 
apparently based. There is, however, a fatal flaw in this argument… The chief 
law officer of Australia must have been familiar with the decision of the High 
Court in the case of Znaty v The Minister of State for Immigration… [in which] 
Counsel briefed by the Attorney-General submitted that the law was and had 
been since 1903 that the Government is not bound to send the deportee back to 
the place from which he came and the Court approved that submission…718 
Murphy believed that if the law provided for deportation of convicted persons, then 
Greenwood was obliged to exercise the power. Yet, it does not follow that Greenwood’s 
concern for someone convicted of non-violent crimes – who had presumably served his 
time by this stage – was fundamentally flawed or that Marincic was worthy of 
deportation. With regard to ASIO, Blaxland argues that Greenwood was “strictly” 
accurate to believe that terrorism directed at a state other than Australia was not within 
the legal purview of ASIO at that time.719 However, it was also plausible to argue that 
the terrorist groups were degrading Australian security by the early 1970s.720 Murphy 
continued to hint at government policy: 
On 4th July 1972 the Attorney-General’s Department put a submission to 
[Greenwood] that he should recommend that [Jure] Maric’s application for a 
passport be refused. The officer of the Department who made this 
recommendation pointed out that ASIO’s latest report and the most recent 
Commonwealth Police report on Maric indicated that he was deeply involved in 
Croatian nationalist activities and was prepared to support acts of violence 
against Yugoslavia and that, if this occurred, it would be an embarrassment to 
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Australia’s relations with Yugoslavia. Senator Greenwood rejected this advice…  
[He has] prove[n] to have been the active protector of terrorists!... 
The Whitlam Government wanted an inchoate offense for alleged terrorists. This speech 
also demonstrates that the government had faith in ASIO and the Commonwealth 
Police; again, throwing the purpose of the Murphy raids into question. Murphy then 
went on to imply that the Whitlam Government supported the approach to terrorism – as 
opposed to the practise – of the Menzies Government. 
The tone of the last Government’s attitude towards Croatian terrorism was set as 
long ago as 27th August 1964 by Sir Robert Menzies… 
It is understandable that some Yugoslav migrants of Croatian origin 
should continue to hope for the establishment of an independent Croatia 
and within a democracy like Australia they have a right to advocate their 
views so long as they do so by legitimate means. 
That is a reasonable position but I leave it to honourable senators to judge 
whether the ‘means’ I have disclosed today are ‘legitimate’. The long list of 
unsolved crimes of violence tells an eloquent story of the indifference of 
governments of 23 years duration to the ‘means’ used by Croatian extremists… 
To be sure, there were sporadic cries of alarm from individual Ministers… 
Sir Garfield Barwick, then Minister for External Affairs… wrote… 
In essence, the problem is one of ‘keeping an eye’ on immigrant 
extremists, while operating within the framework of existing law and 
practice. We should not abandon our democratic principles of free 
speech, belief and association but I would hope that migrants are left 
with no misunderstanding of the activities which might reasonably give 
rise to objections by the present governments of their countries of origin. 
With this end in mind, I should like to suggest that the Australian 
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Security Intelligence Organisation should maintain some supervision 
over migrant groups (making no attempt to disguise its surveillance)… 
The story which I have unfolded today and the documents which I have tabled 
show how little heed was paid to the warnings of… Sir Garfield Barwick…721 
The attorney-general made no effort to rebut the idea that ASIO should be used to 
intimidate citizens, as it had done to communists. Like Menzies and Barwick before 
him, Murphy envisaged a democracy in which the government discerned the means by 
which views could be legitimately exchanged. He continued: 
…[T]he attitude of Attorney-General [Tom] Hughes and his successors was one 
which ASIO described to me as that of ‘indifference’ to the problem of Croatian 
terrorism. In the view of ASIO the organisation was not given proper ministerial 
directives in regard to Croatian terrorism… What I have said about Croatian 
terrorism applies to all terrorism. The present Government’s policy will be to 
deport aliens associated with terrorist organisations who have been convicted of 
crimes of violence, and become liable to deportation… All proper procedures 
and safeguards of civil liberties will be observed… The new policy is to cut out 
the cancer of terrorism from our body politic…. 
Important changes will also be made in our police and security arrangements. 
Pending the full report on the operations of ASIO and its relations with the 
executive government which I intend to present to Parliament during this 
session, the Director-General of ASIO will operate mainly from Canberra. This 
will ensure closer liaison with the Australian Government and the 
Commonwealth Police in combating terrorism. In the past there has been 
inadequate co-operation between ASIO and the Commonwealth Police in areas 
where their operations overlapped… 
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I intend to recommend to Cabinet that legislation be introduced for new 
or strengthened Federal criminal laws to deal with… committing an act of 
violence against a foreign guest… against diplomatic or consular personnel or 
premises or against persons or premises engaged in or used for overseas or 
interstate trade and commerce; acts of violence or threats of violence against 
Australian Ministers or officials… acts or threats of violence or extortion by 
aliens; inciting in Australia acts of violence against a person or property in a 
foreign state with which Australia has friendly relations or to collect money or to 
train persons in the use of weapons, explosives or poisons in Australia for this 
purpose… The Commonwealth Police will be strengthened, especially in its 
criminal investigation unit…722 
The Whitlam Government did not intend to be weak on terrorism nor violent crime 
more broadly. But the definition of ‘violent crime’ went beyond crimes committed to 
persons; property damage was also included. Standing out amongst this list of desired 
law reforms is that pertaining to acts of violence against persons engaged in commerce. 
Demonstrably, the Whitlam Government perceived the business community as worthy 
of special protection from acts of political violence, not dissimilar to President Nixon as 
has already been discussed.  
 
The attorney-general provided the Senate with no explanation as to why ASIO was 
raided. It was as if the government had forgotten that one of its senior ministers had at 
the time harboured deep suspicions of ASIO: 
I am advised that terrorists came to Canberra last week with the intention of 
killing the Yugoslav Prime Minister. The Commissioner of Commonwealth 
Police… advised me that, frustrated in that ambition by security precautions, the 
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terrorists might make an alternative attempt on the life of the Australian Prime 
Minister… or other Ministers of the Government… I make no apology for any 
steps which I took last week to ensure that the intentions of violent terrorists 
were thwarted... Toleration of terrorism in this country is over.723 
All at once the government wanted to achieve three goals: establish the existence of the 
threat of terrorism in Australia, demonstrate a need for reform resulting in an efficient 
intelligence and security apparatus, and discredit the Coalition as protectors of violent 
fascists.  
Murphy’s speech clearly shows posterity the extent to which the parties of government 
agreed on the limits of state power. The speech was not a “report to be made to 
Parliament about ASIO”, as described by the Official History, but a statement on 
terrorism and a political attack on the previous government.724 This was the conclusion 
reached by the United States, which had followed parliamentary debates and press 
coverage closely.725 The reform of ASIO would improve its efficacy to protect the state, 
commerce and foreign powers from acts of political violence. All acts of political 
violence – presumably exempting those of the state – were morally illegitimate. The 
inefficacy of the security and intelligence services arose because of the fervent anti-
communism held by the Coalition, which was so strong it gave the appearance of 
support for Croatian fascism. If this were so – and the case is compelling – the question 
is, why did Murphy not raid the offices of the Coalition? Such an act would make as 
much sense as targeting ASIO; perhaps more sense given the Whitlam Government 
claims to have had faith in the organisation. Of course, this would have created more 
legal and political, let alone philosophical, problems for him. Murphy over-reacted on 
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16 March but he proved to the government that ASIO was not engaged in some grand 




The Opposition immediately identified the absence of discussion of the raids as 
evidence of a cover-up. The debate quickly focused on the damage rendered to ASIO: 
“Why did [Murphy] destroy the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation?” 726 
Meanwhile, Greenwood defended himself by offering more details about his history of 
deportations, attempting to establish his concern for political persecution.727 When 
asked by the Opposition if he had made arrests of alleged terrorists, Murphy merely 
stated an intention to enforce the law where “appropriate”.728 Whitlam and Murphy 
informed Parliament that ASIO, through Barbour, had not lodged a complaint about the 
actions of the senior minster.729 This would soon spark another controversy, as we will 
see. Within the intelligence community nerves seem to have frayed. In April, unnamed 
“[m]embers” were reported to be suspicious of a routine departmental inquiry on 
efficiency, speculating that it was in fact a Trojan horse; a “major review” of the 
intelligence and security apparatus about to start.730 Obviously this did not prove to be 
prescient. 
 
The Whitlam Government attempted to deflect negative attention from its minister. 
According to Whitlam, the minute seized by Murphy did not reveal that the bureaucracy 
was concealing information from the government but rather planned to advise the 
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Attorney-General to mislead the Parliament. 731  He attacked the bureaucracy in 
Parliament for what he called their “unpardonable… conspiracy” to keep information 
from elected representatives.732 At a press conference following his appearance in 
Parliament, Whitlam told journalists that Murphy’s statement meant “[n]o one… would 
doubt there was organised activities that former Australian Governments did not put 
accurately to the Yugoslav Government”.733 In Parliament the next day the prime 
minister continued to confuse the issue – this was probably unintentional – by 
suggesting the minute may have inaccurately recorded the meeting.734 Conversely, 
Murphy instructed his colleagues that the bureaucracy acted to ensure his speech to the 
Senate maintained “consistency with the actions or statements of previous 
governments”.735 Murphy made it clear that this action was “inconsistent with the 
democratic process” and “if that is allowed to persist, the real rulers of this country will 
[be]… those who stay while elected governments come and go”.736 He informed the 
Senate that the document in question could not be tabled for reasons of national security 
and that he had explained to Cabinet why his raids were undertaken in “the national 
interest”. 737 Indeed, the security and intelligence agencies had been providing daily 
reports to the attorney-general about the increasingly volatile circumstances in which 
the Yugoslavian official would arrive.738 The raid occurred because Murphy “was 
dissatisfied with the amount of information” from ASIO.739 At the end of the debate the 
House of Representatives voted to affirm the legitimacy of Murphy’s raid, while the 
Senate expressed support for a judicial inquiry.740 
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In late March and early April the government was making decisions on a number of 
related issues. Minister for Immigration Al Grassby told Federal File that the 
government would deport Croatian terrorists.741 According to journalist David Solomon 
this option was rigidly opposed by Labor backbenchers.742 There was also the question 
of whether the Executive should possess the power to declare organisations unlawful 
under the Crimes Act, as had been done previously with the Communist Party.743  
 
In April the Yugoslavian government executed three Australian citizens for terrorist 
offences, which was condemned by Whitlam.744 The committee became known for its 
lack of interest in its supposed purpose: to determine if Croatian migrants in Australia – 
approximately 130,000 people – were being subjected to human rights violations.745 On 
the first day of hearings the committee heard evidence from Leslie Shaw, spokesperson 
for the National Croatian Civil Rights Committee. Shaw said the actions of Murphy – 
who had tabled the names of “many hundreds” of Croatians living in Australia when he 
gave his speech – had left them exposed to the recriminations of the Yugoslavian 
government.746 In August, the committee heard evidence from Barbour who had been 
granted permission to appear by Murphy at the suggestion of an Opposition senator in 
March.747 It is plausible that the government was threatening junior ASIO employees 
with redundancy if they spoke with the committee.748 Robert Murray in the Australian 
Financial Review described the gallery as having “a mini-Watergate atmosphere”.749 
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Barbour told the committee – with the requirements of truthfulness such hearings attract 
to this day – that the organisation’s “standing with [‘foreign intelligence agencies’] 
remained high” despite the raid and that ASIO “was still continuing to get 
information”. 750  While the Official History does not mention Barbour’s claim it 
nonetheless establishes that the United States and United Kingdom were concerned for 
ASIO’s integrity under Murphy’s oversight, that information was withheld, and that 
ASIO was aware of this at the time.751 Further still, the damage was significant in that it 
attracted President Nixon’s attention.752 Barbour also advised the committee that he did 
not consider Murphy’s raid beyond his powers as attorney-general.753 When asked 
about his meeting with Whitlam after the raids he declined to comment.754  
 
Within hours Barbour’s calm testimony would be drowned by more controversy, this 
time on ASIO’s complaint about the raid. The programme Federal File revealed the 
existence of an ASIO telex message distributed on 28 March which contradicted the 
government – and ASIO’s – claim that no complaint had been made to Whitlam by 
Barbour.755 A week later, a copy of the telex was published showing Barbour had told 
ASIO staff that he had informed the prime minister that the raids were “unprecedented, 
extraordinary and gravely damaging to ASIO and the national security interest”.756 The 
telex described these words as a “[c]omplaint”. 757 In the end the press settled on the 
idea that the government and ASIO were engaged in a cover-up.  
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The fact that ASIO had lied to elected representatives about the existence of a complaint 
dislodged its perception of innocence, which gave the government more confidence on 
the issue. At first it was reported that the government would impose new restrictions on 
the use of photocopiers in “sensitive security areas” to prevent leaks to the press.758 
Whitlam then revealed on the programme Frost Over Australia that he was “inclined” 
to place the entire intelligence and security apparatus under the control of the prime 
minister’s office at some future date.759 He coyly told David Frost, “[l]et us see how 
they behave in the meantime”.760 During the interview Whitlam reiterated what he had 
told Parliament that no complaint had been made by Barbour about Murphy’s raids.761 
Of Barbour and ASIO, Whitlam’s criticism was muted: 
I take a man as I find him, and I have no complaints about him. I have some 
misgivings about a security organisation which lets out telexes to one’s political 
opponents. It does not seem to be very secure security.762 
The prime minister told Frost that “[t]he greatest mistake the Government has made has 
been to take the police into ASIO headquarters”, not the raid itself.763 This is contrary to 
the claims of other scholars that state that Murphy thought the raid itself was bad 
politics.764 Murphy had not consulted him prior to the raids, contrary to correct practise, 
and that he would have wanted more information to justify the minister’s actions had he 
been asked prior.765 An article in the Sun-Herald stated that Murphy, as attorney-
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general, may have been permitted to raid ASIO because of a provision in Barbour’s 
contract that provided for his suspension if the minister suspected his “misconduct”.766  
 
Despite the raid the distrust of ASIO and air of conspiracy continued to swirl. In April 
1973, Dr. John Burton – a former Secretary of the Department of External Affairs from 
1947 to 1950 who had been influential within Labor and the formation of ASIO – began 
publicly commenting on the circumstances surrounding ASIO’s inception.767 Burton 
stated that a secret military intelligence cabal – he called them the ‘gnomes of 
Melbourne’ – operated without the knowledge of the Chifley Government.768 The group 
had blocked a report from Burton to Attorney-General Doc Evatt that argued against the 
need for a domestic intelligence organisation.769  He told a reporter: 
 I think security organisations are divisive. They set people against people. 
People are suspicious and therefore people respond in ways that they normally 
wouldn’t respond… The security of a country depends on its own internal 
integration, integrity. No foreign agent can possibly interfere with the security of 
a country provided its citizens are themselves sharing certain consensually held 
values…770 
In 1985 (originally published in 1974), Nicholas Whitlam, the Prime Minister’s son, 
later co-authored a book detailing Burton’s claims.771  Although the Official History 
makes no reference of the cabal, it reveals that Burton had been reported by MI5’s 
Hollis to have lobbied Chifley for ASIO’s creation.772 Nevertheless, Burton’s claims 
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resonated with the press. In August, it was reported that a civilian organisation – like the 
‘gnomes’ – had been setup before the 1972 election in order to counter “left-wing 
subversion” under the imminent Whitlam Government.773  Murphy, in the Senate, 
acknowledged the continued existence of the so-called “Minuteman” group and said he 
had directed ASIO to report pertinent information to him.774 The National Times 
reported that this reactionary organisation was heightening calls within Labor for an 
intelligence review.775 Murphy informed the Senate that ASIO had disclosed to him its 
involvement in “some sort of para-intelligence organisation”, set up before the 1972 
election, designed to protect national security in anticipation of ASIO’s disbandment by 
“a socialist Labor Government”.776 Despite the political potency of this claim, Whitlam 
refused to elaborate when questioned by press gallery journalists: 
 Answer:    I think ASIO has made some improvements but I am considering  
        the general situation of the Australian Government’s intelligence  
        services. As you realise, it is not the practice to go into any details  
                             on these matters… 
Question: … You said that the existence of this private force in Melbourne  
     disturbs you- 
 Answer:   I won’t say any more on it. I don’t answer questions on security  




The Whitlam Government would not seize the reform initiative and a long impasse on 
the ASIO question would result. The question would not be addressed until the Royal 
                                               




776 Walsh, “The Affair of the ‘Faceless Seventy.” 
777 Gough Whitlam, “Cabinet announcements,” (speech, press conference, August 28, 1973). 
 153 
Commission was called on 21 August 1974. As we will see in the next chapter, at this 
time the politics had shifted decidedly in the government’s favour. Within the Labor 
Party anti-ASIO zeal had ebbed. The 1973 national Labor Conference saw renewed 
moves to disband ASIO, but there was no vote put to members because the proposal did 
not advance beyond the Legal and Constitutional Committee.778 The idea of an inquiry 
was reported to be popular within the government and within the Opposition.779 It 
would be some time before reforms into domestic security would start to be made in 
earnest. For example, it was not until June 1974 that Murphy ordered ASIO to relocate 
its headquarters to Canberra, a move later supported by Hope.780 However, there were 
some reforms with respect to security. In May 1973, the Commonwealth Police were 
introduced to airports to screen passengers after a union dispute involving airline 
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VII. The decision and announcement 
 
 
After the 1974 election the Whitlam Government decided to implement its commitment 
to launch a judicial inquiry into Australia’s intelligence apparatus. As we have seen, 
Labor believed that domestic intelligence gathering by the Executive was necessary and 
that the presence of global terrorism in Australia demonstrated this. This chapter will 
discuss the immediate reasons why the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security 
was launched. There is much confusion in secondary sources as well as in the 
journalistic coverage of the time as to how an inquiry of this magnitude became 
government policy. Whitlam first raised the policy in public in September 1973. Labor 
took the policy to the 1974 election on 8 May as part of its policy platform. However, it 
was not until late June 1974, with the publication of leaked ASIO documents, that the 
policy was acted on. The contents of this leaked series had almost certainly been 
reported on as early as April 1973 but had not drawn the same condemnation from the 
media. The leaked documents brought to attention the blurred line between ASIO as 
institutional protector and ASIO as political participant. However, the Whitlam 
Government remained calm and determined in its aspiration to reform the organisation. 
 
It is clear the Whitlam Government did not want an inquiry that would recommend the 
abolition of ASIO or domestic intelligence agencies more generally. While Labor had 
not clearly articulated what it wanted from a reformed ASIO as such, the Murphy raid 
and its pursuit of Croatian terrorism had demonstrated that it did not intend to diminish 







The idea of an inquiry into the intelligence apparatus had many proponents by the time 
it was established on 21 August 1974. The government was reported to have launched a 
number of ad hoc internal inquiries into specific matters, such as the interdepartmental 
minute which inspired Murphy’s raids in March 1973.782 But the judicial inquiry had 
more uncertain origins predominately because contemporary press reports were 
confused. The Canberra Times cited a pre-1972 election inquiry promise in an article of 
June 1974.783 The National Times also stated that the Whitlam Government had been 
considering instituting an inquiry since 1972. 784 Certainly, an early call for an inquiry 
came from the editorial of the Australian on 19 March 1973. The Sydney Morning 
Herald of 26 August 1973 also speculated that it was “fairly evident” an overhaul of 
sorts was brewing.785 An article in the Australian Financial Review of 4 September 
1973 revealed that the Whitlam Government would hold an inquiry after the Senate 
Committee on Civil Rights of Migrants reported in order to avoid allegations that such a 
move was designed to distract the press from the negative headlines they were 
drafting.786  A week later the Canberra Times wrote that “an inquiry into [ASIO]” was 
imminent.787 In March 1974 National Review published a telex copy of a top secret 
communiqué from the Secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department to Barbour 
citing “the Prime Minister’s Terms of Reference dated 12 September 1973”.788 The 
communiqué, entitled Working Party for the Judicial Enquiry on Intelligence, gave 
Barbour specific instructions on the inquiry.789 However, the National Review believed 
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it to be a hoax of uncertain design. Instead, Whitlam would immediately begin 
preparing for a judicial inquiry – “probably” overseen by Justice Robert Hope – with 
the intention of “rationalis[ing] the system”.790 The 21 June 1974 edition of the 
Australian Financial Review revealed that Murphy had promised to table some kind of 
internal review of ASIO in early 1973 but he had failed to do so.791 The Daily 
Telegraph on 21 June 1974 reported that Whitlam had asked Justice Robert Hope to 
head a judicial inquiry into ASIO.792 In reality, the government probably wanted to 
establish that it wanted to launch an inquiry as early as the Murphy raids. However, 
official documents provide a clearer picture. 
 
At the time of the Murphy raids it was reported that Murphy had already been 
conducting an internal inquiry:  
Senator Murphy’s review of the activities of ASIO is being carried out without 
any public debate of the organisation’s activities or objectives. This review is 
largely in the hands of Mr Peter Barbour, the Director General of ASIO and Mr 
C. Harders, the permanent head of the Attorney General’s Department. Changes 
which will emerge appear likely to be ad hoc administrative moves which will 
bring ASIO into line with the ALP platform. The three major changes 
anticipated will be the introduction of an administrative court to allow appeals 
against ASIO influence on administrative decisions (ie Public Service Board 
decisions based on security checks); the placing of ASIO under firm ministerial 
control; and the presentation of an annual report by the Attorney-General on 
ASIO’s activities and its use of telephone taps.793 
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Hope would later establish that many of his recommendations matched those of this 
early inquiry and had in fact already been implemented before the government’s 
dismissal of November 1975. 
 
The uncertainty of the exact origins of the Royal Commission continues to proliferate in 
secondary sources. Blaxland places the origins of the inquiry as an idea sometime 
around early 1973 when Barbour had originally “suggested that Whitlam might like to 
have some form of independent inspection… of ASIO, perhaps by someone of high 
public standing”.794 However, Hocking suggests the first time Whitlam raised the option 
of an inquiry was a “1974 pre-election policy speech”, as the Murphy raids precluded 
such action at an earlier time.795 In a later work Hocking states that “Whitlam was 
finally persuaded to hold an inquiry” in June 1974.796 Whitlam recollected in 1985 that 
he had been “looking for an opportunity to hold a judicial inquiry into the security 
services” since March 1974.797 McKnight correctly identifies that Whitlam’s press 
conference of September 1973 as the first public acknowledgement that an inquiry was 




The prime minister held a press conference on 11 September 1973 at which he 
addressed the issue of an inquiry into Australia’s intelligence apparatus. He revealed 
that a closed door judicial inquiry was “very likely” but refused to comment on the 
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reasons for erected such an inquiry.799 In his major election policy speech before the 
May 1974 federal election, Whitlam revealed more details about the policy: 
The Government will appoint a judicial inquiry into the structure of the 
Australian security services and into methods of reviewing decisions adversely 
affecting citizens or migrants.800  
This sentence appeared toward the end of his speech between sections on “Aborigines” 
and the arts.801 Around the same time the Australian reported that Murphy had made 
public a departmental policy document, part of which detailed his new “direct 
ministerial control” and capacity to “issue[] directives to [ASIO] on its methods of 
operation”.802 As journalist Mike Steketee noted, even this policy document only 
mentioned ASIO on “the last page of the report”.803 Understandably, the Whitlam 
Government treated ASIO delicately in public. The United States Department of State 
identified this press conference to be of “particular interest”, because the “somewhat 
contentious issue [of ASIO] within Labor” was being dealt with by Whitlam: 
Seems clear he has no intention of abolishing… as socialist left in ALP has long 
advocated, but instead proposes to let the socialist left air its objections to 
Australian intelligence services, without committing to much more than that. He 
will eventually be able to say that he has had a careful inquiry… and might 
make some organizational or personnel changes.804 
The United States observers saw the inquiry as an elegant political solution in an 
otherwise predetermined process. 
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ASIO in the 1974 election 
 
As predicted by the United States embassy, the Whitlam Government decided to call an 
early, double-dissolution election.805 The major political parties more generally avoided 
discussion of ASIO during the 1974 election campaign, despite the intense debate that 
had arisen the previous year. Political advertisements during the election campaign 
demonstrate how little attention was paid to the issue of reforming Australia’s 
intelligence apparatus. Advertisements against the Whitlam Government were 
predominantly concerned with purportedly out of control inflation. 806  Similarly, 
advertisements supporting the government focused on economic policies. 807  An 
exception to this focus was an advertisement placed by then Liberal Premier of New 
South Wales, Sir Robert Askin.808 Buried at the back of the Sydney Morning Herald on 
the day of the election the advertisement lists the “[r]aids on ASIO” and “[r]aids on 
private homes” as evidence of the government’s incompetence and undemocratic 
tendencies.809 Askin’s fear of Labor extended to economic policy. His two-part op-ed in 
the Sydney Morning Herald of 16 May demonstrates the depths of his distrust:   
                                               
805 Embassy of the United States in Canberra, “Yugoslav executions of Australian nationals,” 14 May 
1973, Wikileaks; Department of States, “November 19, 1973 EA press summary,” 19 November 1973, 
Wikileaks. 
806 J. J. Carlton, “Urgent! Education,” political advertisement in Sydney Morning Herald (authorised by J. 
J. Carlton, Ash St, Sydney), 16 May 1974, 9; Liberal Party of Australia, “Who is Whitlam Fooling? 
Inflation is Up!” political advertisement in Sydney Morning Herald (authorised by B.G. Hartcher, 
Canberra), 18 May 1974, 20; Doug Anthony, “It’s Your Choice. Here are the Simple Facts,” political 
advertisement in Sydney Morning Herald (authorised by D. J. Anthony, Parliament House, Canberra), 17 
May 1974, 20; Doug Anthony, “Integrity?” political advertisement in Sydney Morning Herald (authorised 
by D. J. Anthony, Parliament House, Canberra), 17 May 1974, 24; Carlton, J.J. “Your Complete Liberal 
How-to-Vote Guide,” political advertisement in Sydney Morning Herald (authorised by J. J. Carlton, Ash 
Street, Sydney), 18 May 1974, 10. 
807 David Combe, “Only Whitlam Will Reduce Home Interest Rates by 3%,” political advertisement in 
National Times (authorised by David Combe, Ainslie Ave, Canberra), 13 May 1974, 35; New South 
Wales Teachers’ Federation, “Education: Stop or Go?” political advertisement in Sydney Morning Herald 
(authorised by J. R. Williams, Sussex St, Sydney), 16 May 1974, 2; H. Levier, “Can Snedden Beat 
Inflation?” political advertisement in Sydney Morning Herald (authorised by H. Levier), 16 May 1974, 5; 
David Combe, “Vote Australian Labor Party,” political advertisement in Sydney Morning Herald 
(authorised by David Combe, Ainslie Ave, Canberra), 17 May 1974, 23; Seamen’s Union of Australia, 
“The Calamitous Coalition: A Farce in Three Acts,” political advertisement in Sydney Morning Herald 
(authorised by E.P. Kingswood, Sydney), 17 May 1974, 17. 
808 Robert Askin, “Can You Trust Them?” political advertisement in Sydney Morning Herald (authorised 
by Sir Robert Askin, Parliament House, Sydney), 18 May 1974, 24. 
809 Ibid. 
 160 
The primary objective of the ALP… is the socialization of industry, production, 
distribution and exchange… Indeed there is hardly any limit to State authority 
not covered by the Whitlam Government, not merely for its own sake, although 
the appetite for power feeds upon itself, but as a preliminary to the establishment 
of the “socialist dream”.810  
As we have already seen, this was not the first time someone had perceived a link 
between how ASIO is managed and the threat to commerce posed by Labor. Eleven 
days after the election of 18 May the government was reelected with a reduced majority 
in the House of Representatives.811 The ambitious Cairns soon achieved an elevation to 
the position of deputy prime minister.812 A politician in a similar vein to Tony Benn, 
Cairns long represented the so-called left of the party. But his ascension provoked a 
suspicious response when an ASIO document discussing him was published in the 
conservative magazine, the Bulletin.  
 
The Cairns dossier 
 
In June 1974, the Bulletin magazine began releasing a series of leaked ASIO documents 
which brought the reform of ASIO to a head. By way of background, the Bulletin was a 
weekly magazine which started in 1880.813 By 1974 it was owned by Australian 
Consolidated Press and had become the last written news medium owned by Frank 
Packer, grandfather of James Packer, who used it as a conduit for his political views 
until his death in May 1974.814 When Frank’s son, Kerry, inherited control of the 
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magazine its special role continued.815 Known for its controversy, the publication of 
leaked ASIO documents in mid-1974 barely stands out in its long history. The series of 
documents, almost entirely concerned with “left-wing organisations”, was reported to 
have been circulating in the Canberra press gallery for “about three weeks” before one 
emerged in the Bulletin on 19 June.816 The document in question – ostensibly a 
summary or “read-in” designed for consumption by ASIO officers – focused on Cairns 
during his leadership of the Vietnam War Moratorium movement.817 The officer who 
authored it saw Cairns and his politics in extreme terms: 
Dr Cairns is concerned to promote a populist-type theory – a theory close to the 
participatory democracy advocated by various new left spokesmen both inside 
and outside the organised Labor movement. The concept of the will of the 
people and its formation by extra-parliamentary means including civil 
disturbance, and [his] claim that young people are showing their dissatisfaction 
with the parliamentary system of government through movements of protest and 
dissent… all these reflect the populist idea of direct participation in running 
affairs; of direct relationships between people and leadership; and so of the 
supremacy of the will of the people operating in the community at large… 
Overall, the kind of socialism envisaged by Dr Cairns bears a striking 
resemblance to that promoted by the Communist Party of Australia in its 
Statement of Aims as promulgated by its 22nd Congress (March, 1970)… 
[Cairns’ actions] could lead, via civil, industrial and political unrest to the 
growth of elitism in every sphere, to the manipulation of people by demagogues, 
to the fascist cult of the personality, to the worship of force, and to the 
                                               
815 Gideon Haigh, “Packed it in: the demise of the ‘Bulletin’,” Monthly, March 2008, 
https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2008/march/1268869044/gideon-haigh/packed-it. 
816 Canberra Times, “ASIO Report on Cairns to be Investigated,” 21 June 1974, 3.; Jenny Hocking, His 
Time, vol. 2 of Gough Whitlam (Melbourne: Miegunyah Press, 2014), 161.; Canberra Times, “PM issues 
a list of ASIO files,” 3 July 1974, 3. 
817 Peter Samuel, “Cairns: ASIO’s startling dossier,” Bulletin, 22 June 1974, 8-9.; Hocking, Terror Laws, 
43-45.; John Burney, “Cairns’ ASIO file ‘tip of iceberg’,” Daily Telegraph, 21 June 1974, 8-9. 
 162 
destruction of the democratic parliamentary system of government and its 
replacement by a form of collectivism.818 
In this document one can clearly identify ASIO’s confusion on subversion. Simple 
advocacy of democratic alternatives to parliamentary democracy attracted ASIO’s 
attention and distrust. ASIO was also seen to be monitoring non-violent political 
figures. The Director-General of ASIO had assured Murphy in March 1973 – who in 
turn assured Parliament – that there were no files on politicians kept by the 
organisation.819 It has since become well established that ASIO had kept records on a 
vast array of politically active people, including Cairns, who was monitored for decades 
despite his apparent support of domestic intelligence gathering in the past.820 
 
The Bulletin’s commentary on the document indicated its scepticism of the conclusions 
reached in 1971, especially since Cairns had willingly morphed into “a moderate in the 
ALP” after becoming a minister “admir[ed]” by “a large number… in the commercial 
world”.821 The argument that Cairns had undergone a de-radicalisation of sorts was 
advanced by the man himself around the same time in what the United States 
Ambassador, Marshalled Green, called in private a “very impressive” speech.822 The 
magazine continued: 
The most sensational aspect of the paper is that it will confirm in the minds of 
many government members and supporters the long-standing and deep-seated 
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hostility and antagonism of the security service toward the Whitlam 
Government.823 
On this point the magazine lacked prescience. Not only did the leaked document 
confirm existing perceptions of ASIO by those wary of it, the document revealed the 
extraordinary extent of dissent in Australian society towards the organisation. As 
chapter three demonstrated the press was broadly aligned in favour of disrupting the 
status quo. As already noted, the National Times in April 1973 published passages from 
a file of leaked ASIO documents, one of which was almost certainly published by the 
Bulletin.824 No journalist or politician appears to have registered this fact in June 1974. 
 
While the National Review and Canberra Times identified “hand-written corrections” 
on the Cairns document as evidence of it being a draft, newspapers across the country 
instantly appreciated its political significance. 825  The publication of the leaked 
document-excerpts resulted in assurances from the government that its pre-election 
policy commitment to undertake an inquiry into the intelligence apparatus would be 
instigated as “quickly as possible”.826 The Australian reported that “[a] Government 
inquiry ha[d] been ordered into how the document was released, why it was kept, and 
which other MPs [were] the subject of security dossiers”.827 Within a few days the same 
journalist was reporting that the government would launch a broader inquiry before the 
end of July.828 According to the Prime Minister’s spokesperson, at issue was ASIO’s 
misuse of public funds for compiling sub-standard commentary and for investigating 
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ministers of the crown.829 But Whitlam’s response was to “play[] down” the leak, 
stressing that “the documents contained no confidential information”.830 At a wide-
ranging press conference on 20 June at the National Press Club, Cairns answered 
questions about ASIO:  
Q:  Do you believe there is a role for ASIO in Australia at the moment, and 
does that role include the provision of dossiers on Federal MPs? 
A:  I suppose the answer to the first is yes and the answer to the second is 
probably no… [I] am impressed by the statement in The Bulletin that the 
people who wrote them are not any longer with ASIO. I sometimes 
wonder if they ever were… 
Q: Are you concerned that both ASIO and Senator Greenwood thought that 
you were concerned with the destruction of the parliamentary system? 
A: I would probably conclude from what I know that most of those who 
have been concerned with that have at least been retired… [W]hat I was 
doing in 1970 and 1971 was trying to find a way peacefully for the very 
large number of people who were opposed to the Vietnam war to express 
their views democratically… 
Q: Does your election to Deputy Prime Minister entitle you to be told fully 
about the role of U.S. bases in Australia…? 
A: … I am not sure what my present position entitles me to in respect of 
that, but you can be sure about this: I am not going to rush around to 
have a look at the files on ASIO…831 
Cairns was attempting to calm the situation and, at the expense of Murphy, assuage 
what fears there were of another raid on ASIO or other recriminations. With regard to 
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the officer responsible for the documents no longer being employed by ASIO Whitlam 
would soon contradict him, as we will see. Cairns was also reported to have said: 
It is not too much to say that the era of McCarthyism established in Sir Robert 
Menzies’ time, which for so long disfigured Australian life, may have ended.832  
He was in line with the government’s belief that past transgressions arose from an abuse 
of power, not a systemic flaw. However, he was more ambitious in what the prospective 
inquiry would recommend: “[Th]e important thing [was] to have [ASIO] answerable to 
the people so it is answerable to Parliament”.833 
 
Whitlam recollected in his 1985 memoir, the Whitlam Government, 1972-1975, that 
“[w]idespread demand for an inquiry came to a head in June 1974” because of the 
Cairns document.834 He intimated that this was politically motived as the Liberal Party 
member and editor of the Bulletin, Peter Coleman, had received the ASIO documents 
years earlier.835 It is important to note that Coleman, who was a NSW Leader of the 
Opposition for a brief period in the late 1970s, had been editor of the Bulletin from 1964 
until 1967.836 At the time of the leak Coleman was editing a competitor magazine, 
Quadrant.837 Whitlam further recalled that he pre-empted the publication of further 
leaked documents by holding “a press conference on 2 July 1974”, which gave 
“[e]verybody [the impression] that ASIO had acted in a wholly unwarranted fashion and 
outside its functions in supplying the media with material about individual citizens”.838 
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He somewhat hyperbolically claimed that he “forthwith spragged the series” of leaked 
documents by releasing the titles and dates of those in the possession of the Bulletin.839  
 
At the press conference Whitlam had waited until a journalist raised the ASIO issue 
toward its close and only went as far as to indicate that an inquiry announcement was 
imminent and .that the terms of reference would be made public840 When asked about 
the perceptions of “the security service or the Government” after the leak and whether 
the leak would “be… looked at by the Royal Commission”, he prevaricated by merely 
stating that the titles of the documents would be made available to “[a]nybody who 
wants to know” as they were not “confidential”.841 He also explained that each was 
genuinely produced by the organisation and only contained information that  
could have been got from any bookstore, and the dates, the facts, the quotations 
were available in newspapers and magazines which were freely available in 
Australia. There is nothing in these documents which ASIO has sought or 
received in the course of its statutory duties.842  
Clearly, Whitlam did not wish to play the role of dogged ASIO defender. It was also 
revealed that the documents were compiled over a 10-year period and had been written 
by the same officer who was still employed by the organisation.843  Indeed, this 
employee was revealed to have been the same “senior officer” referred to by Murphy in 
December 1973 that had attempted to setup Analysis magazine with the assistant editor 
of the Sun-Herald, Robert Mayne, and Peter Coleman.844 Director-General Barbour – 
who had overseen the practise of compiling summaries of political events – “informed” 
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the government that his organisation ceased allowing these documents to go to 
journalists and that it had stopped compiling them sometime before the 1972 election.845 
Whitlam, quoting Murphy about another leak, said that “[t]he supply of material about 
individual citizens to be used in the media… was wholly unwarranted and outside the 
functions of ASIO”.846 Whitlam also criticised ASIO for the “gross waste of public 
funds” its wild practises necessitated.847 The overall impression given by Whitlam and 
his ministers was that ASIO had misbehaved in the past but had now been brought into 
line through a combination of self-correction on Barbour’s part and responsible 
management by a Labor government. Even the ‘radical’ Cairns ageed.848 As an article in 
the Australian identified: 
The concern within the Government is not so much based on the number of 
security organisations as the grey areas of their control and responsibility.849  
ASIO as a concept was not the problem, as Whitlam affirmed in his 1985 memoir.850 
 
An inquiry is born 
 
Within two months of the leaked document scandal involving the Deputy Prime 
Minister the inquiry was established. At 2pm on 21 August 1974 Governor-General 
John Kerr, acting on the advice of the Federal Executive Council and under the Royal 
Commissions Act of 1902 (Cth), commissioned “Mr. Justice Robert Marsden Hope to 
conduct an inquiry into the intelligence and security services of the Australian 
Government”.851 A press release from the Prime Minister’s office followed which 
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revealed that Hope’s inquiry would look into ASIO’s history as well as concerns as to 
civil liberties. It explained that 
the appointment of a Judge with qualifications as eminent as those of Mr. Justice 
Hope guaranteed that the inquiry would be well conducted, comprehensive and 
responsible and at the same time would reassure those countries and 
organisation with which Australia has connections in the security field.852  
In short, Labor was not vesting Hope with the power to undermine the United States 
and Commonwealth relationships. The “essential part of [Hope’s] terms of reference” 
according to Whitlam was:  
In the light of past experience, and having regard to the security of Australia as a 
nation, the rights and responsibilities of individual persons and future as well as 
present needs, to make recommendations on the intelligence and security 
services which the nation should have available to it and on the way in which 
the relevant organisations can most efficiently and effectively serve the interest 
of the Australian people and Government...853 [emphasis added].  
This was not ill-tempered policy or radicalism. Nor was it unexpected, especially by an 
observant ASIO. The Whitlam Government wished to discover ways in which a de-
politicised domestic intelligence agency should be structured and how that organisation 
should operate. ASIO would be reformed to conform with the interests of the people 
and the government, without compromising existing foreign relationships. On practical 
grounds, the Royal Commission would build on the reforms already undertaken by 
Murphy and made public in a departmental report of 9 May 1974 highlighting the 
directions he had given ASIO addressing matters of legality, procedural integrity and 
political impartiality.854 On the question of democracy, Labor had decided not to 
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disband ASIO before the 1972 election and the terms of reference did not instruct Hope 
to consider such a possibility. This is contrary to the narrative of uncertainty and fear 
put by the Official History.  
 
In part, the selection of Hope as commissioner by the Whitlam Government ensured the 
Royal Commission would not be radical. Hope was a former member of the Liberal 
Party and had a legal positivism when it came to legislation. As a member of the 
judiciary he instilled a sense of impartiality. A similar argument had been made of the 
appointment of Geoffrey Reed as ASIO’s first director-general: “To hide behind the 
judiciary… is excellent”.855 Hope had proved his mettle as head commissioner in the 
National Estate Committee of Inquiry, which provided the government with a “valuable 
report” on environmental conservation and heritage in April 1974.856 In July 1974, 
Hope was appointed a member of the Australian Council for the Arts.857 While he 
approached the intelligence and security apparatus as a novice, it helped the government 
that Hope was described in the press as a civil libertarian.858 His appointment was also 
bipartisan, as the Premier of NSW, Robert Askin granted permission for Hope to be 
“available to undertake this important inquiry”.859 
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VIII. Findings and recommendations 
 
“The collection of security intelligence should begin with the slightest practicable intrusion into civil 
liberties… [But] its seriousness may justify greater intrusion.” 
Justice Robert Hope, Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security, 1977. 
 
 
Justice Robert Hope would hand down most of his reports after the 1975 constitutional 
crisis; the Whitlam Government had been dismissed from office by the governor-
general in 1975 and dismissed by the electorate at the subsequent election.860 His fourth 
report, dealing with ASIO, was partially tabled in Parliament by the Fraser Government 
on 25 October 1977.861 This chapter will discuss the findings and recommendations of 
the Royal Commission as well as touch on the reform process that it began. With 
respect to ASIO its primary recommendation would be for a new legislative basis for 
the organisation that clearly demarcated the extent of the ministerial oversight permitted 
and the degree of operational freedom it could exercise. The Royal Commission began a 
process of reform that consciously depoliticised ASIO, brought it into line with the 
established practises of the bureaucracy, and refocused it on tangible threats posed to 
the state. However, the selection of royal commissioner and the terms of reference 
prevented the Royal Commission from reaching radical conclusions, especially the 
disbandment of ASIO. The Royal Commission found that domestic intelligence 
gathering by the executive was a legitimate and necessary use of power within 
Australia’s parliamentary democracy. 
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The ASIO that Hope envisaged was a politically benign entity – with access to “quite 
large sums” –  which would accumulate information in order to produce dispassionate 
reports and advice for consumption by the executive. 862  For this reason, Hope 
maintained the substantial trust placed in the office of director-general of security to 
self-regulate under the Act.863 He also found that ASIO to have “the confidence of all 
the major political parties”.864 At the outset of the fourth report he stated that the 
“essential part of my terms of reference” with respect to ASIO was the same section that 
Whitlam had identified as being the most important section (see above, p. 169), which 
went to the kind of intelligence service “the national should have available to it”.865 
According to his interpretation of the terms of reference he was to focus on the 
intelligence and security apparatus of the future, not the past. For ASIO he envisaged a 
future in which it was accorded proper respect by the Australian people: 
An organisation truly fulfilling [“the defence of the realm”]… is entitled to the 
confidence and respect of the nation. It is only in performing such a role that 
ASIO will be able to attain a standing comparable with that of the various 
defence services. My recommendations will be directed to this end.866 
This imported a broader meaning than the terms of reference, which only directed the 
commissioner to consider how ASIO served the interests of the people and the 
commonwealth. More generally, Hope interpreted the terms of reference in a way that 
gave it both narrow and broad meaning. On one hand, his consideration of legitimacy 
was a broader interpretation of the terms of reference as the government had already 
directed the commissioner that an intelligence apparatus was needed. On the other hand, 
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Hope interpreted the terms of reference narrowly because he decided not to consider 
ASIO’s past conduct. 
 
The legitimacy of ASIO 
 
Hope decided to “make an overall review of ASIO” that went from its existential 
legitimacy to its operations.867 Overall, Hope established that ASIO was legitimate 
because it satisfied legal, philosophical and practical considerations. Each will be 




Hope predominantly saw ASIO’s legitimacy through the eyes of a legal positivist; the 
answer to the question of legitimacy lay in constitutional law. Hope found that between 
1949 and 1956 ASIO had effectively operated on “a statement of principles of activity 
[rather] than a document of incorporation or of authority”.868 From 1956, ASIO was 
clearly legitimate because it existed as a result of a valid Act of Parliament. 
Constitutionally, Hope argued that the Act was valid under section 51 (vi), the defence 
power, but that sections 51 (xix, xxvii, xxix, xxxix), 52 (i-ii), and 61, or a combination 
of these, would also suffice.869 For Hope, the law was the basis for the practice: 
The first and fundamental principle is that ASIO must operate within the terms 
of its statute, and be concerned only with matters which are relevant to 
security… ASIO should not intrude upon the rights and freedoms or upon the 
privacy of persons except to the extent that the requirements of the nation’s 
security, in the circumstances of the particular case, justify and the law allows… 
[T]he manner in which, and the extent to which, ASIO takes its investigations 
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should be directly related to the importance or seriousness of the security 
issue.870 (Original emphasis). 
Since ASIO was permitted to exist by valid legislation other considerations – 
philosophical and practical – were in effect secondary. As such, definition of ‘security’ 
– pivotal to much of Hope’s discussion on ASIO’s correct function – is entirely 
determined by the Parliament and actioned by the executive, but subject to the High 




Hope premised his discussion on the legitimacy of ASIO on the assumption that the 
Constitution and the institutions of government ensured that Australia was a liberal 
democracy. He began  
by considering whether Australia needs a security service such as ASIO was 
created to provide. That leads to a consideration of what is, or should be, the 
proper place of a domestic security service in a liberal democracy like 
Australia.872 
In order to address his stated consideration he adopted the following test: 
“[I]n the final analysis, public safety and individual liberty sustain each other”… 
There are limitations upon what a security organization should do in a 
democratic society. Aims, even of security, do not justify all means. What has to 
be kept secure is not simply a physical entity; the society which exists within 
Australia is one with standards and principles which secure rights and freedoms 
as well as obligations… In time of actual or threatened danger, the exercize of 
some rights and freedoms may have to be restricted in order that the society on 
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which they depend be preserved at all… In time of peace, with no imminent 
danger, little if any restriction is justified… At all times the object must be to 
achieve a balance between the interests of the person and the interests of the 
State.873 
These comments indicate a clear intention by Hope to preserve democracy and 
democratic rights, but also to preserve the state. It was by no means a comprehensive 
discussion; he did not establish why the state was the legitimate provider of security. 
However, he appears to have understood that national security involved political 
decisions.874 He believed that a “bipartisan approach to security matters” should arise 
organically as it “is literally concerned with security… with the survival of this country 
and, indeed, this globe”.875  
 
Hope found that “ASIO [was] an organ of the executive government” that formed a 
legitimate part of the “official family of government” and the “defence system”; it could 
“no doubt… be used to defend the Commonwealth of Australia against an armed 
revolution or uprising”.876 Indeed, ASIO was “[a]n integral part of government”.877 
ASIO defended parliamentary democracy from the “many ways in which a country can 
be weakened and the overthrow of its government planned and organized by clandestine 
activity of a wholly or substantially domestic origin”.878 However, Hope argued that this 
should not extend to non-violent “undermining” of the Commonwealth: 
“Overthrowing the government” does not… refer to the ousting by constitutional 
methods of the political party in power for the time being but the overthrow by 
unconstitutional methods of the established constitutional government or system 
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of government… Intrusion by ASIO into these areas would prime facie infringe 
basic democratic rights… [T]he nature of our political climate, the importance 
of our political and civil rights and liberties, as well as the importance… for 
ASIO to keep a position of proper balance, lead me to the conclusion that to the 
extent that guidelines are necessary and can be satisfactorily formulated, they 
should be prescribed by legislation… [Although] an organisation rejecting 
Parliamentary democracy may not be subversive, but it may be appropriate for 
ASIO to keep a watch of it if… It is not sufficient to await the commission of a 
crime against the nation’s security, and only then to take action to identify and 
take proceedings against the offenders.879 
A citizen could advocate overthrowing the government (under ASIO’s watchful eye) 
but not advocate an unconstitutional overthrow of the system of government.880 This 
distinction was important given ASIO’s past confusion between protection of an 
institution and protection of its politics. Hope also found that a citizen could hold an 
ideological belief which permitted subversion, as he perceived a difference between “an 
intention” and “a mere contemplation”.881  
 
With respect to the business community and unionism, Hope recommended that ASIO 
constrain its activities to vetting employees who would have “access to classified 
matter”; it was “not [to] function as an employment agency or to promote or to ensure 
industrial peace per se”.882 As with democratic rights more generally the right to protest 
or otherwise engage in industrial action must be balanced by security considerations and 
intelligence information.883  He also recommended that information should not be 
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In applying his “perceptive realism” Hope believed that Australia needed a domestic 
intelligence agency for practical reasons.885 Based on his own research he rejected the 
idea that  
Australia is too remote and too unimportant to attract much attention from 
foreign intelligence services, that it is inconceivable that Australians should be 
traitors to their country…886 It may be equally important or more important for 
an unfriendly power clandestinely to influence or subvert the policies of another 
power, to feed in with false information… to weaken it or confuse its people… 
[S]light twists may be given to true facts; every device may be used to deceive 
and mislead… It is presumably a logical extension of war-time propaganda and 
it can be extremely effective in achieving its intended purpose…887 
This was a low threshold for what constituted propaganda. He also considered important 
that “most significant foreign powers have intelligence services that operate outside 
their territories”.888 This was deemed particularly important because in the mid-1970s 
the number of foreign intelligence officers was “much larger than in the 1940s and 
1950s”.889 As evidence of Australia’s susceptibility, he pointed to the publication of 
leaked information: 
Perhaps the not inconsiderable amount of classified material leaked to the press 
in recent times throws some light on the Commonwealth’s need for protection. 
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If journalists can obtain this amount of material… [so can a] highly professional 
and technically equipped team of intelligence officers, applying themselves full 
time to the task…890  
As for the specific need of a domestic intelligence agency, Hope stated 
if all subversion were domestic subversion, there might be some weight in the 
submission that responsibility… could be better placed with the various police 
forces… [T]he reasons that support the creation of any separate security 
organization… include the desirability that such an organisation should be 
concerned with intelligence and should have no or minimal executive powers, 
and… [be] a highly specialized and professional body.891 
It must also utilise its “entitle[ment] to consider and assess any information which it 
receives or obtains which is relevant to its function”, quite unlike an adversarial 
court.892 
 
Hope recommended that ASIO’s “principal function” should be to protect the 
Commonwealth against espionage, active measures (general covert attempts to 
influence foreign policy), subversion, and sabotage, as well as politically motivated 
terrorism and violent political activity more generally.893 The latter two threats were 
included even though “they may not always involve an ‘attack’ on Australia”.894 Hope 
recommended a narrow definition focused on acts of political violence perpetrated in 
Australia for “foreign political purposes”, especially given the “prejudicial effects” such 
activity could render to “Australia’s [foreign] relations”.895  
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As with the creation of ASIO in 1949, the reform process that began in 1974 had 
recourse to the internal affairs of the United States and United Kingdom; the other 
“liberal democracies”. To justify this practise of consulting “senior security intelligence 
officials overseas”, he argued: 
They gave me the benefit of their knowledge and experience in the context of 
much larger security services than ASIO… I am indebted to these officials for 
their assistance. Their advice has often supported me in conclusions I have 
otherwise reached in regard to ASIO.896 
Hope’s report cites a number of foreign officials, including United States Vice-
President Nelson Rockefeller and Attorney-General Edward Levi, as well as the United 
Kingdom’s Lord Denning, amongst others.897 This recourse to foreign allies indicates 
that Hope saw Australian liberal democracy as being cast from the same mould as that 
of the United States and United Kingdom. In this way, Hope was acting not dissimilarly 
to previous Australian governments, including the Whitlam Government. However,   
Some of the activities allegedly performed by the CIA against governments, 
parties, organizations and persons thought to be inimical to the interests of the 
US are examples of this type of action. It can be assumed that the actions of the 
KGB and of the intelligence services of other communist countries at least equal 
and probably exceed in all respects the activities attributed to the CIA.898 
As we have already seen, the Cambridge History of the Cold War contradicts Hope’s 
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ASIO’s past conduct 
 
Hope narrowed the terms of reference with respect to ASIO’s past conduct, firmly 
focusing on the future: 
I found ASIO’s files in such disorder that, in the time that has been available to 
me, I have been quite unable to establish the truth or otherwise of many of the 
particulars of matter alleged in evidence, or raised with ASIO as the result of 
other inquiries. I have taken the view, however, that my task is to make 
recommendations for the future rather than to seek to track down the truth or 
otherwise of past errors or alleged past errors. 899 
Hope could have requested more resources in order to satisfy the terms of reference, but 
it was clear that he did not believe this was necessary. The allowed Fraser to 
subsequently informed Parliament, “[f]or the first time… people can read carefully 
assessments of an independent judicial authority who has had full access to all the 
information and the time and resources to thoroughly analyse them”. 900  He also 
informed the state premiers that it had been an “exhaustive inquiry”.901 As a senior 
member of the judiciary Hope would have understood the importance of establishing 
fact in order to apportion blame and provide justice. In the executive arm, royal 
commissions are often erected in order to establish fact and make recommendations as 
to reform; the clear intention of the Whitlam Government. This failure is compounded 
by the existence of the seventh report of the Royal Commission, which dealt with the 
history of pre-ASIO organisations.  
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Despite the lack of attention paid to ASIO’s past conduct, Hope indicated that he had 
seen evidence of impropriety. For example, he stated that “at times” the organisation 
had “depart[ed]” from the democratic principles that necessitated balance between 
freedom and restriction of rights.902 However, he noted, “it is somewhat difficult now to 
determine the precise weight of particular matters of justification, for it is not possible 
to place one’s self in the precise context in which the departure occurred”.903 As for 
ASIO’s records of citizens, he found that ASIO was entitled to keep records on anyone 
and that they were not “akin to… a police or criminal record”.904 In fact, he found that 
“[a] very large number of ASIO’s files established that persons [were] not security 
risks”.905 Although Hope found that ASIO’s judgement had been impaired by the poor 
maintenance of its records he also found that information had routinely not been 
“disseminat[ed]… on the basis of need rather than mere curiosity” or even not at all.906 
Any information collected by the organisation must only be “disseminat[ed]… on the 
basis of need rather than mere curiosity”.907 Hope found ASIO’s selection of employees 
was inhibiting its function: 
I must report that I saw little evidence in ASIO that the qualities of mind and 
expertise needed were recognized, or available in any large measure.908 
This deficiency hindered the organisation’s primary function. Part of this problem was 
one of deficient education. For example, Hope started that 
ASIO should be the place where the study of Marxism, in all its forms and 
manidestations [sic], is a high academic discipline.909 
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ASIO also had a “tendency to think of anyone they chose to call ‘left-wing’ as 
subversive” and employ people inept for intelligence work.910 Hope found that ASIO 
had engaged in the dissemination of information to the public and that such 
“propaganda activity” was outside of the proper functions of organisation.911 For this 
reason, the Special Projects Section of ASIO – responsible for disseminating counter-
propaganda – was “improper in the extreme”.912 Hope seems to have implied that ASIO 
had not always complied with the requirement that it act “absolutely free from any 
political bias or influence”.913 Hope found that “it is most important that ASIO should 
not be, and should not appear to be, a political tool” and “should not [develop]… close 




Hope centred the oversight of ASIO firmly with the executive. His primary reason for 
this was the “necessity of secrecy in ASIO’s operations”, which displaced the “normal 
checks and balances” of a parliamentary democracy.915 Another reason was that the 
executive was the institution with “responsibility… [for] acting on any information or 
advice [from] ASIO”.916 He recommended that Australia follow Canada – instead of 
Sweden and the Netherlands – by not extending express parliamentary oversight over 
domestic intelligence.917 ASIO was “in a general way” responsible “to Parliament” 
through the attorney-general and prime minister, but they can elect “not to comment”.918 
It would also be responsible through a secret report to government which would also be 
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seen by the leader of the opposition.919 Hope also recommended against the practice of 
requiring “an annual report [by ASIO] to Parliament”, doubting its “real value”.920 
Despite this lack of parliamentary oversight ASIO had a “duty to investigate” suspect 
members of Parliament.921 
 
The minister responsible for ASIO was clearly the attorney-general; an practice 
accepted since the 1956 legislation.922 According to Hope the minister had “a wide 
supervisory power and responsibility” over ASIO.923 He found that the Act of 1956 had 
precluded ministerial directions pertaining to ASIO’s operational matters, which the 
director-general decided.924 Commenting on the Murphy raids, Hope found that the 
minister was “entitled to enter and to inspect any premises of ASIO, and to take with 
him such persons as he might think necessary”.925 However, the consent of the director-
general was essential as they had a “right and indeed a duty… to resist” any attempts at 
interference.926 But at the time of the raids it was universally accepted that ASIO was 
subject to complete “ministerial direction and control”. 927  More generally, Hope 
recommended that ASIO should be directed by the Prime Minister on “general policy 
directions and guidance”, as had occurred between Menzies and Spry.928  
 
While it was legal under the Act for ASIO to disseminate relevant security information 
to the attorney-general, it was “improper” for the minister to request information from 
the organisation for the purpose of handing it on to backbench MPs.929  ASIO’s 
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operational matters should not be available to “outsider[s]”, nor any “government 
departments, specifically including the Attorney-General’s Department… in any 
sustained or regular way”.930 That is, the government should receive ASIO’s analysis of 
raw information without receiving the raw information itself or knowing how it was 
obtained, unless legislation otherwise permitted, as with telecommunications 
interceptions.931 With respect to terrorism, this rule was important, as only a specialised 
domestic intelligence agency was appropriate to handle the exchange of information 
within a global network of intelligence agencies.932 Importantly, Hope recommended 
that ASIO only give information to the attorney-general if it is “in the interests of 
security”.933  
 
Hope found that ASIO’s operational capacity was also compromised by 
mismanagement borne from a lack of “attention” being given by management to a 
“definition of goals, financial affairs, staffing and recruitment, communication and 
records procedures”.934 As such he consulted bureaucrats and former cabinet ministers, 
as well as “some hundreds of past and present ASIO members”.935 Initially, he was met 
with reluctance on the part of senior ASIO officers, however directors-general after 
Barbour had ensured the organisation approached the Royal Commission in good 
faith.936 Operational reviews of ASIO are now carried out regularly; the latest such 
review was in 2017.937 Hope’s desire to see an avenue of administrative appeal – 
envisaged by the Whitlam Government – was accepted by the Fraser Government.938 
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Top-secret suspicions  
 
The Royal Commission also made a Supplement to the fourth report which disclosed 
various concerns of the “highest sensitivity”. One of Hope’s suspicions was that ASIO 
“may be, or may have been, penetrated by a hostile intelligence service”.939 Although 
the veracity of this claim was not tested by Hope, he identified a number of 
“indicators”. 940  These included various ASIO officers, “sudden and inexplicable 
conclusions” to certain counter-intelligence programmes, the highly unusual absence of 
an internal review procedure, the general inefficacy on counter-intelligence, public 
leaks, and possible collusion between ASIO and Commonwealth Police with respect to 
the Murphy raid.941 Warren Reed and Christopher J. Ward argue that Hope wanted to 
investigate allegations made by United States and United Kingdom counterpart agencies 
that ASIO had been comprised by Soviet intelligence from its inception in 1949.942 
Given the redacted words of this report it is hard to establish this claim. Hope alluded to 
the belief within the United States and allied intelligence community that “the climate 
of disclosures over the last 2-3 years, about western intelligence services may be part of 
a ‘grand design’”.943 Given the timing, it is possible the conspiracy was based on the 
FBI’s Cointelpro activities, referred to earlier.  
 
The Hope Interviews 
 
In 1998 the National Library of Australia’s Oral History Project conducted interviews 
with Hope. The subject approached the interview quite candidly, as evidenced by 
Hope’s admission that he had twice allowed himself to be pressured by President Athol 
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Moffitt of the NSW Court of Appeal into making judgements he would have otherwise 
not made.944 This wide-ranging conversation reveals additional detail which frequently 
contradicted the Royal Commission. Contrary to the fourth report, the Royal 
Commission undertook considerable efforts to consider the history of ASIO.945 For 
example, Hope said that the Royal Commission did “everything… to find out” whether 
the Soviet infiltration of ASIO was true. He also discovered that ASIO and the 
intelligence apparatus had been dominated by an “old boys” network where social class 
dictated your reliability.946 The organisation was also politically biased; it was “well and 
truly in Cold War mode… anybody who was slightly pink” was watched, “the whole 
system was substantially directed to the left wing of politics”. 947 In fact, “anything 
slightly unorthodox” and “any kind of activism” was considered subversive by ASIO. 
948 The organisation’s network was broad, drawing on a large number of “well-known 
and respected” people who willingly informed on colleagues. 949 On one occasion, 
ASIO had handed over personal  information to the government to aid its blackmail of 
an moratorium leader. 950 With respect to his overseas fact-finding missions, he had seen 
that the abuse of domestic intelligence agencies by incumbents was widespread practice 
among the Western states.951 What he learnt of the FBI was “a bit upsetting”. 952 He was 
also concerned about the director-general of MI5, Michael Hanley, who had told him 
that he constrained criticism from the United Kingdom government by offering 
information on unruly backbenchers. 953 Hope believed the Royal Commission was 
limited by a widespread reluctance within the Australian and Western intelligence 
                                               











community to provide him with complete information. 954 ASIO’s archives and records 
system were found to have been deliberately designed to shield the organisation from 
external (and internal) scrutiny. This version of Hope’s report was more inline with the 
one recollected by Malcolm Fraser decades later.955 
 
Overall, Hope said that that part of the problem with reforming ASIO was that a 
“tremendous number of… [employees] by the 1970s had been there since the 1950s”, 
meaning established norms took along time to shift even after the Royal Commission.956 
But the bipartisanship on ASIO that emerged was not surprising, as he found no Labor 
or Coalition politician opposed to ASIO and “all where in favour” of its continued 
existence 957  Governor-General Kerr was deliberately excluded from briefings on 
Australia’s intelligence facilities because he “talks too much”. 958 Hope attempted to 
rectify this but Kerr was not interested. 959 Hope also said that believed Murphy had 
been instrumental in having him selected as commissioner and that Whitlam had 
opposed it out of possible contempt for Murphy. 960 The Official History claims that 
“one of [Hope’s] first steps” as commissioner was to “to see if ASIO held a file on 
him”.961 This is consistent with Murphy’s own attempts to locate his own file.962 But 
Hope explained in 1998 that he did not request his file out a sense of propriety and that 
Murphy had voluntarily requested it from ASIO, causing him to joke that Murphy had 
“disappointed” him when he learned that no such file existed. 963 
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As for Hope personally, he saw himself as a black letter jurist with respect to 
legislation.964 He revealed that he had attempted to join the Communist Party in the late 
1930s but had failed for reasons of administrative incompetence. 965 In the 1960s he 
joined the Liberal Party as part of a deal that ensured his elevation to the role of 
President of the NSW Council of Civil Liberties. 966 But within weeks, the Liberal 
government had elevated him to the bench of the NSW Supreme Court; Hope implied 
this was political as well.967 Hope said he had “a great row” with the Council of Civil 
Liberties during the Royal Commission, as they believed the minister should determine 
what constituted a security matter. 968  Years later he agreed with the council’s 
position.969 Similarly, Hope later believed that Parliament was right to establish the 
Joint Committee on ASIO in 1988. 970 These concessions went a considerable way to 
undermining the Royal Commission’s findings and recommendations, raising the 
possibility that the fourth report was more political than it seemed.  
  
                                               










The Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security was established by the Whitlam 
Government in order to depoliticise ASIO and refocus the intelligence and security 
apparatus on genuine threats to the commonwealth. Although it took time to develop it 
was clear by September 1973 that the government would launch a judicial inquiry. 
However, Labor did not pose a threat to ASIO from at least the 1971 party conference, 
at which it was decided that the organisation would be reformed and not abolished. 
Much of the reform of ASIO had already been undertaken by the Whitlam Government 
by the time Hope finished handing down reports in October 1977. 
 
Labor’s position on ASIO from 1971 solidified when the Whitlam Government came to 
office. However, Labor’s acceptance of ASIO as essential should not have been or 
continue to be surprising. Labor’s long history of mostly passive support of the 
criminalisation of communism, its pursuit of communists in its membership as well as 
the labour movement, indicates something fundamental in its ideology. Namely, Labor 
was not a radical party but one that accepted the political and economic status quo. 
However, the idea of Labor as a once great socialist party proliferates through the 
decades, in part because of poor understanding about ideology, the narrow confines of 
the Australian political landscape, the rhetoric of Whitlam after the dismissal, and the 
change in Australia’s economic fortunes in the early 1970s, with Australia’s position as 
the Financial Times’ “healthiest economy on earth” being rapidly undone.971 
 
Labor’s history with ASIO might have produced a different result; a party determined to 
seek its revenge on an organisation that had meddled in politics and, so many thought, 
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possibly worse. The Menzies Government and succeeding Coalition governments 
misused ASIO and by the late 1960s and early 1970s had rendered the organisation a 
kind of political research unit. By the time the Whitlam Government took office in 1972 
the organisation was ineffectual on national security. In the 1950s ASIO had shared 
anti-communism with the Menzies Government. Both saw communism as a threat to 
the security of the commonwealth and the economic status quo. The difference may be 
that the Menzies Government was not genuinely concerned to the extent that it stated 
but identified a political opportunity. Indeed, the Truman Administration was aware of 
this same advantage, as was Labor who tried to outcompete the Coalition in 1954. 
Conversely, the anti-communist fervour of ASIO and its director-general, Charles Spry, 
is hard to doubt. There is the distinct possibility that Menzies read this situation and 
exploited it for political gains, as he was a politician and a remarkably successful one at 
that.  
 
The mutual benefit that arose from this shared anti-communism was clear. Under a 
Menzies Government ASIO would be permitted to carry out its anti-communist agenda 
without fear of many limitations being placed upon it. This agenda obviously had 
special meaning to the organisation based in its genuine desire to protect the status quo. 
Meanwhile, the government could continue to increase its chances of political success. 
Crucially, neither agency nor government acted to mitigate the benefit they derived so 
as to return both parties to a position of little or no benefit. To argue otherwise is to 
accept that political parties can use the instruments of the state to entrench their 
positions in office; much like gerrymandering. With regard to the Petrov affair and the 
1954 election, the conduct of ASIO and the Menzies Government indicates that there 
was a desire to benefit from the circumstances but also a conscious recognition of the 
risk involved in being seen to capitalise on them. Had Spry and Menzies orchestrated 
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the Petrov defection – an unjustifiable argument – it would have made more sense to 
allow enough time for a royal commission to destroy Labor’s credibility or that of a 
first-term Labor government. By the mid-1960s the relationship of convenience 
between ASIO and the Coalition had become established practise. ASIO’s anti-
communism had become much wider in scope to include radicals in general. Naturally, 
the Coalition in office would aid this expanded mission. It was also evident that ASIO 
feared what a Labor government might render to it.  
 
Despite its flaws, the Royal Commission seems to have improved ASIO by refocusing it 
on actual threats to the commonwealth, not political parties. Hope’s key 
recommendations went to the issue of clarity. He believed that the minister and director-
general needed to have certainty as to the correct processes. Most importantly of all, the 
process must allow the director-general to determine what constituted a security matter. 
This did not fully eventuate. As we have seen, Hope was well aware of the deficiencies 
of ASIO, especially its partisanship. Hope also changed his mind later believing that the 
Parliament was right to begin overseeing ASIO in the 1980s. But by not considering 
history and avoiding serious philosophical debate within the Royal Commission itself, 
serious questions remain on the legitimacy of domestic intelligence gathering. In the 
end, it was politics that bent to the will of the system because it was the emergence of 
bipartisanship that meant the conflicts of the 1950s and 1960s would not arise in later 
decades.  
 
This thesis touches on many underlying debates. Although these have not been 
discussed at any great length – since there is much work on this subject – it is worth 
reflecting, briefly, on where the thesis falls in them. Firstly, there is obviously a fine line 
between domestic intelligence gathering that prepares government for various 
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eventualities that may result in harm being rendered to citizens and governmental 
interference in the democratic exchange. What the history of RCIS shows is that 
governments are far more likely to see the line fall well inside the territory of the latter. 
Conceivably, a non-violent democratic movement could use the entrenched processes to 
bring about revolution of the kind that would displace the interests of those who benefit 
from the status quo. It is understandable that a compulsion toward self-preservation 
within the existing system, like the reactionary ASIO of old, could re-emerge.  
 
Secondly, this thesis demonstrates that the Whitlam Government brought about the 
salvation of ASIO and domestic intelligence gathering in Australia. Had Labor come to 
power with an clandestine intention to rid Australia of such activities, it could have 
done so. This goes to the history of the government in general and raises the question, 
was it the radical, idealistic government of collective imagination? There is also a 
broader question about the extent of democracy in Australia given the history of 
suppression of radical opinion, regardless of the valuable these opinions have. It is 
perhaps instructive that despite leading an armed fascist movement, Blamey became 
Australia’s only Field Marshall and Morshead became President of the Bank of New 
South Wales (now Westpac). 
 
Thirdly, Intelligence and security have become second nature to Australians and anyone 
else in the US ‘hub and spokes’ system. To argue for the abolition of ASIO in the 
present time is unpalatable; for good reason. The neoliberal phenomenon of 
globalisation means that targets of terrorism are, as Nixon feared, ubiquitous. Any 
citizen or corporation or NGO located overseas can be seen as an extension of a targeted 
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government; all it takes is a careless comment by a public official.972 It is often 
overlooked that governments have a clear role in provoking terrorism, including within 
in society, though many may wish to believe this threat comes purely from the mental 
illness, barbarity and jealousy of others. In 2010, the former director general of MI5, 
Eliza Manningham-Buller, told the Chilcot Inquiry that she had warned the Blair 
Government (1997-2007) that involvement in the Iraq War would result in higher levels 
of home-grown terrorism.973 She was of course vindicated. It must be said that ASIO 
has done well so far to keep the Australian Government and citizenry from the kind of 
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